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Abstract 
My placement for the Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology (MAE) degree was 
with the Zoonoses, Foodborne and Emerging Infectious Diseases section (ZoFE), 
within the Office of Health Protection, Australian Government Department of Health. 
This placement has allowed me to apply the skills and knowledge of the epidemiology 
of infectious diseases acquired throughout my degree. I focused on the following four 
core projects. 
In 2013 I was part of a team that investigated an outbreak of foodborne gastroenteritis 
linked to a buffet meal served at a Canberra restaurant. The cohort study and 
environmental and laboratory investigations suggested that a breakdown in 
cleanliness, temperature control and food handling practices resulted in contamination 
of the buffet food. Our investigation resulted in public health actions, such as repairs to 
the kitchen of the implicated restaurant, staff training and the development of food 
business management plans, to limit the potential for such an outbreak to occur in the 
future. 
My review of the National Enhanced Listeriosis Surveillance System (NELSS) found 
that it had been invaluable in listeriosis surveillance in Australia since 2010. It has been 
used not only to detect clusters and outbreaks but has also assisted in the identification 
and investigation of possible sources of these outbreaks. NELSS is viewed as valuable 
with a high level of acceptability by the users of the system, despite limitations 
including a lack of understanding of system capabilities, duplication of data entry and 
the system not storing all available data. This review highlights the effectiveness of 
enhanced surveillance for a foodborne disease, though improvements are needed. 
As there is no reliable treatment for Australian Bat lyssavirus (ABLV) or rabies virus 
infection upon the onset of symptoms, treatment must occur as either pre or post-
exposure prophylaxis. The National Human Rabies Immunoglobulin Database records 
information of people who have received Human Rabies Immunoglobulin (HRIg) in 
Australia as part of post-exposure prophylaxis treatment. Between 1 January 2010 and 
31 December 2013, 3,003 individuals received HRIg for potential exposures to ABLV or 
rabies virus. A third received HRIg due to potential exposures to ABLV occurring in 
Australia. The current messaging for the risks of ABLV infection from bats in Australia 
should be reviewed and revised to ensure that it is appropriately targeted and effective. 
Two thirds of people received HRIg for potential exposures to the rabies virus 
overseas. Most occurred in Indonesia and most due to exposure to monkeys. We need 
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to continue to warn of the risk of potential exposure to rabies virus when travelling 
overseas, particularly to Indonesia. 
Q fever is a zoonosis that has a wide range of reservoirs in Australia. In humans the 
disease can manifest as either acute febrile illness or chronic illness that may affect the 
heart or liver. The Australian Government funded the National Q fever Management 
Program (NQFMP) from 2000 to 2006, which provided screening and vaccination for 
target high risk groups. We found notified Q fever cases were predominately male, 
aged 40 to 59 years, who resided in Queensland or New South Wales. Interestingly the 
age of notified Q fever cases and the proportion of cases that were female both 
increased over time. It may be time to re-evaluate the at-risk groups recommended for 
Q fever vaccination as per the Australian Immunisation Handbook. Additionally, there 
may be a place for an agreed and consistent enhanced dataset for collection at the 
jurisdictional level or at the national level to better understand the epidemiology of 
Q fever in Australia.  
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Summary of Core Competencies 
 
MAE Competency Chapter 2 
Outbreak 
Associated 
with Buffet 
Lunch 
Chapter 3 
Review of 
NELSS 
Chapter 4 
National 
HRIg 
Database 
Chapter 5 
Epidemiology 
of Q fever in 
Australia 
Chapter 6 
Teaching 
Experiences 
Investigate an acute public health problem or threat (typically a 
disease outbreak);  
    
Evaluate a surveillance system or other health information system      
Analyse a public health dataset such as surveillance data      
Design and conduct an epidemiological study      
Preparation of an advanced draft of a paper for publication in a 
national or international peer-reviewed journal  
    
A literature review that demonstrates skills in conducting a targeted 
literature search and synthesis 
     
An abstract and oral presentation of the project at national or 
international scientific conference 
     
A relevant report on the project to a non-scientific audience.      
Prepare and deliver a lesson from the field (LFF)      
Prepare and conduct a case study for first year MAE students or other 
epidemiology training program 
     
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Chapter 1 - MAE Experience 
During the Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology (MAE) program my field 
placement was with the Zoonoses, Foodborne and Emerging Infectious Diseases 
section, Office of Health Protection, Australian Government Department of Health. This 
was located in Canberra, Australian Capital Territory. A few highlights of my placement 
are detailed below. 
Working for the Australian Government provides a unique perspective, as you have 
access to the national picture. During my MAE placement I was fortunate enough to be 
directly involved with the Governmental responses to the emergence of the Middle 
Eastern Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus and the Ebolavirus Disease (EVD) 
outbreak in West Africa. My roles included writing briefings, responding to requests for 
information, attending meetings, developing questionnaires, establishing surveillance 
databases, and developing a script for the Public Health Information line for members 
of the Australian general public who have enquiries about EVD. These were very 
rewarding experiences and helped to develop my communication skills, particularly 
when writing for different audiences. 
The other unique opportunity that an MAE placement in Australian Government 
provides is seeing your work developed into public health policy and action. One such 
occurrence for me was my analysis of Australia’s Human Rabies Immunoglobulin 
usage. My analysis fed directly into information cards developed for travellers and an 
information page on the Department of Health’s website, warning of the dangers of 
rabies virus infection and injuries from animals, particularly monkeys, when travelling 
overseas. 
Another facet of my placement that I enjoyed were the opportunities to communicate 
and engage with a wide range of stakeholders, from state and territory epidemiologists, 
to other Australian Government Departments such as the Department of Agriculture, 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and even international stakeholders. From 
participating in high level meetings on public health events of international/national 
concern to presenting to international delegations, and at national conferences and 
meetings. These opportunities allowed me to see other perspectives and delve deeper 
into the machinations of governments and politics. 
The last unique opportunity I wanted to mention, was my role as an associate editor for 
the Department of Health’s peer reviewed journal, Communicable Diseases 
Intelligence (CDI). There is nothing quite like editing and reviewing the work of others 
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to improve your own writing. Not only did this role improve my own work, it also 
provided valuable skills in critical feedback. It was highly rewarding and something I will 
seek to continue into the future.
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Chapter 2 - Outbreak of 
Gastrointestinal Illness Associated 
with Buffet Lunch 
2.1 Prologue 
2.1.1 Study rationale 
To identify the cause of a reported gastrointestinal illness outbreak associated with a 
buffet lunch at a restaurant in Canberra, May 2013, and implement appropriate public 
health measures to prevent further cases. 
2.1.2 My role 
I was part of an outbreak investigation team and undertook the following tasks: 
 interviews of buffet lunch attendees; 
 data entry, cleaning and analysis; 
 input into epidemiological study design; 
 report and manuscript writing; 
 participation in ACT Health Protection Service Acute Response Team meetings. 
2.1.3 Lessons learnt 
This was my first experience being among the action for an outbreak investigation. 
Something I learnt early on was the need for clear and accurate communication among 
those involved in the outbreak investigation. This was particularly important for those 
conducting interviews, as we needed to know who was interviewing which groups so as 
not to double up on work. 
Additionally, it was important to have open and clear communication between the 
epidemiological, laboratory and environmental investigators. At times, communication 
was limited, which slowed the investigation. Had communication been open and free-
flowing from the start, the epidemiological team may have been able to suggest what 
environmental samples and kitchen staff swabs could have been taken. Additionally, 
the preliminary findings of the environmental investigation could have aided the 
epidemiological investigation. Another important lesson here was that you cannot test 
food if there are no leftovers. In terms of completing the ‘outbreak story’ it would have 
been beneficial to be able to test leftover samples of the epidemiologically implicated 
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food items. This is not always possible in outbreak situations, especially when 
attendees had complained to the proprietor about their illness and restaurant staff had 
thrown out food, namely prawns, which they believed was the cause of the outbreak. 
During interviews, the need to listen carefully and engage with interviewees was 
imperative. By being able to listen and engage with an interviewee, additional 
information that would otherwise be missed was elucidated. It was through this 
listening and engagement that we identified the need to modify the questionnaire as 
the investigation progressed (three seating locations versus two). 
Regarding data entry and analysis, a few lessons were learned. We had multiple 
people entering data into our centralised datasheet. This led to a few data entry and 
coding issues that needed to be rectified prior to analysis. In the future only having one 
person enter data and set field parameters (not free text) would be beneficial to help 
eliminate any issues; however, setting these up is time consuming in an outbreak 
situation. During the analysis, Epi Info 7 was found to be a good tool for rapid analysis, 
but, the version that was used at the time did have some limitations. These included 
slowing when multiple tools were open in the analysis gadget and not being able to 
change the dataset once an analysis had been initiated. When using Stata to conduct 
the multivariate analysis, I detected differences in the coding required between version 
10 (used at work) and version 12 (personal copy). Whilst the difference was minor 
(version 10 required “xi:” to be placed at the start of the logistic regression coding) it 
was significant as without it the multivariate analysis would not run. 
One of the more important lessons learned from this investigation was the need to 
have a good relationships with the laboratory team. The investigation highlighted the 
importance of understanding how samples were collected, how tests are conducted 
and what the results mean. Additionally, participating in laboratory site visits after the 
outbreak investigation further assisted with my understanding of the laboratory side of 
the investigation. 
This outbreak investigation was a perfect example of how quickly an outbreak can start 
and end. Attendees were ill within an hour of consuming food from the buffet, with 
people mostly recovering within 48 hours. The self-limiting nature of the illness resulted 
in those who were ill not seeking medical attention and only two stool samples were 
submitted. This combined with food being thrown out, and few environmental 
samples/swabs being taken, potentially limited the findings of the outbreak 
investigation.  
13 
 
Another lesson from this investigation was the length of time it can take to get a 
manuscript approved for submission to a journal, particularly when you have to get 
approval from other workplaces. There are particular sensitivities that can arise during 
outbreak investigations, particularly when these investigations can result in prosecution 
cases. This did have an impact on our manuscript, and as such it was necessary to 
reduce the risk of identification, or mis-identification, of the implicated premises.  
2.1.4 Public health implications of this work 
Multiple food items were implicated during the outbreak investigation, which illustrates 
the risks posed by cross-contamination, temperature abuse and/or poor food handling 
practices during buffet style meals. The publication of a manuscript in a peer review 
journal adds to the evidence for the risks of catering for large groups, particularly when 
such functions are not a regular occurrence for a particular venue or caterer. 
The environmental and epidemiological investigations resulted in Improvement Notices 
and a Prohibition Order being served on the premises. These resulted in improved 
kitchen facilities, training for staff, and development and implementation of a food 
business management plan that together would reduce the risk of such an outbreak 
occurring again in the future. 
2.1.5 Acknowledgements 
I wish to acknowledge the following persons and organisations for their assistance with 
the investigation: Bridget O’Connor, Martyn Kirk and Emily Fearnley at the National 
Centre for Epidemiology & Population Health, ANU; Katrina Knope and Rhonda Owen 
at the Australian Government Department of Health; April Roberts-Witteveen, Cameron 
Moffatt and staff at the Communicable Disease Control section, ACT Health Protection 
Service; Keith Rogers, Andrew Kaye and the Environmental Health officers at the ACT 
Health Protection Service; Radomir Krsteski and staff at the ACT Government 
Analytical Laboratory; Karina Kennedy and staff at ACT Pathology, The Canberra 
Hospital; and John Coventry and staff at the Microbiological Diagnostic Unit, 
Melbourne, Victoria. 
2.1.6 Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology core activity requirement 
 Investigate an acute public health problem or threat (typically a disease outbreak); 
 Preparation of an advanced draft of a paper for publication in a national or 
international peer-reviewed journal (Appendix 1).  
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2.2 Abstract 
In May 2013, an outbreak of gastrointestinal illness occurred following a Mother’s Day 
buffet lunch at a restaurant in Canberra, Australia. An investigation was conducted to 
identify the cause of illness and to implement appropriate public health measures to 
prevent further disease. 
We conducted a retrospective cohort study via telephone interviews, using a structured 
questionnaire developed from the restaurant buffet menu. A case was defined as 
someone who ate the buffet lunch at the restaurant on 12 May 2013 and developed 
any symptoms of gastrointestinal illness (such as diarrhoea, abdominal pain and 
nausea) following the consumption of food.  
A total of 74% (225/303) of known attendees were interviewed, of whom 56% 
(125/225) became ill. The median incubation period and duration of illness were 13 and 
19 hours respectively. The most commonly reported symptoms were diarrhoea (94%, 
118/125) and abdominal pain (82%, 103/125). A toxin mediated gastrointestinal illness 
was suspected based on the incubation period, duration of illness and the symptoms. 
The environmental health investigation identified a lack of designated hand washing 
facilities in the kitchen, an absence of thermometers for measuring food temperatures 
and several maintenance and minor cleaning issues. A number of food samples were 
taken for microbiological analysis. Multivariable analysis showed that illness was 
significantly associated with consuming curried prawns (OR 18.4, 95% CI 8.6-39.3, 
p <0.01) and Caesar salad (OR 3.6, 95% CI 1.8-7.5, p <0.01). Enterotoxin-producing 
Staphylococcus aureus and Bacillus cereus were identified in leftover samples of 
cooked buffet food, but this food was not epidemiologically implicated. 
The results of the investigation indicated that a breakdown in cleanliness, temperature 
control and food handling practices resulted in contamination of the buffet food. In 
order to prevent such outbreaks in the future, caterers and restaurateurs need to 
ensure they have the appropriate facilities and procedures in place if planning to cater 
for large groups. 
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2.3 Introduction 
In 2006, it was estimated that there were 5.4 million cases of gastroenteritis originating 
from contaminated food in Australia (1) at a cost of over $1.2 billion per annum (2). In 
2010, 42% (64/154) of the outbreaks investigated by OzFoodNet, Australia’s foodborne 
disease surveillance network, were associated with restaurants and commercial 
caterers, affecting over 880 people (3). 
Catering for large numbers of patrons can put added pressure on food preparation 
systems, particularly if such functions are not a regular occurrence for a particular 
venue or caterer (4). A total of 17 outbreaks associated with buffet style meals have 
been investigated by OzFoodNet since 2000, two of which were specifically associated 
with Mother’s Day functions (OzFoodNet Outbreak Register. August 2013, unpublished 
data). 
Staphylococcus aureus (S. aureus) and Bacillus cereus (B. cereus), in particular their 
enterotoxins, are known causes of foodborne illness in Australia and around the world. 
In Australia, between 1995 and 2009, S. aureus and B. cereus caused 17 and eight 
investigated outbreaks respectively, affecting over 500 people (5, 6). Outbreaks due to 
these organisms and their enterotoxins are underreported due to the self-limiting nature 
of disease, people not seeking medical care and submitting stool samples and the fact 
that neither disease is nationally notifiable in Australia (7, 8). 
Under the right environmental conditions, such as inadequate cooking, reheating or 
storage of food, inadequate cooling and temperature abuse, both these bacteria can 
produce enterotoxins (8-12). With S. aureus, illness is associated with the consumption 
of preformed enterotoxin. Symptoms include diarrhoea, abdominal pain and vomiting 
with severity and incubation period (ranging from 30 minutes to eight hours) depending 
on the amount of enterotoxin ingested and individual susceptibility (11). The 
enterotoxins can survive in conditions, such as heat treatment, freezing and drying, that 
would otherwise kill the enterotoxin-producing bacteria (11).  
B. cereus differs to S. aureus in that there are two distinct types of the foodborne 
illness. The emetic syndrome is caused by the ingestion of preformed enterotoxin and 
has an incubation period of one to five hours (12). The diarrhoeal syndrome is caused 
by ingestion of viable cells or spores that produce enterotoxins in the gut. The 
incubation period is eight to 16 hours with additional symptoms including abdominal 
pain and watery diarrhoea (8). While the enterotoxin is heat sensitive, B. cereus spores 
are activated by cooking procedures, and slow cooling followed by inadequate storage 
can lead to the proliferation of viable cells (9). With both pathogens, illness is self-
limiting and cases will usually recover within 12 to 48 hours; death is rare (12). 
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On 13 May 2013, the ACT Health Protection Service received complaints of 
gastrointestinal illness from three separate groups who attended the same venue for a 
Mother’s Day buffet lunch on 12 May 2013 at a restaurant in Canberra, Australia. 
Following an Acute Response Team meeting, an investigation was launched to identify 
the cause of illness and implement appropriate public health measures to prevent 
further cases. 
2.4 Methods 
2.4.1 Study type 
Initial interviewing of complainants using a hypothesis generating questionnaire 
indicated that cases had attended the Mother’s Day buffet lunch at a particular 
restaurant in Canberra on the same day.  
We conducted a retrospective cohort study via telephone interview using a structured 
questionnaire developed from the restaurant buffet menu. The restaurant’s booking list 
and interviews of known attendees were used to identify restaurant patrons on the day 
of the outbreak.  
2.4.2 Case definition 
A case was defined as a person who ate the Mother’s Day buffet lunch at the 
restaurant on 12 May 2013 and developed any symptoms of gastrointestinal illness 
(such as diarrhoea, abdominal pain or nausea) following the consumption of food.  
Eleven staff were excluded from the analysis as they did not consume the buffet food 
and none became ill. 
2.4.3 Data collection 
All identified attendees were interviewed using a structured paper-based questionnaire 
(Appendix 2), which itemised food available on the day of the buffet lunch. Interviews 
were conducted by trained interviewers via telephone with attendees or with a family 
contact where an attendee was too young to be interviewed (<16 years). The interview 
included questions about onset of illness, symptoms of illness and consumption of 
specific foods from the buffet lunch. 
Phone numbers for groups who attended the Mother’s Day buffet lunch were obtained 
from the restaurants handwritten booking list. The number listed was usually the 
person who had booked for the entire group. During interviews with these people, 
contact details were requested for the other members of their group. 
If calls were not answered, messages requesting individuals to call back the ACT 
Health Protection Service were only left on answering machines if a person was 
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identified correctly. We stopped trying to contact individuals if we were unsuccessful 
after a maximum of six attempts. 
Data from the paper-based questionnaires were entered into Microsoft Excel 2010 and 
preliminary data cleaning was performed. 
2.4.4 Epidemiological investigation 
Descriptive and statistical analysis of the data were conducted using Epi Info version 
7.1.1.14 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, USA) and Stata intercooled 
version 10 (Stata Corp, Collage Station, TX, USA). Gender was compared using a Chi 
squared test and age was compared using a Wilcoxon rank sum test. 
All cases with complete food histories were included in the univariable and 
multivariable analyses. In a univariable analysis, we compared food exposures among 
those who were ill to those who were not and generated crude risk ratios (RR), 95 % 
confidence intervals (CI) and calculated p values. We constructed an initial 
multivariable logistic regression model including food items with p values <0.1 in the 
univariable analysis, as well as age group, gender and seating location. Non-
statistically significant variables (p >0.05) were then removed from the model using a 
backward stepwise elimination method. Likelihood ratio tests were used to determine 
for each removed exposure variable whether it was significantly associated with being 
a case, whilst adjusting for potential confounding caused by other variables in the 
model (p <0.05).  
The final model included statistically significant food items and gender, and generated 
adjusted odds ratios (OR), with 95 % CI and p values. A likelihood ratio test was 
conducted on the initial and final models and Hosmer and Lemeshow test was carried 
out to test model fit. 
2.4.5 Environmental investigation 
Environmental Health Officers from the ACT Health Protection Service visited the 
implicated restaurant on 14 May 2013, following the complaints received by ACT 
Health on 13 May 2013. During this inspection, samples of leftover foods were taken 
for laboratory testing. Three samples of each food were taken as per statutory 
sampling requirements. Follow-up inspections of the premises were conducted on 16, 
21, 23, and 31 May and 7 June 2013. 
2.4.6 Laboratory investigation 
Food samples were tested by the microbiology unit of the ACT Government Analytical 
Laboratory (ACTGAL), ACT Health Protection Service, Holder, Australian Capital 
Territory. All food samples were initially tested for the presence of Salmonella spp., 
Listeria monocytogenes (L. monocytogenes), Escherichia coli (E. coli), coagulase-
18 
 
positive staphylococci (S. aureus), B. cereus and a Standard Plate Count (SPC) was 
undertaken.  
Coagulase-positive staphylococci (S. aureus) were selected for using inoculated rabbit 
fibrogen supplement (Oxoid) added to Baird Parker agar (Oxoid). 
B. cereus were differentially selected by growth on mannitol, egg-yolk, polymixin (MYP) 
agar (Oxoid) plates. Presumptive B. cereus colonies were then streaked onto sheep 
blood agar plates (Oxoid) to check for haemolysis. Presumptive B. cereus colonies 
were fixed onto microscope slides for spore staining using a simplified Wirtz-Conklin 
method (13) to confirm the presence of B. cereus spores. 
B. cereus and coagulase-positive staphylococci (S. aureus) isolated from food samples 
were sent to the Microbiological Diagnostic Unit (MDU) Public Health Laboratory, The 
University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, for further testing. Cultures of B. cereus 
and coagulase-positive staphylococci were grown in heart infusion broth at 37°C for 24 
hours. Cells were removed from the growth broth by centrifugation (3,000 rpm for 15 
minutes, Labfuge 200 Heraeus Sepatech, Germany) and the supernatant fluid was 
used for toxin analysis. The presence of bacillus diarrhoeal enterotoxin (BDE), was 
determined using a 3M Tecra BDE visual immunoassay kit (3M Food Safety, product 
No: BDEVIA48), where 5 mL of culture supernatant fluid was mixed with 50 uL of kit 
sample additive prior to analysis. The presence of staphylococcal enterotoxin (SET) 
was determined using a 3M Tecra SET visual immunoassay kit (3M Food Safety, 
product No: SETVIA48), where 1 mL of culture supernatant fluid was mixed with 50 uL 
of kit sample additive prior to analysis. Analyses for BDE and SET were performed in 
accordance with the kit manufacturers’ instructions, using a microplate reader 
(ThermoMax, Molecular Devices, USA). 
Stool samples from two ill attendees were examined for a range of foodborne 
pathogens by the ACT Pathology at the Canberra Hospital, Garran, Australian Capital 
Territory. Standard bacterial cultures were set up to test for the presence of 
Campylobacter, Shigella and Salmonella. Antigen tests were conducted for the 
detection of rotavirus and norovirus and direct microscopy was used to search for the 
presence of blood cells (white/red) and parasites. These stool samples were forwarded 
to MDU for BDE and SET analysis, using the same kits as used for the food toxin 
testing described above. 
2.4.7 Ethics 
Ethics approval was not sought for this investigation as the data were collected for the 
purpose of public health surveillance under public health legislation (14).  
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2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Epidemiological investigation 
Interviews were conducted between 13 and 27 May 2013. The majority of interviews 
were completed on the first attempt however, some required multiple call backs. We 
interviewed 74% (225/303) of known attendees. Reasons for not being able to contact 
the remaining known attendees (n=78) include wrong numbers, unable to contact or 
not willing to participate in the investigation. 
Of those interviewed, 56% (125/225) became ill (Table 1). None of those ill were 
hospitalised. The median age of the cohort (n=225) was 33 years (range 1 to 88 years) 
and 53% (n=119) were female. The median age for those ill was 40 years (range 2 to 
88 years) and the median age for those not ill was 29 years (range 1 to 87 years) 
(Table 1). Males were more likely to be ill (Crude RR 1.27 CI 1.0-1.6, p <0.05) and 
there was no statistically significant difference in age (p >0.05) between those ill and 
not ill. 
Initially, we were informed by restaurant staff that all food was served from a single 
buffet location, however, interviews revealed that food for the buffet lunch was served 
in three different locations and all received the same food from the same kitchen. No 
significant difference was observed in seating location between those who were ill and 
those who were not (p >0.5). 
Ninety-four per cent (118/125) of those ill reported experiencing diarrhoea, of which 
79% (93/118) experienced three or more episodes of diarrhoea in 24 hours, and 82% 
(103/125) of those ill reported abdominal pain (Table 1). The median incubation period 
was 13 hours (range of 1 to 33 hours) and the median duration of illness was 19 hours 
(range of 1 to 55 hours).  
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Table 1: Counts (N) and percentages of demographic characteristics and symptoms of 
those ill and not ill following a Mother’s Day buffet, ACT, May 2013. 
  Ill Not ill 
  N % N % 
Interviewed 125 56 100 44 
Gender         
Male 66 53 39 39 
Female 59 47 60 60 
Gender unknown     1 1 
Age         
Median age (years) 39   29   
0-19 17 14 41 41 
20-39 43 34 28 28 
40-59 35 28 12 12 
60+ 21 17 16 16 
Age unknown 9 7 3 3 
Symptoms         
Diarrhoea 118 94     
Abdominal pain 103 82     
3 or more diarrhoea in 24hrs 93 74     
Fatigue 40 32     
Nausea 38 30     
Headache 19 15     
Chills 15 12     
Fever 11 9     
Vomiting 11 9     
Muscle aches 9 7     
Other symptoms* 6 5     
2 or more vomiting in 24hrs 5 4     
Bloody diarrhoea 5 4     
*Other symptoms included cough, back pain and report of ‘being warmer than usual’. 
The epidemic curve was indicative of a point source outbreak, with a short incubation 
period and tight clustering of cases over time (Figure 1). A toxin-mediated 
gastrointestinal illness was suspected based on the incubation period, duration of 
illness and symptoms. 
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Figure 1: Epidemiological curve of case onset dates and times following a Mother’s Day buffet, ACT, May 2013 (n=120)*. 
* Five cases excluded due to missing onset times.   
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The univariable analysis was conducted on 222 attendees, as three attendees (two ill 
and one not ill) were excluded due to missing food histories. 
In the univariable analysis, multiple foods were found to be significantly associated with 
illness (Table 2). Initially, we suspected that risks may vary by seating location, and 
analysis showed this to be the case when exposures were stratified; Location 1 
(Table 3), Location 2 (Table 4) and Location 3 (Table 5). As we subsequently identified 
that all seating locations served the same food from the same kitchen, seating location 
was removed from the analysis. 
Table 2: Univariable analysis of risk factors for foodborne illness following a Mother’s 
Day buffet lunch, ACT, May 2013 (n=222). 
Food eaten Exposed Unexposed Crude 
RR 
95% CI p value 
Cases Total AR Cases Total AR 
Curried prawns 92 104 88% 31 118 26% 3.4 2.5-4.6 <0.01 
Caesar salad 95 135 70% 27 86 31% 2.2 1.6-3.1 <0.01 
Sweet & sour pork 103 151 68% 20 70 29% 2.4 1.6-3.5 <0.01 
Beef stroganoff 91 135 67% 31 84 37% 1.8 1.4-2.5 <0.01 
Rice 111 181 61% 12 40 30% 2.0 1.3-3.3 <0.01 
Corn cobs 71 111 64% 52 111 47% 1.4 1.1-1.7 0.01 
Orange & almond cake 55 83 66% 68 139 49% 1.4 1.1-1.7 0.01 
Roast chicken 74 118 63% 49 103 48% 1.3 1.0-1.7 0.02 
Chat potatoes 72 119 61% 50 102 49% 1.2 1.0-1.6 0.09 
Blueberry cheesecake 74 127 58% 49 95 52% 1.1 0.9-1.4 0.32 
Bread rolls 89 165 54% 34 57 60% 0.9 0.7-1.2 0.46 
Condiments 16 31 52% 106 190 56% 0.9 0.6-1.3 0.67 
Sausages 68 124 55% 55 98 56% 1.0 0.8-1.2 0.85 
AR = Attack rate 
RR = Risk ratio 
CI = Confidence interval  
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Table 3: Univariable analysis of risk factors for foodborne illness for those sitting in 
Location 1 following a Mother’s Day buffet lunch, ACT, May 2013 (n=52). 
Food Eaten Exposed Unexposed Crud
e RR 
95% CI p value 
Cases Total AR Cases Total AR 
Curried prawns 20 25 80% 7 27 26% 3.1 1.6-6.0 <0.01 
Sweet & sour pork 25 36 69% 2 16 13% 5.6 1.5-20.7 <0.01 
Caesar salad 22 28 79% 5 24 21% 3.8 1.7-8.4 <0.01 
Rice 22 41 54% 5 11 45% 1.2 0.6-2.4 0.32 
Beef stroganoff 19 30 63% 7 21 33% 1.9 1.0-3.7 0.02 
Corn cobs 11 16 69% 16 36 44% 1.6 0.9-2.5 0.06 
Orange & almond cake 10 13 77% 17 39 44% 1.8 1.1-2.8 0.02 
Roast chicken 18 29 62% 9 23 39% 1.6 0.9-2.8 0.06 
Chat potatoes 15 22 68% 11 29 38% 1.8 1.0-3.1 0.02 
Blueberry cheesecake 22 37 59% 5 15 33% 1.8 0.8-3.8 0.05 
Sausages 14 30 47% 13 22 59% 0.8 0.5-1.3 0.20 
Bread rolls 14 33 42% 13 19 68% 0.6 0.4-1.0 0.04 
Condiments 3 6 50% 24 46 52% 1.0 0.4-2.2 0.46 
AR = Attack rate 
RR = Risk ratio 
CI = Confidence interval 
Table 4: Univariable analysis of risk factors for foodborne illness for those sitting in 
Location 2 following a Mother’s Day buffet lunch, ACT, May 2013 (n=40). 
Food Eaten Exposed Unexposed Crude 
RR 
95% CI p value 
Cases Total AR Cases Total AR 
Curried prawns 21 25 84% 4 15 27% 3.2 1.3-7.4 <0.01 
Sweet & sour pork 23 33 70% 2 7 29% 2.4 0.7-8.0 0.03 
Caesar salad 20 27 74% 5 13 38% 1.9 0.9-4.0 0.02 
Rice 25 39 64% 0 1 0% 0.0 N/A 0.38 
Beef stroganoff 20 31 65% 5 9 56% 1.2 0.6-2.2 0.32 
Corn cobs 19 27 70% 6 13 46% 1.5 0.8-2.9 0.08 
Orange & almond cake 16 25 64% 9 15 60% 1.1 0.6-1.8 0.40 
Roast chicken 20 27 74% 5 12 42% 1.8 0.9-3.6 0.03 
Chat potatoes 20 27 7% 5 13 38% 1.9 0.9-4.0 0.02 
Blueberry cheesecake 17 26 65% 8 14 57% 1.1 0.7-2.0 0.31 
Sausages 16 23 70% 9 17 53% 1.3 0.8-2.2 0.15 
Bread rolls 22 35 63% 3 5 60% 1.0 0.5-2.2 0.45 
Condiments 9 11 82% 16 29 55% 1.5 1.0-2.3 0.07 
AR = Attack rate 
RR = Risk ratio 
CI = Confidence interval  
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Table 5: Univariable analysis of risk factors for foodborne illness for those sitting in 
Location 3 following a Mother’s Day buffet lunch, ACT, May 2013 (n=130). 
Food Eaten Exposed Unexposed Crude 
RR 
95% CI p value 
Cases Total AR Cases Total AR 
Curried prawns 51 54 94% 20 76 26% 3.6 2.5-5.3 <0.01 
Sweet & sour pork 55 82 67% 16 47 34% 2.0 1.3-3.0 <0.01 
Caesar salad 53 80 66% 17 49 35% 1.9 1.3-2.9 <0.01 
Rice 64 101 63% 7 28 25% 2.5 1.3-4.9 <0.01 
Beef stroganoff 52 74 70% 19 54 35% 2.0 1.3-3.0 <0.01 
Corn cobs 41 68 60% 30 62 48% 1.3 0.9-1.7 0.09 
Orange & almond cake 29 45 64% 42 85 49% 1.3 1.0-1.8 0.05 
Roast chicken 36 62 58% 35 68 51% 1.1 0.8-1.5 0.23 
Chat potatoes 37 70 53% 34 60 57% 0.9 0.7-1.3 0.33 
Blueberry cheesecake 35 64 55% 36 66 55% 1.0 0.7-1.4 0.49 
Sausages 38 71 54% 33 59 56% 1.0 0.7-1.3 0.39 
Bread rolls 53 97 55% 18 33 55% 1.0 0.7-1.4 0.50 
Condiments 4 14 29% 66 115 57% 0.5 0.2-1.2 0.02 
AR = Attack rate 
RR = Risk ratio 
CI = Confidence interval 
The final model for multivariable logistic regression included data from 220 attendees 
(Table 6). In the multivariable analysis, consuming curried prawns (OR 18.4) and 
Caesar salad (OR 3.6) were significantly associated (p <0.05) with illness after 
adjusting for gender. When comparing gender and food consumption, ill males had 
higher odds (OR 1.9) of having consumed the curried prawns and Caesar salad 
compared with ill females, though this was not statistically significant (p >0.05). 
The likelihood ratio test (p <0.05) and the Hosmer and Lemeshow test (p >0.05) 
indicated that the final model fitted the data well. 
Table 6: Multivariable analysis of risk factors for foodborne illness following a Mother’s 
Day buffet lunch, ACT, May 2013. 
Variable OR 95% CI p value 
Male* 1.9 0.9-3.9 0.08 
Curried prawns 18.4 8.6-39.3 <0.01 
Caesar salad 3.6 1.8-7.5 <0.01 
  *Female was the reference category 
2.5.2 Environmental investigation 
The initial environmental health inspection of the premises found the need for kitchen 
repairs and cleaning of food preparation and non-preparation areas. Additionally, there 
was no dedicated sink for hand washing in the kitchen area. Details of the buffet food 
preparation and equipment used suggested evidence of temperature abuse through 
slow or inadequate cooling and prolonged food storage prior to service. During this 
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inspection, the following samples of leftover foods were taken (Table 7) for laboratory 
testing. 
Table 7: Samples taken by EHO during initial inspection. 
Sample Comments 
Cooked chicken Served in buffet 
Peeled tomatoes in sauce Served at breakfast 
Parboiled chat potatoes Served in buffet 
Raw bacon Served at breakfast 
Hollandaise sauce Used in buffet food 
BBQ sauce Used in buffet food 
Cooking cream Used in buffet food 
 
Following this inspection, two Improvement Notices were issued on 15 May 2013 and 
16 May 2013 respectively. The notices were served due to breaches of the Food Act 
2001 (15) and the Food Standards Code (16).  
This first Improvement Notice required the premises to clean equipment and kitchen 
areas, repair or replace damaged walls, tiles and equipment and install a designated 
hand washing facility in the kitchen area. In total it related to 28 breaches of the Food 
Standards Code. The second Improvement Notice related to a further two breaches of 
the Food Standards Code and a breach of the Food Act 2001, and required the food 
business to provide food thermometers, maintain cleaning and sanitising records and 
develop and implement a Food Safety Program that is complainant with Standard 3.2.1 
of the Food Standards Code.  
On 21 May 2013, a Prohibition Order was served on the premises, to prevent or 
mitigate the threat to public health under section 82 of the Food Act 2001. This order 
stated that the premises was only permitted to serve a la carte meals and were 
prohibited from performing catering services and preparing and serving buffet meals. 
This order was to stay in place until staff had obtained sufficient competence in food 
safety training courses, the business had developed and implemented a food business 
management plan, and the premises had been inspected and found to be compliant on 
a further six occasions. 
Both of the Improvement Notices were revoked on 31 May 2013 and 14 June 2013 
respectively, when all of the non-complaint offences had been rectified. The Prohibition 
Order was lifted on 2 July 2013 as all conditions of the order had been met. 
2.5.3 Laboratory investigation 
Initial laboratory testing of foods by ACTGAL detected coagulase-positive 
staphylococci (S. aureus) and B. cereus in samples of leftover cooked chicken, 
parboiled chat potatoes and raw bacon (Table 8). Samples of the epidemiologically 
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implicated food vehicles, the curried prawns and Caesar salad, were not available for 
testing. 
The user guide that accompanies Standard 1.6.1 – Microbiological limits for food of the 
Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code (16) contains limits for microbiological 
levels for foods for distribution to consumers. Unacceptable microbiological levels for a 
SPC is greater than or equal to 100,000 CFU/g and greater than 1,000 CFU/g for both 
coagulase positive staphylococci (S. aureus) and B. cereus. The cooked chicken and 
Hollandaise sauce both exceeded acceptable microbiological limits for the SPC. The 
cooked chicken exceeded microbiological limits for both coagulase positive 
staphylococci (S. aureus) and B. cereus. The parboiled chat potatoes exceeded 
microbiological limits for B. cereus only. 
Testing at MDU confirmed the presence of both BDE and SET in cultures isolated from 
the cooked chicken and the parboiled chat potatoes. Cultures isolated from the raw 
bacon were negative for S. aureus and B. cereus enterotoxins. 
The first human stool sample was collected at 7:00 pm on 13 May 2013 and the 
second was collected at 10:00 am on 16 May 2013. Upon testing, both were negative 
for Campylobacter, Shigella, Salmonella, norovirus and rotavirus. No blood cells 
(red/white) or parasites were observed. Testing at MDU also found them to be negative 
for BDE and SET. 
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Table 8: ACTGAL food testing results. 
Test Units Cooked 
chicken 
Parboiled 
chat 
potatoes 
Raw 
bacon 
Peeled 
tomato in 
sauce 
Hollandaise 
sauce 
BBQ 
sauce 
Cooking 
cream 
Standard Plate 
Count 
CFU/g 12,000,000* 20,000* 5,500* 34,000* 160,000,000* 100* <50 
Coagulase positive 
staphylococci 
(S. aureus) 
CFU/g 360,000 250 50 <50 <50 <50 <50 
B. cereus CFU/g 340,000 1,200 - - - - - 
E. coli CFU/g <3 <3 <3 <3 <3 <3 <3 
Salmonella Present/Absent Absent Absent Absent Absent Absent Absent Absent 
L. monocytogenes Present/Absent Absent Absent Absent Absent Absent Absent Absent 
*Estimate only  
CFU/g Coli forming units per gram 
The red text indicates results exceeding the Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code microbiological limits for food, SPC ≥100,000 CFU/g, S. aureus 
and B. cereus ≤1,000 CFU/g. 
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2.6 Discussion 
We report a large outbreak of gastrointestinal illness following a Mother’s Day buffet 
lunch at a Canberra restaurant. The environmental health investigation found the need 
for repairs and cleaning at the restaurant. The results of the epidemiological 
investigation showed that illness was significantly associated with the consumption of 
curried prawns and the Caesar salad from the buffet. Microbiological evidence of 
enterotoxin producing B. cereus and S. aureus, two pathogens previously implicated in 
foodborne outbreaks with similar symptom and onset profiles (17, 18), were found in 
leftover cooked food samples (cooked chicken and parboiled chat potatoes) of food 
served in the buffet. However, we were unable to definitively confirm the aetiological 
agent for this outbreak. 
The results of the outbreak investigation suggest that food served at the Mother’s day 
buffet was responsible for the outbreak, and a breakdown in cleanliness, temperature 
control and food handling practices are likely to have been contributing factors. The 
evidence for multiple food items from the buffet menu being contaminated with 
B. cereus and S. aureus suggests there was cross-contamination, adding to the 
evidence for a breakdown in food handling practices, with the resultant implications for 
human health.  
Outbreaks involving buffet style meals, and those specifically associated with Mother’s 
Day functions, have been investigated by OzFoodNet in the past (19-25). This 
investigation highlights the care needed when catering for large groups, particularly 
when such events may not be a regular occurrence for some caterers. Restaurants 
need to ensure they have adequate facilities and training to cater for the numbers at 
such functions, and that they are following their food business management plans and 
food safety procedures in order to limit the potential for such outbreaks to occur. 
2.6.1 Limitations 
Whilst we were unable to contact and or interview all known attendees of the Mother’s 
Day buffet lunch, approximately three quarters of the known attendees were 
interviewed and we have achieved a representative cohort. There is a potential for 
selection bias due to our broad case definition, which would result in bias towards the 
null. However, we are unlikely to have misclassification of those ill due to the rapid 
onset and severity of the gastrointestinal illness symptoms. 
Measurement bias in our study was minimised using validated and standardised 
laboratory testing methods. Interviewer and recall bias were minimised by using a 
structured questionnaire developed around the set Mother’s Day buffet lunch menu 
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with prompts for all buffet food items. Potential cofounders such as age and sex were 
controlled for in our regression analysis.  
A limitation of this study that was out of our control was the lack of samples, 
environmental, food and clinical, for laboratory testing. There were no leftovers of the 
epidemiologically implicated foods, only two stool samples were available for testing 
and no environmental swabs were taken. As the stool samples were collected one and 
four days after the buffet lunch, it is possible that the enterotoxins may have been 
cleared by the individuals at the time of collection. Additionally, the kits used by MDU 
are not validated for the detection of BDE and SET from stool samples. These factors 
contributed towards being unable to definitively confirm the aetiological agent for this 
outbreak. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The incubation period, duration of illness and symptom profile were suggestive of a 
toxin-mediated illness in attendees following a buffet lunch at a Canberra restaurant, 
however, we were unable to definitively confirm the aetiological agent. The results of 
the investigation suggest that a breakdown in cleanliness, temperature control and food 
handling practices have resulted in contamination of the buffet food. In order to prevent 
such outbreaks in the future, caterers need to ensure that staff are adequately trained 
and employing appropriate food preparation and handling practices to reduce potential 
risks when catering for large groups.  
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2.8 Appendices 
Appendix 1: Advanced draft of a paper for publication 
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Appendix 2: Structured questionnaire for the outbreak investigation. 
 
 
                  ID #: -
______________ 
 
Gastrointestinal illness outbreak questionnaire 
(De-identified version) 
SECTION 1: DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
First Name:      Last Name:      
Address:      
      
Telephone: (home)      (mb)      
Date of Birth:              Sex:      
Occupation:      
 
Did you have breakfast or lunch at the implicated restaurant, on Day Month Year?  
 Yes   No    Don’t know. 
If yes, please continue with the questionnaire. If no, you do not need to fill in this questionnaire. 
Please select which sitting you ate your meal:   
 Breakfast  Lunch   Other (specify)         
What time did you eat?       am / pm   Inside  Outside   Other (specify) 
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SECTION 2: SYMPTOMS AND ILLNESS 
Did you have any gastrointestinal illness (such as diarrhoea or vomiting) following your 
breakfast or lunch at the implicated restaurant? 
 Yes   No  (go to Section 4)  Unknown 
Onset date of first symptom:                 Time of onset:      am / pm    
What was your first symptom? ___________________________________ 
Please mark all symptoms   
 Diarrhoea   Blood in diarrhoea  Nausea   Vomiting   Fever    Abdominal pain   
 Chills          Fatigue      Muscle aches  Headaches  Other (specify)       
If you had diarrhoea did you have 3 or more episodes in 24 hr period?    Yes  No  
If you had vomiting did you have 2 or more episodes in a 24hr period?    Yes  No  
Are your symptoms ongoing at the time of this interview?  Yes  No 
OR 
Date of symptoms ceased:                 Time symptoms ceased:      am / pm    
Have any other family members / close contacts who did not eat with you at the implicated 
restaurant been unwell with a similar illness? 
 Yes    
If yes: Name          Relationship          Onset date         
 No   
SECTION 3: TREATMENT AND TESTING 
Did you consult a doctor about your illness?      Yes    No          Unknown 
Name of treating doctor:      
Name / address of practice:      
Emergency Department visit?:  Canberra Hospital  Calvary   Other :      
Were you admitted to hospital overnight?      Yes    No          Unknown 
If yes, please enter date of admission and date of discharge: 
Admission date:                 Discharge date:      
Did you provide a faecal sample for testing?       Yes    No          Unknown 
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SECTION 4: FOODS EATEN AT IMPLICATED RESTAURANT  
Implicated Restaurant Lunch Buffet Menu options 
PLEASE SELECT ANY FOOD / BEVERAGE ITEMS EATEN 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Lunch 
Sweet and sour 
pork  
 Yes  No           Don’t know No. serves 
_____ 
Curried Prawns  Yes  No           Don’t know No. serves 
_____ 
Roast Chicken  Yes  No           Don’t know No. serves 
_____ 
Beef Stroganoff   Yes  No           Don’t know No. serves 
_____ 
Sausages  Yes  No           Don’t know No. serves 
_____ 
Caesar Salad  Yes  No           Don’t know No. serves 
_____ 
Chat Potatoes with 
garlic butter 
 Yes  No           Don’t know No. serves 
_____ 
Corn Cobs  Yes  No           Don’t know No. serves 
_____ 
Bread Rolls  Yes  No           Don’t know No. serves 
_____ 
Condiments  Yes  No           Don’t know No. serves 
_____ 
Rice  Yes  No           Don’t know No. serves 
_____ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Desserts 
Did you have any desserts as part of your meal?     Yes    No        Don’t know 
If yes, 
Blueberry 
Cheesecake  
 
 Yes  No          Don’t know No. serves _____ 
Orange and Almond 
Cake 
 Yes  No          Don’t know No. serves _____ 
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Drinks 
Did you have any drinks with your meal?     Yes    No        Don’t know 
if yes, 
Coffee  Yes  No           Don’t know No. drinks _____ 
Tea  Yes  No           Don’t know No. drinks _____ 
Water  Yes  No           Don’t know No. drinks _____ 
Juice  Yes  No           Don’t know No. drinks _____ 
Soft drink  Yes  No           Don’t know No. drinks _____ 
Wine (Red)  Yes  No           Don’t know No. drinks _____ 
Wine (White)  Yes  No           Don’t know No. drinks _____ 
Beer  Yes  No           Don’t know No. drinks _____ 
Spirits  Yes  No           Don’t know No. drinks _____ 
Other (specify 
below) 
 Yes  No           Don’t know No. drinks _____ 
__________________________________________________________________________Di
Did you eat any other food item(s) not included on the list?       
Any other comments?       
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 Chapter 3 - Review of the National 
Enhanced Listeriosis Surveillance 
System 
3.1 Prologue  
3.1.1 Study rationale 
The purpose of this review was to follow on from work carried out by a previous MAE 
scholar who evaluated the National Enhanced Listeriosis Surveillance System 
(NELSS). NELSS aims to detect and investigate possible clusters of human Listeria 
monocytogenes infections in a timely manner. 
3.1.2 My role 
I was the lead investigator who was responsible for the following tasks: 
 literature review; 
 epidemiological study design; 
 questionnaire design; 
 interview of stakeholders; 
 data entry cleaning and analysis; and 
 stakeholder feedback and report writing. 
3.1.3 Lessons learnt 
This project was a rewarding one in that it provided many challenges that needed 
careful consideration and planning. Whilst I had worked with NELSS previously, 
information gleaned from the interviews and during the analysis stage broadened my 
knowledge of this system. This included finding out that all records entered and edited 
are time and date stamped. 
Whilst I have interviewed people previously for an outbreak investigation, I had not 
been involved in question/survey design before. This was a challenging task, one that 
highlighted the need to ask clear and concise questions and to pre-test any 
questions/surveys in order to ensure participants understand questions the way they 
were intended. The personal nature of a one-on-one interview also allowed me to 
gather more information, in greater detail, than an email-based questionnaire. 
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This project also highlighted to me the importance of having close working relationships 
with stakeholders, particularly when they are asked to participate in ‘unfunded’ work. I 
needed to craft the laboratory staff questions for the interviews and ensure they were 
asked in a manner that was not offensive, in order to engage them and obtain as much 
information as possible.  
Analysing the interview data in itself was a lesson learnt as I was previously unfamiliar 
with qualitative analysis. It was an area I needed to research prior to designing the 
analysis. I think this yielded positive results and I would be interested in learning more 
about this in the future. 
Another lesson learned was the need for clear and concise delivery of information 
when developing the stakeholder report (Appendix 1) and the accompanying 
presentation (Appendix 2), both of which were delivered to OzFoodNet and laboratory 
staff at the 43rd OzFoodNet face-to-face meeting on 22 to 23 July 2014. I received 
positive feedback from those at the meeting and also an invitation to present the report 
to the Public Health Laboratory Network at their face-to-face meeting on 23 September 
2014. Both opportunities allowed me to further develop my presentation skills. The 
feeding back of findings to stakeholders was also an important part of this evaluation 
and should be the last step for any evaluation. I found that this step led to greater 
stakeholder engagement, with many expressing their thanks for the information. The 
stakeholder report appeared to be the first direct feedback, particularly to laboratories, 
on how their data are used and the benefits (outbreak/cluster detection) in doing so. 
3.1.4 Public health implications of this work 
This was a review of Australia’s only enhanced surveillance system for a foodborne 
disease. Whilst it highlights the effectiveness of this system and potential life and costs 
savings through the detection of listeriosis clusters and outbreaks and prevention of 
further cases, improvements are needed. The recommendations made to OzFoodNet 
would allow timelier analysis of data from NELSS, thus resulting in swifter public health 
action. A formal response to the review recommendations was received on 
18 November 2014. Five of the recommendations were agreed to with the rest being 
noted, see Appendix 3 for more details. 
This review raises a number of broader issues regarding timeliness, laboratory testing, 
funding and future typing requirements, not only for this system, but also for enhanced 
surveillance of other diseases should additional systems be developed. These issues 
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also relate to the Communicable Diseases Network Australia (CDNA) discussion paper 
titled Towards a Communicable Disease Control Framework for Australia. 
3.1.5 Acknowledgements 
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3.2 Abstract 
There has been a number of significant listeriosis outbreaks investigated in Australia, 
though it was the 2009 multi-jurisdictional outbreak associated with chicken wraps that 
led to the standardised collection of national listeriosis case definitive laboratory and 
epidemiological data, via the National Enhanced Listeriosis Surveillance System 
(NELSS).  
The purpose of this review was to determine if the only national enhanced surveillance 
system for a foodborne disease, NELSS, is achieving the aims under which it was 
established. OzFoodNet and jurisdictional reference laboratory staff were asked about 
their experiences using NELSS via interviews.  
A retrospective descriptive analysis was conducted on 2010 to 2013 notified human 
listeriosis cases entered into NELSS. In addition to this, time and date stamped data 
were extracted from NELSS to determine the amount of time in days it took to complete 
a record, compared with the timelines proposed in the NELSS conceptual plan. 
Since the establishment of NELSS, a total of 17 clusters or outbreaks of listeriosis have 
been investigated, with approximately half of these being detected through analysis of 
NELSS data. While NELSS has been effective in detecting cluster and outbreaks, only 
12% of all records had definitive laboratory results entered into NELSS within the 
agreed timelines, with over 80% of cases in 2013 not completed within the agreed 
timelines. Additionally, delays in definitive typing results being entered into NELSS 
impacted case-case analyses. 
All those interviewed considered NELSS as extremely valuable, with the main benefits 
being able to use the data to detect multi-jurisdictional clusters and outbreaks and a 
centralised collection point for all enhanced human listeriosis epidemiological and 
laboratory data. Combining time costs for epidemiological data and isolate testing 
costs, we estimate complete data for NELSS to be approximately $57,000 per year, 
based on 2010 to 2013 data. This is significantly less than the estimated costs of over 
$83 million for listeriosis cases in Australia annually. 
Delays in obtaining definitive typing results through referral to laboratories prior to the 
national reference laboratory, batching of isolates for sending and batching of isolates 
for testing, results in NELSS not meeting the aim of ‘timely characterisation’. 
Additionally, this has flow on effects for the timely epidemiological investigation of 
listeriosis cases.  
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This review highlights the effectiveness of enhanced surveillance for a foodborne 
disease, though improvements are needed. Funding for reference laboratories to 
conduct specified tests within stipulated timelines would ensure NELSS can meet the 
aims under which it was established. This would also ensure clusters and outbreaks 
are detected and investigated in a timely manner, which will flow on to timely public 
health action to prevent further cases. 
3.3 Recommendations 
This review proposes the following recommendations for OzFoodNet’s consideration: 
1. Develop and document NELSS definitions for ‘cluster’ and ‘outbreak’ to assist with 
fortnightly reports and case-case analyses. 
2. Develop a data dictionary for NELSS. 
3. Reassess minimum targets for definitive testing results to be entered into NELSS. 
4. Establish a log of cluster investigations to assist analysis. Such a record would 
assist the epidemiological analysis of clusters, particularly when considering case 
definitions for case-case analysis. 
5. Add separate fields in NetEpi to collect other laboratory typing data such as 
multiple-locus variable-number tandem repeat analysis results and a unique 
laboratory identifier for isolate tracking.  
6. Provide access to NetEpi or specific reports for laboratory staff to improve isolate 
tracking. 
7. Determine whether the current definitive characterisation method for human 
listeriosis isolates is still appropriate. 
8. Provide NetEpi training and capacity building for OzFoodNet staff.  
9. Consider funding for reference laboratories to conduct definitive testing within 
stipulated timelines. 
10. Replace NetEpi with a system that allows database integration. This will limit data 
duplication and the need for users to have multiple databases, particularly if other 
enhanced surveillance systems are established. 
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3.4 Introduction 
Listeria monocytogenes (L. monocytogenes) is a gram-positive, non-spore forming, rod 
shaped bacterium appearing ubiquitously in nature. Almost all human cases of 
listeriosis are the result of infection with L. monocytogenes (1). Listeriosis presents in 
two forms, the first being non-invasive gastrointestinal listeriosis, in which patients may 
experience mild gastroenteritis and flu-like symptoms. The second form is invasive 
listeriosis, which can lead to encephalitis, meningitis, septicaemia and abortion.  
Invasive listeriosis disproportionately affects vulnerable populations such as the elderly 
and those with immunocompromising conditions, including pregnancy. The potential for 
severe outcomes in these groups, such as greater than 90% hospitalisation rate (2) 
and a 20% to 40% case fatality rate (3-5), makes listeriosis a disease of public health 
significance. Whilst most listeriosis cases occur sporadically, there have been many 
recognised listeriosis outbreaks nationally (6-13) and internationally (5, 14, 15). 
The principal route for listeriosis transmission is foodborne (16) and the predominant 
cause of listeriosis is the consumption of ready-to-eat (RTE) foods (17), such as deli 
meats, cheeses, fruit and pre-prepared packaged foods. This predominance in RTE 
foods is due to a lack of a kill step during processing or prior to consumption, and 
prolonged storage at temperatures in which L. monocytogenes can survive and grow 
(16). L. monocytogenes has been isolated from foods such as raw and pasteurised 
milk, cheeses (particularly soft-ripened varieties), ice cream, raw vegetables, fermented 
raw meat, cooked sausages, raw and cooked poultry, raw meats, and raw and smoked 
seafood (3, 16, 18). 
L. monocytogenes can be difficult to eliminate during food processing. It can grow at 
temperatures from 0°C to 45°C, at a pH between 4.4 and 9.4 and even survive 
pasteurisation (16-19). Environmental surveys of food manufacturers frequently identify 
L. monocytogenes (19). For these reasons, there is a high potential for 
L. monocytogenes to contaminate manufactured food. 
OzFoodNet is an Australian Government initiative that was established in 2000. The 
network consists of nine state or territory-based sites and OzFoodNet central. The 
purpose of OzFoodNet is to investigate the epidemiology of foodborne diseases, to 
provide a better understanding of their causes and incidence in the community, and to 
provide evidence for policy and practice (20). 
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Listeriosis was made nationally notifiable in Australia in 1991, with the collection of 
enhanced laboratory typing and food history/exposure data in a web-based system, 
NetEpi, from 2010. Prior to the establishment of the enhanced surveillance system, 
laboratory-confirmed listeriosis cases were only captured in the National Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) and in the event of an outbreak, the 
OzFoodNet Outbreak Register or an outbreak case management system. Case 
information such as demographics and basic laboratory data were collected by states 
and territories, however, laboratory subtyping of listeriosis cases was not standardised 
nationally, and no risk factor data were collected and collated nationally. This meant 
the detection of multi-jurisdictional outbreaks was neither sensitive nor timely. 
Table 1 lists recognised outbreaks and clusters that were investigated prior to the 
introduction of enhanced surveillance of listeriosis in Australia. 
Table 1: Listeriosis outbreaks and clusters investigated prior to 2010. 
Year Location Setting Cases Deaths Food 
implicated 
References 
1991 TAS Community 3 0 Imported 
smoked 
mussels 
(7, 8) 
1997-
1999 
NSW Hospital 9 6 Fruit salad 
(9) 
2004 SA Community 2 2 Unknown (10) 
2005 SA Hospital 4 2 RTE meats (11) 
2009 QLD, VIC, 
NSW, SA, 
WA and 
TAS 
Airline, 
catering 
company 
13 laboratory 
confirmed and 23 
epidemiologically
-linked non-
invasive cases 
3 Chicken 
wraps 
(6) 
 
In response to the multi-jurisdictional listeriosis outbreak in 2009, OzFoodNet, state 
health departments, New South Wales Food Authority, Food Standards Australia New 
Zealand (FSANZ) and public health authorities conducted a debrief. One of the 
recommendations of this debrief was the need for uniform national collection and 
collation of laboratory and epidemiological data (OzFoodNet, unpublished work). From 
this NELSS was developed. 
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The aims of NELSS as per the ‘National surveillance of invasive human Listeria 
monocytogenes infection OzFoodNet conceptual plan (2 September 2010)’ are: 
Timely detection and investigation of possible clusters of human L. monocytogenes 
infections through: 
1. Timely characterisation of L. monocytogenes isolates for routine and outbreak 
surveillance and reporting to state and territory health departments and to the 
NNDSS. 
2. Regular analysis of L. monocytogenes routine surveillance data to identify potential 
intra-jurisdiction and multi-jurisdiction clusters. 
3. Timely epidemiological investigation of related L. monocytogenes cases for a 
common source. 
Enhanced surveillance involves the routine web-based collection of detailed 
epidemiological information, such as exposure history and prior health status, via the 
standardised national listeriosis questionnaire (Appendix 4). Cases, or where a death 
has occurred, next of kin, are interviewed as soon as health departments are notified of 
a case via laboratory testing results. 
The typing and subtyping tests conducted on all human listeriosis isolates under this 
plan include serotyping (ST), binary typing (BT) and pulse field gel electrophoresis 
(PFGE). Multilocus sequence typing (MLST) was being conducted on human listeriosis 
isolates, though the Microbiological Diagnostic Unit Public Health Laboratory (MDU) 
ceased this in 2013. Since 2012, multiple-locus variable-number tandem repeat 
analysis (MLVA) has also been conducted routinely on isolates. According to the 
conceptual plan, human listeriosis isolates should be definitively characterised within 
19 days of a diagnosing laboratory confirming L. monocytogenes. Additionally, risk 
factor data should be collected and entered into the centralised database within the 
same time period. Currently, all definitive molecular subtyping of human listeriosis 
isolates is conducted by the national reference laboratory, MDU in Melbourne, without 
a formal agreement in place and without funding. 
OzFoodNet central coordinates the maintenance of and reporting from NELSS. Data 
are reviewed fortnightly, analysed for clusters and a report detailing national subtyping 
results of human listeriosis cases is distributed among OzFoodNet epidemiologists and 
the national reference laboratory (Appendix 5). The collection of enhanced laboratory 
and exposure data allows for timely analysis of common exposures in an outbreak 
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setting. It also allows for the identification of clusters by molecular subtyping at a 
national level and subsequent analysis of exposures.  
If a cluster is detected, cluster or outbreak-related cases can be compared to sporadic 
cases using a derivation of the case-control methodology termed case-case analysis. 
McCarthy and Giesecke (21) state that this alternative method allows for the reduction 
of both selection and differential recall bias as both cases and the controls are enrolled 
through the same selection process (i.e. notified listeriosis cases) and both would have 
a similar level of recall compared to healthy individuals. 
Despite a drawback of this method being the inability to determine general risk factors 
for disease, as both outbreak cases and sporadic cases will have similar distributions 
of these, this method has been used effectively in Australian (12, 13) and overseas 
(22-24) listeriosis outbreak investigations.  
Data flow for NELSS is summarised in Figure 1. There are different testing capacities 
within jurisdictional reference laboratories, and interview procedures for jurisdictional 
health departments vary, which make data flow into NELSS quite complex. A more 
detailed diagram can be found at Appendix 6.  
Figure 1: Summarised dataflow for NELSS 
 
 
A conventional review of NELSS was conducted by Kate Astridge in 2011 (25), and this 
found the system to be achieving its stated objectives as per the CDC Updated 
Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems (26). At the time of this 
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review, there was only one year (2010) of complete data. Since this review there have 
been some significant outbreaks detected and investigated. During 2013, a review of 
NELSS was requested by the OzFoodNet network and the Australian Government 
Department of Health to fulfil the planned review after two years of operation as 
detailed in the conceptual plan. 
The purpose of this review is to determine if NELSS, the only national enhanced 
surveillance system for a foodborne disease, is achieving the aims under which it was 
established. This will help inform whether or not NELSS is an effective model for 
enhanced surveillance of foodborne diseases and thus, whether it could be used as a 
template for other foodborne diseases. Additionally, whilst elements of the costing of 
NELSS described in this report may be specific to human listeriosis surveillance, it 
could be used as indicative costs in plans to establish enhanced surveillance systems 
for other foodborne diseases. 
Currently, all definitive molecular subtyping of human listeriosis isolates is conducted 
by the national reference laboratory (MDU) without a formal agreement in place and 
without funding. Should this arrangement ever cease, the current costs of conducting 
this testing will be needed in order to mount a business case for funding. 
3.5 Aims and objectives 
The aims of this review are: 
1. to determine whether NELSS has been used to achieve the timely detection 
and investigation of possible clusters and outbreaks; and 
2. to estimate the costs of running NELSS. 
 
The objectives of this review are to: 
1. establish how NELSS is used in routine surveillance and outbreak 
investigations (i.e. operation of the system); 
2. describe the invasive listeriosis outbreaks and clusters detected using NELSS; 
3. determine the role of NELSS in the timely detection and investigation of 
possible clusters and outbreaks; and 
4. describe the breakdown of current costs for operating NELSS. 
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3.6 Methods 
3.6.1 Study type 
Typically, an MAE surveillance system review will use guidelines such as the CDC 
Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems (26). As an 
evaluation of NELSS using these guidelines was undertaken by Kate Astridge in 2011 
(25), I developed my own framework for this study. 
This involved the development of clear and concise study aims and objectives, a data 
collection and review plan and directly addressing the review aims and objectives in the 
write up. 
3.6.2 Case definitions 
A case of listeriosis was defined as per the CDNA national surveillance case definition 
(27). 
For national surveillance, there is no formal definition for a cluster. The current working 
definition is three or more cases with the same MDU PFGE type/pattern over a 24 
week period. The NELSS data were analysed retrospectively for clusters using this 
detection algorithm. OzFoodNet surveillance reports were reviewed to determine when 
clusters were detected and investigated (objective 2). 
The NELSS conceptual plan states that human listeriosis isolates should be definitively 
characterised within 19 days of a diagnosing laboratory confirming L. monocytogenes. 
Definitive characterisation was considered complete when the MDU PFGE result was 
entered into NELSS. The reason for choosing this is that the MDU PFGE result is 
currently used in both the cluster detection algorithm and case-case analysis. 
3.6.3 Stakeholder interviews 
Many of the stakeholders were identified in the work carried out by Astridge (25). A 
small stakeholder working group was established in order to engage and consult with 
these stakeholders and identify others. This group included OzFoodNet 
epidemiologists, state health department employees, members of the Australian 
Government Department of Health and myself. A list of stakeholders is provided in 
Table 2.  
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Table 2: Stakeholders of the NELSS. 
Stakeholder Stake in system 
Australian Government Funds the work of OzFoodNet 
OzFoodNet central Coordinator of the system. Maintains, 
analyses and reports on the system. 
OzFoodNet sites - state & territory health 
departments 
Conduct the interviews of human cases of 
invasive listeriosis. Rely on the detection 
of multi-jurisdictional clusters and 
outbreaks via NELSS. 
Public Health Laboratory Network  Public health laboratories conduct the 
laboratory testing of human isolates. 
Diagnostic laboratories Provide initial typing data on human 
listeriosis isolates. 
Microbiological Diagnostic Unit Public 
Health Laboratory  
National reference laboratory for the 
molecular typing of L. monocytogenes. 
 
Users of NELSS (data collectors, those who enter the data and those who analyse and 
report on the data) were interviewed about their experiences using NELSS. Specifically 
these stakeholders were asked how they contribute to and use NELSS, the time 
expended in doing so, and the enablers and barriers to using NELSS. 
The questions for the OzFoodNet staff were tested on Doctor Tony Merritt (Public 
health physician, Hunter New England Population Health) and Doctor Mark Veitch 
(Senior medical adviser, Tasmanian Department of Health and Human Services). The 
questions for the laboratory stakeholders were tested on Associate Professor Geoff 
Hogg (Director, MDU). These individuals were chosen as they all had extensive 
knowledge of listeriosis and NELSS. All three individuals provided feedback on the 
questions around clarifying what was being asked and ensuring the information 
collected would meet the objectives of the review. The pre-interview questions and 
interview questionnaires were amended as per feedback from these experts. 
Interviews were conducted with staff from 10 OzFoodNet sites, nine state or territory-
based sites (Australian Capital Territory, Hunter New England, New South Wales, 
Northern Territory, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and Western 
Australia) and OzFoodNet central. Interviews were also conducted with staff from 
jurisdictional reference laboratories to understand how the laboratory data that are 
entered into NELSS are generated. The five laboratories were: Institute for Clinical 
Pathology and Medical Research New South Wales, Queensland Health Forensic and 
Scientific Services, PathWest Laboratory Medicine Western Australia, South Australia 
Pathology and the national reference laboratory, MDU Victoria. Key comments from 
these interviews are provided in italics in the Results section (3.7). 
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Each interviewee was emailed the pre-interview questions, which were due back prior 
to conducting the interviews where possible. A one-on-one interview was conducted 
with each stakeholder and this interview was recorded for playback purposes. The 
recording was not started until the person being interviewed had consented to both 
being interviewed and the interview being recorded. After the recording was reviewed, 
it was deleted and the interviewee was emailed informing them that the recording had 
been erased. 
The pre-interview and interview questions for OzFoodNet and laboratory staff can be 
found at Appendix 7, Appendix 8, Appendix 9 and Appendix 10. These questions 
sought to answer objectives 1, how NELSS is used in routine surveillance and 
cluster/outbreak investigations and 3, the role of NELSS in the timely detection and 
investigation of possible clusters and outbreaks. These were also used to elucidate 
information on clusters and outbreaks detected and investigated by OzFoodNet since 
the establishment of NELSS (objective 2). 
Qualitative thematic analysis (28-30) was conducted separately on the OzFoodNet and 
laboratory staff interview data, looking for common patterns or themes in the 
responses. This was conducted in the following steps: 
1. data entry and familiarisation; 
2. initial coding of responses into labels (i.e. data entry only, analysis, reporting); 
3. combine labels into over-arching themes and list theme frequencies; and 
4. accurately define themes, what they capture and what is interesting about them. 
 
3.6.4 Operating costs of NELSS 
As part of the interviews, OzFoodNet staff were asked about the amount of time they 
expend in using NELSS. This time includes interviews, data entry and any analysis of 
human listeriosis cases (objective 4).  
To calculate the costs of these interviews, salaries from recently advertised OzFoodNet 
epidemiologist positions (n=6) were used. These advertised salaries ranged from 
$82,500 to $112,053 per year. A salary of $95,387 was used by calculating the 
midpoint for each salary then averaging the six midpoints. The cost of interview, data 
entry and analysis was calculated to be $48.92 per hour, using a standard 7.5 hour 
working day. 
During interviews with laboratory staff, information was sought on tests carried out and 
the estimated laboratory costs for each test per human listeriosis isolate (objective 4). 
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Only reference laboratories were interviewed, and this costing does not take into 
account initial tests for notification. 
3.6.5 NELSS data analysis 
All notified human listeriosis cases were extracted from the web-based NELSS 
database on 3 February 2014, with onset dates ranging from 1 January 2010 to 
31 December 2013. The exported Microsoft Excel file was imported into Stata 
intercooled v10 (Stata Corp, Collage Station, TX, USA) for analysis. 
A retrospective descriptive analysis was conducted on notified human listeriosis cases 
(objective 2). Cases were summarised by age, gender, state/territory and known risk 
factors (comorbidities, pregnancy and age). 
To calculate the time between when a health department was notified of the result of 
L. monocytogenes (notification date) and the date the definitive characterisation (MDU 
PFGE) was entered into NELSS, time and date stamps for when records were created 
and updated in NetEpi were extracted. This was used to determine the amount of time 
in days it took to complete a record in terms of entering definitive laboratory data and 
epidemiological interview data, compared with the timelines proposed in the NELSS 
conceptual plan (objective 1 and 3). 
3.6.6 Ethics 
Ethics approval was not required for this review as the data in NELSS were collected 
for the purpose of public health surveillance under jurisdictional public health 
legislation, and this analysis was consistent with the purpose for which the data were 
collected. 
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3.7 Results 
3.7.1 Descriptive analysis 
At the time of data extraction (3 February 2014), epidemiological data had been 
entered for all cases in NELSS. From 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2013, there 
were 305 cases of human invasive listeriosis entered into NELSS, of which 52% 
(157/303) were female. Two cases were missing details on gender. The median age of 
cases was 71 years (range 0 to 97 years). Eighty-five per cent (260/305) of cases were 
aged 50 years or older. All records had completed details for age. 
Eighty-one per cent (246/305) of cases reported comorbidities such as diabetes, heart 
disease, renal/kidney disease or cancer. Just over half (54%, 165/305) of the cases 
had two or more comorbidities. All records had completed details for comorbidities. 
The majority (94%, 288/305) of cases were hospitalised; 15 cases were missing data 
for hospitalisation, and 14% (42/305) died. Nineteen cases (6%, 19/305) were listed as 
pregnancy-related, and of these, five resulted in foetal death, and a further two were 
stillborn or died soon after delivery. 
The larger jurisdictions of New South Wales (n=113) and Victoria (n=103) reported the 
majority (71%, 216/305) of cases, with 2012 recording the most cases in a single year 
(n=92) (Table 3). 
Table 3: Human invasive listeriosis cases by jurisdiction and year, 2010 to 2013, 
NELSS (n=305). 
State 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
ACT 2 1 0 1 4 
NSW 26 20 39 28 113 
NT 0 1 0 3 4 
QLD 9 9 5 9 32 
SA 1 6 4 2 13 
TAS 3 2 3 2 10 
VIC 28 22 33 20 103 
WA 3 7 8 8 26 
Total 72 68 92 73 305 
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3.7.2 Stakeholder interviews 
3.7.2.1 OzFoodNet staff interviews 
As of April 2014, 11 clusters and six outbreaks had been investigated by OzFoodNet 
staff, of which five were multi-jurisdictional (Table 4). These clusters and outbreaks 
involved 107 cases of invasive listeriosis and 19 deaths. All five multi-jurisdictional 
investigations and three jurisdictional investigations (all of which were from one 
jurisdiction) were detected using analysis of NELSS data. The remainder (n=9) were 
detected from local jurisdictional analysis. Only South Australia and the Northern 
Territory have not had any clusters or outbreaks detected only within their jurisdictions 
since the implementation of NELSS. 
Table 4: Human listeriosis outbreaks and clusters detected since the establishment of 
NELSS, NELSS OzFoodNet interviews. 
Jurisdiction Year Cases Deaths Food implicated 
MJOI (ACT, NSW, QLD, VIC, 
TAS and WA) 
2012-2013 34 4 Cheese 
MJOI (NSW and VIC) 2012 14 0 Smoked Salmon 
MJOI (VIC, QLD and NSW)  2010 9 2 Rockmelons (12, 13) 
VIC 2011 6 1 Unknown 
MJOI (VIC)  2010 6 4 Unknown (12, 13) 
VIC 2010 6 4 Cold roast meat 
QLD 2013 4 0 Unknown 
WA 2012 4 1 Unknown 
VIC 2012 4 0 Unknown 
VIC 2011 4 1 Unknown 
WA 2013 3 0 Catered meals 
NSW 2013 3 0 Profiteroles 
MJOI (NSW and VIC) 2012 3 1 Smoked Salmon 
TAS 2013 2 0 Unknown. 
NSW 2012 2 0 Unknown 
ACT 2010 2 1 Unknown 
ACT 2011 1 0 Unknown 
MJOI – Multi-jurisdictional outbreak investigation 
Interviews identified that all sites shared a common theme of NELSS being a valuable 
system as it was a central repository for all exposure and laboratory data for human 
listeriosis cases, and allowed the detection of multi-jurisdictional clusters and 
outbreaks. Despite one jurisdiction stating that state-specific clusters had been 
detected via NELSS, all sites reported that clusters would be detected through their 
routine surveillance systems rather than NELSS. 
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 ‘Coordinated enhanced surveillance and definitive typing data in one system, 
this is the successful part of the whole system’. 
All listeriosis cases are interviewed using the national listeriosis questionnaire. For the 
sites that conduct interviews, over half (56%, 5/9), conducted both the interviews and 
entered data into NELSS. For the remaining four sites, interviews may be conducted by 
other staff (i.e. public health unit staff or other members of the surveillance unit) with 
OzFoodNet staff entering the data into NELSS. All sites reported some level of 
duplication of data entry (data entered into NELSS and other state based systems), 
though this was not viewed as burdensome by any site. The main reason for the 
duplication was that some data fields (mainly demographics, some basic 
epidemiological and laboratory data) were also required to be entered into the state or 
territories’ disease surveillance database. One jurisdiction entered all data from the 
national enhanced listeriosis questionnaire into their state-based system as well as 
NELSS.  
Three sites use NELSS as the only database for the collection of their enhanced data 
(epidemiological and laboratory) on human listeriosis cases, as their existing systems 
were unable to hold this additional data. In addition to entering data into the state 
notifiable disease surveillance system and NELSS, four sites also use additional 
databases to hold data. Two of these four sites had multiple additional databases (two 
additional) for listeriosis data. The reason for additional databases was that NELSS 
was unable to hold data on isolate tracking (isolates sent between laboratories), food 
and environmental testing, and information on cases of non-invasive listeriosis. A 
common theme was that no site viewed NELSS as adequate for their jurisdictional-
specific listeriosis surveillance needs. 
‘Our state currently has four databases for listeria and it would be great if 
NELSS could replace some of these.’ 
‘We have a food testing spreadsheet as NetEpi won’t hold food testing results.’ 
Only one site (OzFoodNet central) regularly analyses NELSS data, as per its role as 
the coordinator of the system. Therefore the aim of regular analysis of routine 
surveillance data, from the current conceptual plan, is being met. This analysis involves 
a fortnightly review of NELSS data and national reporting via the ‘listeria surveillance 
report’ (Appendix 4). At the time of this analysis personnel changes at OzFoodNet 
central resulted in national surveillance reports being conducted by other OzFoodNet 
sites. As only a few people in the OzFoodNet network were familiar with the national 
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surveillance procedures, there is a need to upskill others to ensure regular analysis of 
L. monocytogenes routine surveillance data is maintained. 
‘We need to improve the capacity within the network for review and analysis of 
the NELSS data.’ 
Three sites reported occasionally analysing NELSS data during routine jurisdictional 
listeriosis surveillance. The reasons for sites not using NELSS data, or only using it 
sporadically, included: being unaware that they could use the data for their own 
analysis and preference for other databases. All sites stated that their own systems 
were used for rapid analysis and basic descriptive epidemiological analysis as they 
were easier to use. 
When a local cluster was detected, all sites that conducted case interviews devote 
additional time in responding to cases by, re-interviewing cases, probing more on 
specific questions and actively following up with laboratories for test results. It was 
evident during the interviews that there was a lack of a clear case definition of a 
‘cluster’ or ‘outbreak’ among sites. It was a recommendation of the review by Kate 
Astridge in 2011 that “…criteria for identifying clusters/outbreaks and for when these 
are to be further investigated…” be developed (25) and OzFoodNet are seeking expert 
opinion to help create these (personal communication, Gerard Fitzsimmons, former 
OzFoodNet Coordinating Epidemiologist). 
Case-case analysis is initiated when epidemiologists within the OzFoodNet network 
believe a potential cluster requires further investigation. It was noted that there was a 
lack of NELSS-specific ‘how to’ documentation or historical records from previous 
case-case analyses. This, combined with staff changes within the network, has limited 
case-case analysis being conducted on NELSS data during 2013. Again this shows a 
need to upskill those within the network to ensure the data in NELSS are used to assist 
in cluster/outbreak investigations and the need for documentation of any analyses. 
When asked what aspects of NELSS sites would like see improved, answers included: 
more data fields for the laboratory typing results (both MLVA and MLST are entered 
into a free text field) and better integration of databases to limit duplication of data 
entry. 
 ‘I would like to see more fields for the other typing data, MLVA and MLST…’ 
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‘…it would be great to integrate it (NELSS) with state systems to remove (data) 
duplication.’ 
3.7.2.2 Laboratory staff interviews 
Laboratories also viewed NELSS as extremely beneficial, with the centralised collection 
of definitive subtyping data allowing for the detection of clusters in a timelier manner 
compared with previously.  
‘Five years ago outbreak identification was by phage type and was reactive only. 
Phage typing was slow and not very good for differentiation.’ 
Three of the four jurisdictional reference laboratories refer their isolates onto the 
national reference laboratory for further testing directly. PathWest Laboratory Medicine 
sends their isolates to Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific Services, who then 
send them on to MDU. A full list of laboratories and the tests they conduct on human 
listeriosis isolates are listed in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Laboratory name and the tests conducted on human listeriosis isolates, 
NELSS laboratory interviews. 
Laboratory name Tests conducted PFGE method 
Institute for Clinical Pathology 
and Medical Research, New 
South Wales 
BT 
MLVA 
N/A 
Queensland Health Forensic and 
Scientific Services, Queensland 
ST 
BT 
MLVA 
N/A 
PathWest Laboratory Medicine, 
Western Australia 
PFGE PulseNet (31) 
SA Pathology, South Australia ST (O1 or O4 only) N/A 
Microbiological Diagnostic Unit 
Public Health Laboratory, Victoria 
BT 
Molecular ST 
MLVA 
PFGE 
Whole genome sequencing 
MDU Method 
BT – Binary typing 
ST – Serotyping 
PFGE – Pulse field gel electrophoresis 
MLVA - Multiple-locus variable number tandem repeat analysis  
 
Upon receipt of isolates, these laboratories can report results for BT and ST within 24 
to 48 hours and MLVA and PFGE within one to two weeks. All but one laboratory 
stated that these timelines would speed up during a human listeriosis outbreak 
investigation, with urgent results being communicated via telephone where required. 
Other ways in which timelines could be reduced included: referring isolates on as they 
are received instead of batching requests, testing of single isolates and testing outside 
of normal working hours. 
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One theme that carried through from all laboratories was that there is currently no 
funding, contract or agreement in place for definitive characterisation of human 
listeriosis isolates to be conducted within certain timelines. Whilst the theoretical 
timelines mentioned above are what is possible, in reality, these timelines may vary 
depending on testing requirements (number of isolates needed to run a test), 
laboratory resources and other competing priorities. 
‘No one pays for the isolate testing, so asking labs to drop stuff in an outbreak 
situation to do more testing is a big burden…’ 
‘As there is no funding or contract to deliver results within a certain timeline, tests 
are conducted when they can be done.’ 
During outbreak investigations, the reference laboratory has been unable to link their 
isolate testing results to NELSS records. MDU suggested the addition of a field in 
NELSS for a laboratory unique identifier (such as MDU unique identifier) for case 
isolate tracking. 
‘As we don’t have access to NetEpi, we can’t tell whether an isolate has been 
received for a case (in NELSS) or even processed.’ 
One laboratory (MDU) is currently conducting quality assurance testing to establish 
whole genome sequencing of human listeriosis isolates. This test takes approximately 
two weeks. With a move to whole genome sequencing, MDU had stopped conducting 
MLST and in future will also stop BT, ST and MLVA. Whilst sequencing produces an 
enormous amount of information-rich data, it cannot be stored in NetEpi.  
3.7.3 Timeliness 
The median number of days from when the jurisdictional health department was 
notified of L. monocytogenes to epidemiological data (not including follow-up or re-
interview data) being entered into NELSS was eight days (range 0 to 619 days). The 
median number of days to complete the epidemiological data did improve over time 
from 46 days (2 to 619 days) in 2010 to five days (0 to 86 days) in 2013. 
Over two-thirds (69%, 210/305) of cases in NELSS had epidemiological data entered in 
19 days or less of the notification date. This result also improved over time with 97% 
(71/73) of 2013 cases completed in 19 days or less (Table 6).  
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Table 6: Median number of days to enter epidemiological data and number completed 
(N) in 19 days or less, by year, 2010 to 2013, NELSS. 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Median days to complete 
epidemiological data (range) 
46 
(2 to 619) 
8 
(0 to 466) 
7 
(0 to 182) 
5 
(0 to 86) 
8 
(0 to 619) 
N (%) completed in 19 days 
or less 
21 (30) 49 (72) 69 (75) 71 (97) 210 (69) 
 
The initial subtyping carried out on human listeriosis isolates is ST and BT. The median 
number of days for initial subtyping data to be entered into NELSS was 37 days (range 
0 to 619 days). This median did improve over time, reducing from 91 days (range 15 to 
619 days) in 2010 to 18 days (range 0 to 168 days) in 2013. At the time of analysis, 2% 
(7/305) of records were missing BT and an additional 10 records (6%, 17/305 in total) 
were also missing ST results. When listed, reasons for these data not being completed 
included no isolate being available for testing or the primary testing laboratory 
discarding the isolate. 
The MLVA protocol used in Australia was developed by the Queensland Health 
Forensic and Scientific Services (32) and is currently used in Queensland, New South 
Wales and Victoria. This definitive typing technique is relatively new for these 
laboratories, with 97% (71/73) recording MLVA results for 2013, compared with only 
65% (60/92) in 2012. In 2013, the median number of days from when the jurisdictional 
health department was notified of a case of listeriosis to the MLVA result being entered 
into NELSS was 22 days (0 to 172 days). 
In NELSS, definitive characterisation is considered to be MDU PFGE. Nine per cent 
(26/305) of records were missing definitive laboratory characterisation at the time of 
data extraction. These included nine cases in 2010, five cases in 2011, four cases in 
2012 and eight cases in 2013. Reasons for some of the missing PFGE results were a 
lack of isolate for testing or the primary laboratory discarding the isolate, though the 
majority of records missing PFGE results had no reason listed. 
Of the 279 records in NELSS where MDU PFGE results have been entered, the 
median number of days it took from when the jurisdictional health department was 
notified of L. monocytogenes to the MDU PFGE result being entered into NELSS was 
51 days (range 6 to 1,032 days). Only 12% (38/305) of records had the MDU PFGE 
results entered into NELSS in 19 days or less of the jurisdictional health department 
being notified of the case. Both the median number of days to complete a record and 
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the percentage of records completed in 19 days or less of being notified improved over 
time (Table 7) however, each year still had some substantial outliers. 
When conducting case-case analysis using NELSS data, sporadic cases within one 
incubation period (70 days) of the first cluster-related case are compared. Additionally, 
all records with missing definitive subtyping results or no epidemiological data are 
excluded from the analysis. The MDU PFGE results for more than half of all records 
(59%, 180/305) were entered within 70 days or less (Table 7). The cases completed 
within 70 days or less also improved over time. 
Table 7: Median number of days to enter definitive typing results, number completed 
(N) in 19 days or less and 70 days or less by year, 2010 to 2013, NELSS. 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Median days to complete 
PFGE data (range) 
106 
(17 to 1,032) 
50 
(9 to 739) 
44 
(10 to 210) 
37 
(6 to 284) 
51 
(6 to 1,032) 
N (%) completed in 19 
days or less 
1 (1) 9 (13) 15 (16) 13 (18) 38 (12) 
N (%) completed in 70 
days or less 
14 (19) 44 (65) 66 (72) 55 (75) 180 (59) 
 
The median number of days to complete a record (PFGE results entered) varied by 
jurisdiction, with Victoria having the lowest median days and Western Australia, the 
highest (Table 8). Despite having differing notification dates for listeriosis cases within 
their jurisdiction, New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia had several 
cases with definitive testing results entered on the same day. 
Table 8: Median number of days and range to enter definitive typing results by 
jurisdiction, 2010 to 2013, NELSS. 
State Median days to complete PFGE data (range) 
WA 82 (39 to 315) 
SA 72 (13 to 619) 
NSW 60 (10 to 1,032) 
QLD 56 (14 to 739) 
NT 44 (24 to 59) 
ACT 40 (21 to 84) 
TAS 39 (20 to 96) 
VIC 27 (6 to 193) 
 
Records for outbreak-associated cases (36 days, range 6 to 151 days) were also 
completed faster than those for sporadic cases (55 days, range 9 to 1,032 days). 
Additionally, there was a slight improvement in completion time for all records during 
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the most recent and largest multi-jurisdictional listeriosis outbreak involving soft cheese 
in 2013 (34 days, range 6 to 284 days). 
3.7.4 Cluster identification 
Nine separate PFGE profile clusters could be identified through retrospective cluster 
analysis (Table 9). Of these, three clusters (121:199:1, 23:22:1 and 6:6:6) could not be 
detected by the algorithm as cases occurred before regular surveillance was initiated 
(from 20 March 2010). Of the remaining six clusters, only two had the PFGE entered 
into NELSS in a time that allowed detection according to the algorithm (11:10:10 and 
18:17:10) and one potential cluster (86:46:37) was missed entirely. These clusters are 
labelled in blue and red respectively in Table 9. Delays in entering the PFGE data into 
NELSS resulted in delays in identifying clusters.  
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Table 9: Listeriosis clusters detected by retrospective cluster analysis and whether they were detected by OzFoodNet, 2010 to 2013, 
NELSS. 
PFGE Detection possible according 
to algorithm 
Detection possible according to 
completed PFGE 
Detected by OzFoodNet 
1:1:1 October 2011 February 2012 Investigated 12 cases in October 2012 
11:10:10 April 2011 May 2011 Investigated 5 cases in June 2011 
Detected 3 cases in July 2012 associated with smoked salmon 
199:44:1 August 2011 March 2012 MDU identified 4 cases in July 2011 from matching lab data 
Investigated 12 cases in October 2012 
Detected outbreak late 2012 associated with cheese 
121:119:1 * No detectable cases  - Not detected as cases not analysed retrospectively* 
18:17:10 June 2012 July 2012 Detected 3 cases July 2012 associated with smoked salmon 
20:19:20 March 2011 May 2011 Investigated 3 cases in May 2011 
23:22:1 * No detectable cases   Not detected as cases not analysed retrospectively* 
4:4:1 March 2010 May 2011  Investigated 12 cases in May 2011 
Detected 3 cases in April 2013 associated with a hospital 
6:6:6 * No detectable cases  - Not detected as cases not analysed retrospectively* 
8:110:2 March 2012 February 2013 Investigated 3 cases February 2013 
86:46:37 April 2012 PFGE completed outside of 
detection algorithm 
Not detected 
* First listeria surveillance report produced on 4 September 2010. Cluster detection algorithm used from 20 March 2010. 
Blue text indicates clusters that had the PFGE entered into NELSS in a time that allowed detection according to the algorithm 
Red text indicates a cluster that missed detection due to delays in entering the PFGE into NELSS. 
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3.7.5 Costing of NELSS 
Sites reported that interviews for human listeriosis cases ranged from 30 minutes 
to two hours, data entry from 20 minutes to an hour and analysis 30 minutes to 
two hours. These figures do not take into account the time to follow up cases or 
next of kin and arrange for an interview, follow-up for re-interview or obtain 
laboratory results. Fortnightly cluster analysis and reporting by OzFoodNet 
central took approximately two hours.  
Taking the maximum time for state/territory OzFoodNet site interview, data entry 
and analysis, we calculated five hours per human invasive listeriosis case at a 
cost of $48.92 per hour. Thus the estimated cost for the epidemiological data for 
a single human listeriosis case is $244.60. 
Tests carried out on each human listeriosis isolate include ST ($50), BT ($35 to 
$50), MLVA ($45 to $150) and PFGE ($250). Whilst MDU is currently conducting 
whole genome sequencing, this was not factored into the costing as it is still 
being established. Using the upper ranges of stated costs for tests, the cost of 
isolate subtyping of each human listeriosis isolate is $500. 
Combining both the gathered time costs for the epidemiological data and isolate 
testing costs from reference laboratories, we found that each case is estimated to 
cost approximately $750 for complete data for NELSS. With an average of 76 
cases in NELSS each year between 2010 and 2013, this equates to 
approximately $57,000 a year.  
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3.8 Discussion 
Invasive listeriosis is a disease that can have serious consequences for 
vulnerable populations. OzFoodNet has been conducting enhanced surveillance 
on all invasive human listeriosis cases since 1 January 2010 using a web-based 
system. 
The purpose of this review was to answer whether or not NELSS was meeting 
the aims under which it was established and followed on from the work of Kate 
Astridge in 2011 (25). It should be noted here that whilst the conceptual plan for 
NELSS detailed the aims and expected timelines for the system, there is neither 
formal agreement nor funding in place for the definitive laboratory 
characterisation of human listeriosis isolates. 
All those interviewed considered NELSS as extremely valuable, and the 
acceptability of the system was high. Interviewees reported the main benefits of 
NELSS were being able to use the data to detect multi-jurisdictional clusters and 
outbreaks and a centralised collection point for all enhanced human listeriosis 
epidemiological and laboratory data.  
OzFoodNet staff viewed such benefits as outweighing the weaknesses arising 
from system limitations, specifically, jurisdictional databases being unable to 
communicate with NELSS and thus having to double enter data. OzFoodNet, and 
the Australian Government, should consider other platforms that allow database 
integration, particularly if enhanced surveillance systems for other diseases are 
established. 
Whilst the success of NELSS has been demonstrated through the detection of 
multi-jurisdictional and jurisdictional clusters and outbreaks, overall, the system 
does not completely match the requirements of those using it. Being unaware of 
the reporting capabilities of NetEpi and NELSS not holding all available case 
information, resulted in OzFoodNet staff preferring other systems for analysis and 
reporting. This highlights the need for more training and capacity building in the 
use of NetEpi. 
A recommendation of the Astridge review was for clusters and outbreaks 
investigated using NELSS to be documented (25). As this recommendation has 
not been implemented, the only way to collect the presented information on 
investigated clusters or outbreaks was through the stakeholder interviews and 
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searching OzFoodNet surveillance reports. Such a record would assist the 
epidemiological analysis of clusters, particularly when considering case 
definitions for case-case analysis. This, along with capacity building within the 
OzFoodNet network for surveillance, analysis and reporting, should be 
considered as priorities. 
Less than 15% of all records had definitive test results (MDU PFGE) entered into 
NELSS within the 19 day timeframe, despite laboratories reporting that subtyping 
of human listeriosis isolates could be carried out within two weeks of receiving 
isolates. The median number of days from the jurisdictional health department 
being notified of a human listeriosis case to the epidemiological and definitive 
characterisation data being entered into NELSS did improve over time. However, 
over 80% of cases in 2013 were still not completed in NELSS within the agreed 
conceptual plan timelines.  
Delays in definitive characterisation results being entered in NELSS can also 
affect case-case analysis. For 2013, a quarter of cases were potentially excluded 
from any case-case analysis due to missing definitive typing results. This result is 
noteworthy, as key data on cluster/outbreak-related cases or sporadic cases 
could be excluded during any analysis. These delays result in NELSS not 
meeting the aim of timely characterisation of isolates and reporting, as per the 
current conceptual plan. These delays also affect any potential investigation, 
meaning that NELSS is only partially meeting the timely investigation of clusters 
for a common source. OzFoodNet, in collaboration with reference laboratories, 
may wish to reconsider the current conceptual timelines and the minimum targets 
for definitive testing results.  
Delays in entering the PFGE results into NELSS have resulted in the late 
identification or non-detection of possible clusters. Only two clusters identified 
retrospectively from the NELSS data had the PFGE profiles entered into NELSS 
in a timeframe in which the current algorithm could detect them. If clusters are 
being missed then the opportunity to implement public health measures to limit 
listeriosis outbreaks are also being missed. 
One way to reduce the median number of days to complete a record in NELSS 
could be to change the definitive characterisation method. Currently, the PFGE 
results reported by MDU are used as definitive characterisation for human 
listeriosis isolates. The median number of days to complete the BT and ST 
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results in NELSS was considerably less than for PFGE. The lowering of 
specificity and increasing of sensitivity for the case-case analysis case definition 
using BT/ST would result in the identification of more ‘potential’ clusters requiring 
greater analysis and follow-up.  
MLVA is a method that has the potential to offer similar levels of specificity and 
sensitivity as PFGE, with shorter turnaround times and lower cost. Due to MLVA 
being a relatively new type of test conducted on human listeriosis isolates, the 
results are currently entered into a free text field that captures any additional 
testing information. Furthermore, any case-case analysis would be limited due to 
the lack of historical MLVA data for comparison without testing of old isolates. It 
should be noted that determining whether or not MLVA could replace PFGE as 
the definitive typing method for NELSS was outside the scope of this review. The 
NELSS conceptual plan does refer to the need to review the ‘specific laboratory 
characterisation methods’ after 24 months of operation. As this has not yet been 
done, OzFoodNet may wish to establish a multidisciplinary working group to 
determine whether the current definitive characterisation method for human 
listeriosis isolates is still appropriate. 
The referral of isolates to jurisdictional reference laboratories prior to being 
referred to the national reference laboratory appears to increase the time it takes 
to complete a record in NELSS. One reason for this may be the batching of 
isolates for referral or batching of isolates for testing within a laboratory. 
Forwarding of individual isolates, as opposed to batching, and conducting tests 
on single isolates would be expensive if conducted routinely. Whilst delays due to 
batching may be unavoidable outside of an outbreak investigation, sites and 
laboratories should seek to minimise these delays where possible. 
During interviews, both OzFoodNet and laboratory staff stated that during a 
cluster or outbreak investigation, responses to individual cases change, resulting 
in further follow-up and shorter turnaround times for testing results. This was 
reflected in the data, with outbreak-related cases having a smaller median 
number of days to complete the record than sporadic cases.  
A limitation of NELSS was the inability to track isolates that have been sent for 
testing. The addition of a field for a unique laboratory identifier is a simple 
modification that would allow both laboratories and OzFoodNet staff to better 
track isolate movements around the country. Additionally, giving laboratory staff 
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access to NELSS, either directly or indirectly via specific reports, would assist in 
knowing which isolates are yet to be received by laboratories and the status of 
MDU definitive characterisation. The ability to track isolates was viewed as an 
improvement for NELSS by both OzFoodNet and laboratory staff. 
Another issue for NELSS that will require planning and consideration is the 
potential move to whole genome sequencing. Whilst this method has the 
potential to offer more information than current techniques, the disadvantages are 
that NetEpi is unable to store the immense amount of data generated through 
sequencing and the interpretation of this data is more complex. This information 
would not be in a format that allows easy labelling or distinguishing between 
subtypes of an organism. This would make case-case analysis unfeasible, as it 
would be unmanageable to differentiate between sporadic and cluster-related 
cases. 
It is difficult to determine whether NELSS operates within a timely manner without 
a comparison. PulseNet is a national laboratory network of 87 laboratories in all 
50 American states (31, 33). This network is partially funded by the United States 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and relies on a PFGE 
methodology that is different to the MDU method.  
A multistate listeriosis outbreak in 2012 in the United States of America linked to 
rockmelons affected 147 people, with 33 deaths from five different outbreak 
strains. Twenty-one days after the onset of the first listeriosis case linked to this 
outbreak, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment notified the 
CDC regarding seven cases of listeriosis in their jurisdiction. Within four days 
PulseNet had defined the outbreak strains and 10 days later, the food source had 
been identified and a recall was initiated for contaminated product (14). This is an 
example of a system that works effectively to rapidly identify and investigate 
listeriosis clusters and outbreaks. PulseNet differs from NELSS in that definitive 
molecular typing can be provided by multiple laboratories and the network has 
partial centralised funding. OzFoodNet may wish to consider such a model in 
order to enhance the timeliness of listeriosis cluster and outbreak detection and 
investigation. 
During the interview process for this review, stakeholders were asked about the 
number of hours taken to collect, enter and analyse data for NELSS and the 
costs for laboratory tests. It should be noted that the aim was not to undertake a 
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complete costing, and this analysis does not include factors such as the time 
required for following up cases for additional interviews, laboratory staff time or 
initial testing carried out in notifying laboratories. Combining both the staff costs 
for gathering the epidemiological and the laboratory tests, the cost for NELSS 
equates to approximately $57,000 a year. This is a minor amount compared with 
the estimated costs of over $83 million for listeriosis cases in Australia annually, 
based on 2000 data (34). 
With no contract in place or specific funding provided for the definitive 
characterisation of human listeriosis isolates, reference laboratories absorb the 
costs of isolate characterisation. The CDNA discussion paper Towards a 
Communicable Disease Control Framework for Australia (35) identified an urgent 
need for a sustainable financial model for communicable disease surveillance 
and specialised testing by public health laboratories in Australia. Financial 
mechanisms that would support specialised testing, such as definitive 
characterisation of human listeriosis isolates, would ensure specific typing results 
were obtained within specified timelines. 
NELSS has been invaluable in the detection of listeriosis clusters and outbreaks 
in Australia, and has assisted in the identification and investigation of possible 
sources of these. Overall, NELSS is an effective and relatively inexpensive model 
for enhanced surveillance of foodborne diseases. Nevertheless, delays obtaining 
definitive characterisation results of human listeriosis isolates do prevent NELSS 
from meeting all the aims under which it was established. Whilst much of the 
design of NELSS could be considered disease-specific, the system as a whole 
could be used as a template for enhanced surveillance for other foodborne 
diseases. If additional enhanced surveillance systems were to be considered, 
issues such as funding for definitive testing, capacity for analysis and reporting, 
suitable systems that allow database integration and the ability to evolve with 
future laboratory techniques would need to be considered. 
3.9 Conclusion 
NELSS has been an invaluable enhanced surveillance system for a foodborne 
disease in Australia since 2010. It has been used not only to detect clusters and 
outbreaks but also assisted in the identification and investigation of possible 
sources of these outbreaks. NELSS is viewed as valuable with a high level of 
acceptability by the users of the system, despite limitations including a lack of 
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understanding of system capabilities, duplication of data entry and the system not 
storing all available data. This review highlights the effectiveness of enhanced 
surveillance for a foodborne disease, though improvements are needed. 
Funding for reference laboratories to conduct specified tests within stipulated 
timelines would ensure NELSS can meet the aims under which it was 
established. This would also ensure clusters and outbreaks are detected and 
investigated in a timely manner that will flow on to timely public health action to 
prevent further cases. 
The individual aims of NELSS and the key review findings for each aim are listed 
below in Table 10. 
Table 10: Key findings of the review of the National Enhanced Listeriosis 
Surveillance System, 2014. 
Aims of NELSS Review findings 
1. Timely characterisation of 
L. monocytogenes isolates for routine 
and outbreak surveillance and reporting 
to state and territory health departments 
and to the National Notifiable Diseases 
Surveillance System. 
Delays in obtaining definitive typing 
results due to referral of isolates to 
laboratories prior to the national 
reference laboratory, batching of 
isolates for sending and batching of 
isolates for testing results in NELSS 
not meeting this aim. 
2. Regular analysis of L. monocytogenes 
routine surveillance data to identify 
potential intra-jurisdiction and multi-
jurisdiction clusters. 
Analysis of the routine surveillance 
data is conducted fortnightly, thus 
NELSS consistently meets this aim. 
Jurisdictional reference laboratories 
could be more involved in surveillance 
via access to the system or 
surveillance reports. 
3. Timely epidemiological investigation of 
related L. monocytogenes cases for a 
common source. 
Delays in characterisation of isolates 
may affect timely epidemiological 
investigations. Timeliness of 
characterisation did improve during 
outbreak investigations. NELSS only 
partially met this aim. 
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3.10 Appendices 
Appendix 1: Review of NELSS stakeholder report. 
 
Timothy Sloan-Gardner 
Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology (MAE) Scholar, Department 
of Health 
2014 
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About this report 
A review of the National Enhanced Listeriosis Surveillance System (NELSS) was 
requested by the OzFoodNet network and the Australian Government 
Department of Health to fulfil the planned review after two years of operation as 
detailed in the national surveillance of invasive human Listeria monocytogenes 
infection OzFoodNet conceptual plan (2 September 2010). 
This review was conducted by Timothy Sloan-Gardner as part of the Master of 
Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology (MAE) program, through the National Centre 
for Epidemiology and Population Health at the Australian National University. 
Timothy Sloan-Gardner’s MAE scholarship is funded by the Department of 
Health. 
This report was written with support from Katrina Knope from the Australian 
Government Department of Health, Dr Emily Fearnley from the National Centre 
for Epidemiology and Population Health and Bridget O’Connor from the ACT 
Health Protection Service. 
This report is based on analysis of the NELSS as well as interviews with 
OzFoodNet and Public Health Laboratory Staff. The author would like to thank 
the interviewees for their time and the editors for their review of this report. 
Please direct any comments or questions to Timothy Sloan-Gardner at 
OzFoodNet@health.gov.au. 
Cover photo courtesy of Dr. Balasubr Swaminathan and Peggy Hayes, Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). CDC Public Health Image Library, 
Image ID 10828. 
  
  
  76 
  
Summary 
The National Enhanced Listeriosis Surveillance System (NELSS) has been an 
invaluable enhanced surveillance system for a foodborne disease in Australia 
since 2010. It has been used not only to detect clusters and outbreaks but has 
also assisted in the identification and investigation of possible sources of these 
outbreaks. NELSS is viewed as valuable with a high level of acceptability by the 
users of the system, despite limitations including a lack of understanding of 
system capabilities, duplication of data entry and the system not storing all 
available data. This review highlights the effectiveness of enhanced surveillance 
for a foodborne disease, though improvements are needed. 
Funding for reference laboratories to conduct specified tests within stipulated 
timelines would ensure NELSS can meet the aims under which it was 
established. This would also ensure clusters and outbreaks are detected and 
investigated in a timely manner that will flow on to timely public health action to 
prevent further cases. 
The individual aims of NELSS and the key review findings for each aim are listed 
below in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Key findings of the review of NELSS, 2014. 
Aims of NELSS Review findings 
1. Timely characterisation of L. monocytogenes 
isolates for routine and outbreak surveillance 
and reporting to state and territory health 
departments and to the National Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System. 
Delays in obtaining definitive typing results due to 
referral of isolates to laboratories prior to the national 
reference laboratory, batching of isolates for sending 
and batching of isolates for testing results in NELSS 
not meeting this aim. 
2. Regular analysis of L. monocytogenes 
routine surveillance data to identify potential 
intra-jurisdiction and multi-jurisdiction clusters. 
Analysis of the routine surveillance data is conducted 
fortnightly, thus NELSS consistently meets this aim. 
Jurisdictional reference laboratories could be more 
involved in surveillance via access to the system or 
surveillance reports. 
3. Timely epidemiological investigation of 
related L. monocytogenes cases for a common 
source. 
Delays in characterisation of isolates may affect timely 
epidemiological investigations. Timeliness of 
characterisation did improve during outbreak 
investigations. NELSS only partially met this aim. 
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Recommendations 
Whilst NELSS has proven its usefulness in the detection of listeriosis clusters and 
outbreaks, this review proposes the following recommendations for OzFoodNet’s 
consideration: 
1. Develop and document NELSS definitions for ‘cluster’ and ‘outbreak’ to assist 
with fortnightly reports and case-case analyses. 
2. Develop a data dictionary for NELSS. 
3. Reassess minimum targets for definitive testing results to be entered into 
NELSS. 
4. Establish a log of cluster investigations to assist analysis. Such a record 
would assist the epidemiological analysis of clusters, particularly when 
considering case definitions for case-case analysis. 
5. Add separate fields in NetEpi to collect other laboratory typing data such as 
multiple-locus variable-number tandem repeat analysis results and a unique 
laboratory identifier for isolate tracking.  
6. Provide access to NetEpi or specific reports for laboratory staff to improve 
isolate tracking. 
7. Determine whether the current definitive characterisation method for human 
listeriosis isolates is still appropriate. 
8. Provide NetEpi training and capacity building for OzFoodNet staff.  
9. Consider funding for reference laboratories to conduct definitive testing within 
stipulated timelines. 
10. Replace NetEpi with a system that allows database integration. This will limit 
data duplication and the need for users to have multiple databases, 
particularly if other enhanced surveillance systems are established. 
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1 Introduction 
OzFoodNet is an Australian Government initiative that was established in 2000. 
The network consists of nine state or territory-based sites and OzFoodNet 
central. The purpose of OzFoodNet is to investigate the epidemiology of 
foodborne diseases, to provide a better understanding of their causes and 
incidents in the community, and to provide evidence for policy and practice (1). 
Listeriosis was made nationally notifiable in Australia in 1991, with the collection 
of enhanced laboratory typing and food history/exposure data in a web-based 
system, NetEpi, from 2010. Prior to the establishment of the enhanced 
surveillance system, laboratory-confirmed listeriosis cases were only captured in 
the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) and in the event 
of an outbreak, the OzFoodNet Outbreak Register or an outbreak case 
management system. Case information such as demographics and basic 
laboratory data were collected by states and territories, however, laboratory 
subtyping of listeriosis cases was not standardised nationally, and no risk factor 
data were collected and collated nationally. This meant the detection of multi-
jurisdictional outbreaks was neither sensitive nor timely. 
Table 2 lists recognised outbreaks and clusters that were investigated prior to the 
introduction of enhanced surveillance of listeriosis in Australia. 
Table 2: Listeriosis outbreaks and clusters investigated prior to 2010. 
Year Location Setting Cases Deaths Food 
implicated 
References 
1991 TAS Community 3 0 Imported 
smoked 
mussels 
(2, 3) 
1997-
1999 
NSW Hospital 9 6 Fruit salad 
(4) 
2004 SA Community 2 2 Unknown (5) 
2005 SA Hospital 4 2 RTE meats (6) 
2009 QLD, 
VIC, 
NSW, 
SA, WA 
and TAS 
Airline, 
catering 
company 
13 laboratory 
confirmed and 23 
epidemiologically-
linked non-
invasive cases 
3 Chicken 
wraps 
(7) 
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The aims of the National Enhanced Listeriosis Surveillance System (NELSS) as 
per the ‘National surveillance of invasive human Listeria monocytogenes infection 
OzFoodNet conceptual plan (2 September 2010)’ are: 
Timely detection and investigation of possible clusters of human 
L. monocytogenes infections through: 
1. Timely characterisation of L. monocytogenes isolates for routine and outbreak 
surveillance and reporting to state and territory health departments and to the 
NNDSS. 
2. Regular analysis of L. monocytogenes routine surveillance data to identify 
potential intra-jurisdiction and multi-jurisdiction clusters. 
3. Timely epidemiological investigation of related L. monocytogenes cases for a 
common source. 
The typing and subtyping tests conducted on all human listeriosis isolates under 
this plan include serotyping (ST), binary typing (BT) and pulse field gel 
electrophoresis (PFGE). Multilocus sequence typing (MLST) was being 
conducted on human listeriosis isolates, though the Microbiological Diagnostic 
Unit Public Health Laboratory (MDU) ceased this in 2013. Since 2012, multiple-
locus variable-number tandem repeat analysis (MLVA) has also been conducted 
routinely on isolates. According to the conceptual plan, human listeriosis isolates 
should be definitively characterised within 19 days of a diagnosing laboratory 
confirming L. monocytogenes. Additionally, risk factor data should be collected 
and entered into the centralised database within the same time period. Currently, 
all definitive molecular subtyping of human listeriosis isolates is conducted by the 
national reference laboratory, MDU in Melbourne, without a formal agreement in 
place and without funding. 
OzFoodNet central coordinates the maintenance of and reporting from NELSS. 
Data are reviewed fortnightly, analysed for clusters and a report detailing national 
subtyping results of human listeriosis cases is distributed among OzFoodNet 
epidemiologists and the national reference laboratory. The collection of enhanced 
laboratory and exposure data allows for timely analysis of common exposures in 
an outbreak setting. It also allows for the identification of clusters by molecular 
subtyping at a national level and subsequent analysis of exposures. 
Data flow for NELSS is summarised in Figure 1. There are different testing 
capacities within jurisdictional reference laboratories, and interview procedures 
for jurisdictional health departments vary, which make data flow into NELSS quite 
complex. 
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Figure 1: Summary of data flow for NELSS
 
 
2 Aims and objectives 
The purpose of this review is to determine if NELSS, the only national enhanced 
surveillance system for a foodborne disease, is achieving the aims under which it 
was established. This will help inform whether or not NELSS is an effective model 
for enhanced surveillance of foodborne diseases and thus, whether it could be 
used as a template for other foodborne diseases. Additionally whilst elements of 
the costing of NELSS described in this report may be specific to human listeriosis 
surveillance, it could be used as indicative costs in plans to establish enhanced 
surveillance systems for other foodborne diseases. 
 
The aims of this review are: 
1. To determine whether NELSS has been used to achieve the timely 
detection and investigation of possible clusters and outbreaks; and, 
2. To estimate the costs of running NELSS. 
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3 Methods 
3.1 Stakeholder interviews 
Users of NELSS (data collectors, those who enter the data and those who 
analyse and report on the data) were interviewed about their experiences using 
NELSS. Specifically these stakeholders were asked how they contribute to and 
use NELSS, the time expended in doing so, and the enablers and barriers to 
using NELSS. 
Interviews were conducted with staff from 10 OzFoodNet sites, nine state or 
territory-based sites (Australian Capital Territory, Hunter New England, New 
South Wales, Northern Territory, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, 
Victoria and Western Australia) and OzFoodNet central. These interviews were 
also used to determine how many clusters and outbreaks have been investigated 
by OzFoodNet since the establishment of NELSS. 
Interviews were also conducted with staff from jurisdictional reference 
laboratories to understand how the laboratory data that are entered into NELSS 
are generated. The five laboratories were: Institute for Clinical Pathology and 
Medical Research, Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific Services, 
PathWest Laboratory Medicine, SA Pathology and the national reference 
laboratory (MDU). 
Qualitative thematic analysis (8-10) was conducted separately on the OzFoodNet 
and Laboratory staff interview data, looking for common patterns or themes in the 
responses. This was conducted in the following steps: 
1. data entry and familiarisation; 
2. initial coding of responses into labels (i.e. data entry only, analysis, reporting); 
3. combining of labels into over-arching themes and list theme frequencies; and 
4. accurately defining themes, what they capture and what is interesting about 
them. 
3.1.1 Operating costs of NELSS 
As part of the interviews, OzFoodNet staff were asked about the amount of time 
they expend in using NELSS. This time includes interviews, data entry and any 
analysis of human listeriosis cases.  
To calculate the costs of these interviews, salaries from recently advertised 
OzFoodNet epidemiologist positions (n=6) were used. These advertised salaries 
ranged from $82,500 to $112,053 per year. A salary of $95,387 was used by 
calculating the midpoint for each salary then averaging the six midpoints. The 
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cost of interview, data entry and analysis was calculated to be $48.92 per hour, 
using a standard 7.5 hour working day. 
During interviews with laboratory staff, information was sought on tests carried 
out and the estimated laboratory costs for each test per human listeriosis isolate. 
Only reference laboratories were interviewed, and this costing does not take into 
account initial tests for notification. 
3.2 NELSS data analysis 
All notified human listeriosis cases were extracted from the web-based NELSS 
database on 3 February 2014, with onset dates ranging from 1 January 2010 to 
31 December 2013. The exported Microsoft Excel file was imported into Stata 
intercooled v10 (Stata Corp, Collage Station, TX, USA) for analysis. 
Descriptive analysis was conducted on the data. Cases were summarised by 
age, gender, state/territory and known risk factors (comorbidities, pregnancy and 
age). 
For national surveillance, there is no formal definition for a cluster. The current 
working definition is three or more cases with the same MDU PFGE type/pattern 
over a 24 week period. The NELSS data were analysed retrospectively for 
clusters using this detection algorithm. OzFoodNet surveillance reports were 
reviewed to determine when clusters were detected and investigated. 
The NELSS conceptual plan states that human listeriosis isolates should be 
definitively characterised within 19 days of a diagnosing laboratory confirming 
L. monocytogenes. Definitive characterisation was considered complete when the 
MDU PFGE result was entered into NELSS. The reason for choosing this is that 
the MDU PFGE result is currently used in both the cluster detection algorithm and 
case-case analysis. 
To calculate the time between when a health department was notified of the 
result of L. monocytogenes (notification date) and the date the definitive 
characterisation (MDU PFGE) was entered into NELSS, time and date stamps for 
when records were created and updated in NetEpi were extracted. This was used 
to determine the amount of time in days it took to complete a record in terms of 
entering definitive laboratory data and epidemiological interview data, compared 
with the timelines proposed in the NELSS conceptual plan. 
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4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
At the time of data extraction (3 February 2014), there were 305 cases of human 
invasive listeriosis entered into NELSS, of which 52% (157/303) were female. 
Two cases were missing details on gender. The median age of cases was 71 
years (range 0 to 97 years). Eighty-five per cent (260/305) of cases were aged 50 
years or older and 19 cases were listed as pregnancy-related. 
Eighty-one per cent (246/305) of cases reported comorbidities such as diabetes, 
heart disease, renal/kidney disease or cancer. Just over half (54%, 165/305) of 
the cases had two or more comorbidities. The majority (94%, 288/305) of cases 
were hospitalised and 14% (42/305) died. Of the pregnancy related cases, five 
resulted in foetal death, and a further two were stillborn or died soon after 
delivery. 
The larger jurisdictions of New South Wales (n=113) and Victoria (n=103) 
reported the majority (71%, 216/305) of cases, with 2012 recording the most 
cases in a single year (n=92) (Table 3). 
Table 3: Human invasive listeriosis cases by jurisdiction and year, 2010 to 2013, 
NELSS (n=305). 
State 2010 2011 2012 2013 
ACT 2 1 0 1 
NSW 26 20 39 28 
NT 0 1 0 3 
QLD 9 9 5 9 
SA 1 6 4 2 
TAS 3 2 3 2 
VIC 28 22 33 20 
WA 3 7 8 8 
Total 72 68 92 73 
 
4.2 Stakeholder interviews 
4.2.1 OzFoodNet staff interviews 
As of April 2014, 11 clusters and six outbreaks had been investigated; of which 
five were multi-jurisdictional (Table 4). These clusters and outbreaks involved 107 
cases of invasive listeriosis and 19 deaths. All five multi-jurisdictional 
investigations and three jurisdictional investigations (all of which were from one 
jurisdiction) were detected using analysis of NELSS data. The remainder (n=9) 
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were detected from local jurisdictional analysis. Only South Australia and the 
Northern Territory have not had any clusters or outbreaks detected only within 
their jurisdictions since the implementation of NELSS. 
Table 4: Human listeriosis outbreaks and clusters detected since the 
establishment of NELSS, NELSS OzFoodNet interviews. 
Jurisdiction Year Cases Deaths Food implicated 
MJOI (VIC, QLD and NSW)  2010 9 2 Rockmelons (11, 12) 
MJOI (VIC)  2010 6 4 Unknown (11, 12) 
MJOI (NSW and VIC) 2012 3 1 Smoked Salmon 
MJOI (NSW and VIC) 2012 14 0 Smoked Salmon 
MJOI (ACT, NSW, QLD, VIC, 
TAS and WA) 
2012-2013 34 4 Cheese 
ACT 2010 2 1 Unknown 
ACT 2011 1 0 Unknown 
TAS 2013 2 0 Unknown. 
WA 2012 4 1 Unknown 
WA 2013 3 0 Catered meals 
QLD 2013 4 0 Unknown 
NSW 2013 3 0 Profiteroles 
NSW 2012 2 0 Unknown 
VIC 2010 6 4 Cold roast meat 
VIC 2011 6 1 Unknown 
VIC 2011 4 1 Unknown 
VIC 2012 4 0 Unknown 
MJOI – Multi-jurisdictional outbreak investigation 
Interviews identified that all sites shared a common view that NELSS is a 
valuable system as it was a central repository for all exposure and laboratory 
data for human listeriosis cases, and allowed the detection of multi-jurisdictional 
clusters and outbreaks. Despite one jurisdiction stating that state-specific clusters 
had been detected via NELSS, all sites reported that clusters would be detected 
through their routine surveillance systems rather than NELSS. 
 ‘Coordinated enhanced surveillance and definitive typing data in one 
system, this is the successful part of the whole system’. 
All sites reported some level of duplication of data entry (data entered into 
NELSS and other state based systems), though this was not viewed as 
burdensome by any site. Three sites use NELSS as the only database for the 
collection of their enhanced data (epidemiological and laboratory) on human 
listeriosis cases, as their existing systems were unable to hold this additional 
data. In addition to entering data into the state notifiable disease surveillance 
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system and NELSS, 40% (4/10) of sites also use additional databases to hold 
data. Two of these four sites had multiple additional databases (two additional) 
for listeriosis data. The reason for additional databases was that NELSS was 
unable to hold data on isolate tracking (isolates sent between laboratories), food 
and environmental testing, and information on cases of non-invasive listeriosis. A 
common theme was that no site viewed NELSS as adequate for their 
jurisdictional-specific listeriosis surveillance needs. 
‘Our state currently has four databases for listeria and it would be great if 
NELSS could replace some of these.’ 
‘We have a food testing spreadsheet as NetEpi won’t hold food testing 
results.’ 
Only one site (OzFoodNet central) regularly analyses NELSS data, as per its role 
as the coordinator of the system. Therefore the aim of regular analysis of routine 
surveillance data, from the current conceptual plan, is being met. This analysis 
involves a fortnightly review of NELSS data and national reporting via the ‘listeria 
surveillance report’. At the time of this analysis personnel changes at OzFoodNet 
central resulted in national surveillance reports being conducted by other 
OzFoodNet sites. As only a few people in the OzFoodNet network were familiar 
with the national surveillance procedures, there is a need to upskill others to 
ensure regular analysis of L. monocytogenes routine surveillance data is 
maintained. 
‘We need to improve the capacity within the network for review and 
analysis of the NELSS data.’ 
Three sites reported occasionally analysing NELSS data during routine 
jurisdictional listeriosis surveillance. The reasons for sites not using NELSS data, 
or only using it sporadically, included: being unaware that they could use the data 
for their own analysis and preference for other databases. All sites stated that 
their own systems were used for rapid analysis and basic descriptive 
epidemiological analysis as they were easier to use. 
When a local cluster was detected, all sites that conducted case interviews 
devote additional time in responding to cases by, re-interviewing cases, probing 
more on specific questions and actively following up with laboratories for test 
results. It was evident during the interviews that there was a lack of a clear case 
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definition of a ‘cluster’ or ‘outbreak’ among sites. It was a recommendation of the 
review by Kate Astridge in 2011 that “…criteria for identifying clusters/outbreaks 
and for when these are to be further investigated…” be developed (13) and 
OzFoodNet are seeking expert opinion to help create these (personal 
communication, Gerard Fitzsimmons, former OzFoodNet Coordinating 
Epidemiologist).  
Case-case analysis is initiated when epidemiologists within the OzFoodNet 
network believe a potential cluster required further investigation. It was noted that 
there was a lack of NELSS-specific ‘how to’ documentation or historical records 
from previous case-case analyses. This, combined with staff changes within the 
network, has limited case-case analysis being conducted on NELSS data for at 
least the past 12 months. Again this shows a need to upskill those within the 
network to ensure the data in NELSS are used to assist in cluster/outbreak 
investigations and the need for documentation of any analyses. 
When asked what aspects of NELSS sites would like see improved, answers 
included: more data fields for the laboratory typing results (both MLVA and MLST 
are entered into a free text field) and better integration of databases to limit 
duplication of data entry. 
‘I would like to see more fields for the other typing data, MLVA and 
MLST…’ 
‘…it would be great to integrate it (NELSS) with state systems to remove 
(data) duplication.’ 
4.2.2 Laboratory staff interviews 
Laboratory staff also viewed NELSS as extremely beneficial, with the centralised 
collection of definitive subtyping data improving the timeliness of cluster 
detection.  
‘Five years ago outbreak identification was by phage type and was reactive 
only. Phage typing was slow and not very good for differentiation.’ 
Three of the four jurisdictional reference laboratories refer their isolates onto the 
national reference laboratory for further testing directly. PathWest Laboratory 
Medicine WA send their isolates to Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific 
Services, who then send them on to MDU. A full list of laboratories and the tests 
they conduct on human listeriosis isolates are listed in Table 5.  
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Table 5: Laboratory name and the tests conducted on human listeriosis isolates, 
NELSS laboratory interviews. 
Laboratory name Tests conducted PFGE method 
Institute for Clinical Pathology 
and Medical Research, New 
South Wales 
BT 
MLVA 
N/A 
Queensland Health Forensic and 
Scientific Services, Queensland 
ST 
BT 
MLVA 
N/A 
PathWest Laboratory Medicine, 
Western Australia 
PFGE PulseNet (14) 
SA Pathology, South Australia ST (O1 or O4 only) N/A 
Microbiological Diagnostic Unit 
Public Health Laboratory, Victoria 
BT 
Molecular ST 
MLVA 
PFGE 
Whole genome sequencing 
MDU Method 
BT – Binary typing 
ST – Serotyping 
PFGE – Pulse field gel electrophoresis 
MLVA – Multiple-locus variable number tandem repeat analysis  
 
Upon receipt of isolates, these laboratories can theoretically report results for BT 
and ST within 24 to 48 hours and MLVA and PFGE within one to two weeks. All 
but one laboratory stated that these timelines would speed up during a human 
listeriosis outbreak investigation, with urgent results being communicated via 
telephone where required. Other ways in which timelines could be reduced 
included: referring isolates on as they are received instead of batching requests, 
testing of single isolates and testing outside of normal working hours. 
One theme that carried through from all laboratories was that there is currently no 
funding, contract or agreement in place for definitive characterisation of human 
listeriosis isolates to be conducted within certain timelines. Whilst the theoretical 
timelines mentioned above are what is possible, in reality, these timelines may 
vary depending on testing requirements (number of isolates needed to run a 
test), laboratory resources and other competing priorities. 
‘No one pays for the isolate testing, so asking labs to drop stuff in an 
outbreak situation to do more testing is a big burden…’ 
‘As there is no funding or contract to deliver results within a certain timeline, 
tests are conducted when they can be done.’ 
During outbreak investigations, the reference laboratory has been unable to link 
their isolate testing results to NELSS records. MDU suggested the addition of a 
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field in NELSS for a laboratory unique identifier (such as MDU unique identifier) 
for case isolate tracking. 
‘As we don’t have access to NetEpi, we can’t tell whether an isolate has 
been received for a case (in NELSS) or even processed.’ 
One laboratory (MDU) is currently conducting quality assurance testing to 
establish whole genome sequencing of human listeriosis isolates. This test takes 
approximately two weeks. With a move to whole genome sequencing, MDU had 
stopped conducting MLST and in future will also stop BT, ST and MLVA. Whilst 
sequencing produces an enormous amount of information-rich data, it cannot be 
stored in NetEpi.  
4.3 Timeliness 
The median number of days from when the jurisdictional health department was 
notified of L. monocytogenes to epidemiological data (not including follow-up or 
re-interview data) being entered into NELSS was eight days (range 0 to 619 
days). The median number of days to complete the epidemiological data did 
improve over time from 46 days (2 to 619 days) in 2010 to five days (0 to 86 
days) in 2013. 
Over two-thirds (69%, 210/305) of cases in NELSS had epidemiological data 
entered in 19 days or less of the notification date. This result also improved over 
time with 97% (71/73) of 2013 cases completed in 19 days or less (Table 6). 
Table 6: Median number of days to enter epidemiological data and number 
completed (N) in 19 days or less, by year, 2010 to 2013, NELSS. 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Median days to complete 
epidemiological data (range) 
46 (2 to 619) 8 (0 to 466) 7 (0 to 182) 5 (0 to 
86) 
8 (0 to 619) 
N (%) completed in 19 days or 
less 
21 (30) 49 (72) 69 (75) 71 (97) 210 (69) 
 
The median number of days for initial subtyping data (ST and BT) to be entered 
into NELSS was 37 days (range 0 to 619 days). This median did improve over 
time, reducing from 91 days (range 15 to 619 days) in 2010 to 18 days (range 0 
to 168 days) in 2013.  
The MLVA protocol used in Australia was developed by the Queensland Health 
Forensic and Scientific Services (15) and is currently used in Queensland, New 
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South Wales and Victoria. In 2013, the median number of days from when the 
jurisdictional health department was notified of a case of listeriosis to the MLVA 
result being entered into NELSS was 22 days (0 to 172 days). 
Of the 279 records in NELSS where MDU PFGE results have been entered, the 
median number of days it took from when the jurisdictional health department 
was notified of L. monocytogenes to the MDU PFGE result being entered into 
NELSS was 51 days (range 6 to 1,032 days). Only 12% (38/305) of records had 
the MDU PFGE results entered into NELSS in 19 days or less of the jurisdictional 
health department being notified of the case. Both the median number of days to 
complete a record and the percentage of records completed in 19 days or less of 
being notified improved over time (Table 7) however, each year still had some 
substantial outliers.  
When conducting case-case analysis using NELSS data, sporadic cases within 
one incubation period (70 days) of the first cluster-related case are compared. 
Additionally, all records with missing definitive subtyping results or no 
epidemiological data are excluded from the analysis. The MDU PFGE results for 
more than half of all records (59%, 180/305) were entered within 70 days or less 
(Table 7). The cases completed within 70 days or less also improved over time. 
Table 7: Median number of days to enter definitive typing results, number 
completed (N) in 19 days or less and 70 days or less by year, 2010 to 2013, 
NELSS. 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Median days to complete 
PFGE data (range) 
106 (17 to 1,032) 50 (9 to 739) 44 (10 to 210) 37 (6 to 284) 51 (6 to 1,032) 
N (%) completed in 19 
days or less 
1 (1) 9 (13) 15 (16) 13 (18) 38 (12) 
N (%) completed in 70 
days or less 
14 (19) 44 (65) 66 (72) 55 (75) 180 (59) 
 
The median number of days to complete a record (PFGE results entered) varied 
by jurisdiction, with Victoria having the lowest median days and Western 
Australia, the highest (Table 8). Despite having differing notification dates for 
listeriosis cases within their jurisdiction, New South Wales, Queensland and 
Western Australia had several cases with definitive testing results entered on the 
same day.  
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Table 8: Median number of days and range to enter definitive typing results by 
jurisdiction, 2010 to 2013, NELSS. 
State Median days to complete PFGE data (range) 
ACT 40 (21 to 84) 
NSW 60 (10 to 1,032) 
NT 44 (24 to 59) 
QLD 56 (14 to 739) 
SA 72 (13 to 619) 
TAS 39 (20 to 96) 
VIC 27 (6 to 193) 
WA 82 (39 to 315) 
 
Records for outbreak-associated cases (36 days, range 6 to 151 days) were also 
completed faster than those for sporadic cases (55 days, range 9 to 1,032 days). 
Additionally, there was a slight improvement in completion time for all records 
during the most recent and largest multi-jurisdictional listeriosis outbreak 
involving soft cheese in 2013 (34 days, range 6 to 284 days). 
4.4 Cluster Identification 
Nine separate PFGE profile clusters were identified through retrospective cluster 
analysis. Of these, three clusters could not be detected by the algorithm as cases 
occurred before regular surveillance was initiated (from 20 March 2010). Of the 
remaining six clusters, only two had the PFGE entered into NELSS in a 
timeframe that allowed detection according to the algorithm and one potential 
cluster was missed entirely. 
4.5 Costing of NELSS 
Sites reported that interviews for human listeriosis cases ranged from 30 minutes 
to two hours, data entry from 20 minutes to an hour and analysis 30 minutes to 
two hours. These figures do not take into account the time to follow up cases or 
next of kin for interview, follow-up for re-interview or obtain laboratory results. 
Fortnightly cluster analysis and reporting by OzFoodNet central took 
approximately two hours.  
Taking the maximum time for interview, data entry and analysis, we calculated 5 
hours per human invasive listeriosis case at a cost of $48.92 per hour. Thus the 
estimated cost for the epidemiological data for a single human listeriosis case is 
$244.60. 
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Tests carried out on each human listeriosis isolate include ST ($50), BT ($35 to 
$50), MLVA ($45 to $150) and PFGE ($250). Whilst MDU is currently conducting 
whole genome sequencing, this was not factored into the costing as it is still 
being established. Using the upper ranges of stated costs for tests, the cost of 
isolate subtyping of each human listeriosis isolate is $500. 
Combining both the gathered time costs for the epidemiological data and isolate 
testing costs from reference laboratories, we found that each case is estimated to 
cost approximately $750 for complete data for NELSS. With an average of 76 
cases in NELSS each year between 2010 and 2013, this equates to 
approximately $57,000 a year. 
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5 Discussion 
Invasive listeriosis is a disease that can have serious consequences for 
vulnerable populations. OzFoodNet has been conducting enhanced surveillance 
on all invasive human listeriosis cases since 1 January 2010 using a web-based 
system. 
The purpose of this review was to answer whether or not NELSS was meeting 
the aims under which it was established and followed on from the work of Kate 
Astridge in 2011 (13). It should be noted here that whilst the conceptual plan for 
NELSS detailed the aims and expected timelines for the system, there is neither 
formal agreement nor funding in place for the definitive laboratory 
characterisation of human listeriosis isolates. 
All those interviewed considered NELSS as extremely valuable, and the 
acceptability of the system was high. Interviewees reported the main benefits of 
NELSS were being able to use the data to detect multi-jurisdictional clusters and 
outbreaks and a centralised collection point for all enhanced human listeriosis 
epidemiological and laboratory data.  
OzFoodNet staff viewed such benefits as outweighing the weaknesses arising 
from system limitations, specifically, jurisdictional databases being unable to 
communicate with NELSS and thus having to double enter data. OzFoodNet, and 
the Australian Government, should consider other platforms that allow database 
integration, particularly if enhanced surveillance systems for other diseases are 
established. 
Whilst the success of NELSS has been demonstrated through the detection of 
multi-jurisdictional and jurisdictional clusters and outbreaks, overall, the system 
does not completely match the requirements of those using it. Being unaware of 
the reporting capabilities of NetEpi and NELSS not holding all available case 
information, resulted in OzFoodNet staff preferring other systems for analysis and 
reporting. This highlights the need for more training and capacity building in the 
use of NetEpi. 
A recommendation of the review by Astridge 2011 was for clusters and outbreaks 
investigated using NELSS to be documented (13). As this recommendation has 
not been implemented, the only way to collect the presented information on 
investigated clusters or outbreaks was through the stakeholder interviews and 
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searching OzFoodNet surveillance reports. Such a record would assist the 
epidemiological analysis of clusters, particularly when considering case 
definitions for case-case analysis. This, along with capacity building within the 
OzFoodNet network for surveillance, analysis and reporting, should be 
considered as priorities. 
Less than 15% of all records had definitive test results (MDU PFGE) entered into 
NELSS within the 19 day timeframe, despite laboratories reporting that subtyping 
of human listeriosis isolates could be carried out within two weeks of receiving 
isolates. The median number of days from the jurisdictional health department 
being notified of a human listeriosis case to the epidemiological and definitive 
characterisation data being entered into NELSS did improve over time. However, 
over 80% of cases in 2013 were still not completed in NELSS within the agreed 
conceptual plan timelines.  
Delays in definitive characterisation results being entered in NELSS can also 
affect case-case analysis. For 2013, a quarter of cases were potentially excluded 
from any case-case analysis due to missing definitive typing results. This result is 
noteworthy, as key data on cluster/outbreak-related cases or sporadic cases 
could be excluded during any analysis. These delays result in NELSS not 
meeting the aim of timely characterisation of isolates and reporting, as per the 
current conceptual plan. These delays also affect any potential investigation, 
meaning that NELSS is only partially meeting the timely investigation of clusters 
for a common source. OzFoodNet, in collaboration with reference laboratories, 
may wish to reconsider the current conceptual timelines and the minimum targets 
for definitive testing results.  
Delays in entering the PFGE results into NELSS have resulted in the late 
identification or non-detection of possible clusters. Only two clusters identified 
retrospectively from the NELSS data had the PFGE profiles entered into NELSS 
in a timeframe in which the current algorithm could detect them. If clusters are 
being missed then the opportunity to implement public health measures to limit 
listeriosis outbreaks are also being missed. 
One way to reduce the median number of days to complete a record in NELSS 
could be to change the definitive characterisation method. Currently, the PFGE 
results reported by MDU are used as definitive characterisation for human 
listeriosis isolates. The median number of days to complete the BT and ST 
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results in NELSS was considerably less than for PFGE. The lowering of 
specificity and increasing of sensitivity for the case-case analysis case definition 
using BT/ST would result in the identification of more ‘potential’ clusters requiring 
greater analysis and follow-up.  
MLVA is a method that has the potential to offer similar levels of specificity and 
sensitivity as PFGE, with shorter turnaround times and lower cost. Due to MLVA 
being a relatively new type of test conducted on human listeriosis isolates, the 
results are currently entered into a free text field that captures any additional 
testing information. Furthermore, any case-case analysis would be limited due to 
the lack of historical MLVA data for comparison without testing of old isolates. It 
should be noted that determining whether or not MLVA could replace PFGE as 
the definitive typing method for NELSS was outside the scope of this review. 
The referral of isolates to jurisdictional reference laboratories prior to being 
referred to the national reference laboratory appears to increase the time it takes 
to complete a record in NELSS. One reason for this may be the batching of 
isolates for referral or batching of isolates for testing within a laboratory. 
Forwarding of individual isolates, as opposed to batching, and conducting tests 
on single isolates would be expensive if conducted routinely. Whilst delays due to 
batching may be unavoidable outside of an outbreak investigation, sites and 
laboratories should seek to minimise these delays where possible. 
During interviews, both OzFoodNet and laboratory staff stated that during a 
cluster or outbreak investigation, responses to individual cases change, resulting 
in further follow-up and shorter turnaround times for testing results. This was 
reflected in the data, with outbreak-related cases having a smaller median 
number of days to complete the record than sporadic cases.  
A limitation of NELSS was the inability to track isolates that have been sent for 
testing. The addition of a field for a unique laboratory identifier is a simple 
modification that would allow both laboratories and OzFoodNet staff to better 
track isolate movements around the country. Additionally giving laboratory staff 
access to NELSS, either directly or indirectly via specific reports, would assist in 
knowing which isolates are yet to be received by laboratories and the status of 
MDU definitive characterisation. The ability to track isolates was viewed as an 
improvement for NELSS by both OzFoodNet and laboratory staff. 
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Another issue for NELSS that will require planning and consideration is the 
potential move to whole genome sequencing. Whilst this method has the 
potential to offer more information than current techniques, the disadvantages are 
that NetEpi is unable to store the immense amount of data generated through 
sequencing and the interpretation of this data is more complex. This information 
would not be in a format that allows easy labelling or distinguishing between 
subtypes of an organism. This would make case-case analysis unfeasible, as it 
would be unmanageable to differentiate between sporadic and cluster-related 
cases. 
It is difficult to determine whether NELSS operates within a timely manner without 
a comparison. PulseNet is a national laboratory network of 87 laboratories in all 
50 American states (14, 16). This network is partially funded by the United States 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and relies on a PFGE 
methodology that is different to the MDU method. A multistate listeriosis outbreak 
in 2012 in the United States of America linked to rockmelons affected 147 people, 
with 33 deaths from five different outbreak strains. Twenty-one days after the 
onset of the first listeriosis case linked to this outbreak, the Colorado Department 
of Public Health and Environment notified the CDC regarding seven cases of 
listeriosis in their jurisdiction. Within four days PulseNet had defined the outbreak 
strains and 10 days later, the food source had been identified and a recall was 
initiated for contaminated product (17). This is an example of a system that works 
effectively to rapidly identify and investigate listeriosis clusters and outbreaks. 
PulseNet differs from NELSS, in that definitive molecular typing can be provided 
by multiple laboratories and the network has partial centralised funding. 
OzFoodNet may wish to consider such a model in order to enhance the 
timeliness of listeriosis cluster and outbreak detection and investigation. 
During the interview process for this review, stakeholders were asked about the 
number of hours taken to collect, enter and analyse data for NELSS and the 
costs for laboratory tests. It should be noted that the aim was not to undertake a 
complete costing, and this analysis does not include factors such as the time 
required for following up cases for additional interviews, laboratory staff time or 
initial testing carried out in notifying laboratories. Combining both the staff costs 
for gathering the epidemiological and the laboratory tests, the cost for NELSS 
equates to approximately $57,000 a year. This is a minor amount compared with 
  
  96 
  
the estimated costs of over $83 million for listeriosis cases in Australia annually, 
based on 2000 data (18). 
With no contract in place or specific funding provided for the definitive 
characterisation of human listeriosis isolates, reference laboratories absorb the 
costs of isolate characterisation. The CDNA discussion paper Towards a 
Communicable Disease Control Framework for Australia (19) identified an urgent 
need for a sustainable financial model for communicable disease surveillance 
and specialised testing by public health laboratories in Australia. Financial 
mechanisms that would support specialised testing, such as definitive 
characterisation of human listeriosis isolates, would ensure specific typing results 
were obtained within specified timelines. 
NELSS has been invaluable in the detection of listeriosis clusters and outbreaks 
in Australia, and has assisted in the identification and investigation of possible 
sources of these. Overall NELSS is an effective and relatively inexpensive model 
for enhanced surveillance of foodborne diseases. Nevertheless, delays obtaining 
definitive characterisation results of human listeriosis isolates do prevent NELSS 
from meeting all the aims under which it was established. Whilst much of the 
design of NELSS could be considered disease-specific, the system as a whole 
could be used as a template for enhanced surveillance for other foodborne 
diseases. If additional enhanced surveillance systems were to be considered, 
issues such as funding for definitive testing, capacity for analysis and reporting, 
suitable systems that allow database integration and the ability to evolve with 
future laboratory techniques would need to be considered. 
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Appendix 2: NELSS review presentation – 43rd OzFoodNet face-to-face meeting, 
22 - 23 July 2014, Sydney. 
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Appendix 3: OzFoodNet response to the NELSS review recommendations, 
November 2014. 
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Appendix 4: National listeriosis questionnaire 
 Sporadic case       Listeria           
 Case part of outbreak - Outbreak ref_____________Case Questionnaire 
 
 
 
PRIVACY MESSAGE : The information you provide in this questionnaire is for the purpose of trying 
to prevent further cases of illness. We do this by trying to find out what is likely to have caused your illness 
and also by providing you with information to reduce the spread of illness to others. The data collected is 
kept confidential and identifying information will not be disclosed for any other purpose without your 
consent. You can access your information by contacting the Department of Human Services. A fact sheet 
is available (“Privacy Legislation & Notification of Infectious Diseases – Information for Patients”) if you 
would like further information   Information read?    
Note: The following preliminary information can be recorded prior to interview if known 
 
Person interviewed (if not case):     
Patient details 
 
First Name: ________________________ Address: 
 ______________________________ 
Last Name: ________________________  
 ______________________________ 
Telephone:  ____________________ (Home)  
 ______________________________ 
                    ____________________ (Mobile)  Post Code: _________ 
                    ____________________ (Work)  Occupation: 
 ________________________ 
Date of Birth:  _____ / _____ / ________  Age:  ______  Sex:    Male / Female
  
Do you identify yourself as indigenous or of a particular ethnic background?    Yes    No 
If yes: 
  Aboriginal        TSI         both Aboriginal & TSI       other: _________________________ 
Country of birth:  ______________________  Language spoken at home:  ___________________ 
Case admitted to hospital?   Yes    No   Hospital: 
__________________________________ 
Date of admission: ____ / ____ / ________ Date of discharge:  ____ / ____ / ______ 
Hospital UR#: _________________________ Notification Date:  ____ / ____ / ______ 
Reason for admission:   Listeriosis    Other ________________________________________ 
Treating Doctor: _______________________________ Telephone:  _____________________ 
Hospital / Medical Practice:  ________________________________________________________ 
Attempt Date Time Outcome 
 1 ___ / ___ / _______ _______  am / pm _________ 
2 ___ / ___ / _______ _______  am / pm _________ 
3 ___ / ___ / _______ _______  am / pm _________ 
4 ___ / ___ / _______ _______  am / pm _________ 
Call Outcomes 
OC1 – No Answer 
OC2 – Subject not home, call back 
OC3 – Appointment to call back 
OC4 – Refusal 
OC5 - Interviewed 
Interviewer: ___________________ 
Date of interview: _____/____/____ 
State ID no.:  __________________ 
National ID no.: ________________ 
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Medical & diagnostic information 
Typing Result Conducted by (lab name): 
Serotype (PCR)   
Binary type   
Has the isolate been forwarded for further typing?      Yes    No    
PFGE   
Other:  
_____________________ 
 
  
 
  Non-perinatal case 
Culture site (case):   CSF     Blood     Other _____ Collection date: __ / __/ ___ Day: ______ 
 
Nature of illness (case):  Meningitis     Septicaemia     Other _________________________ 
Outcome:   Survived   
   Died        Date of death: __ / ___/ ___       Death due to listeriosis?  Yes  No   
   Unknown   
 
  Perinatal case         
 
Mother 
 
Foetus / Neonate 
Culture Site Specimen collection date Culture Site Specimen collection date 
 
 Blood ____ / ____ / _____  Blood ____ / ____ / _____ 
 CSF ____ / ____ / _____  CSF ____ / ____ / _____ 
 Placenta ____ / ____ / _____  Gastric aspirate ____ / ____ / _____ 
 Other ____ / ____ / _____  Meconium ____ / ____ / _____ 
   Other ____ / ____ / _____ 
Specify: _____________________________ Specify: _______________________________ 
 
Outcome of pregnancy Weeks Gestation Date 
 Still pregnant…………………………………. _______ ____ / ____ / _____ 
 Foetal death (miscarriage / stillbirth)………. _______ ____ / ____ / _____ 
 Induced abortion…………………………….. _______ ____ / ____ / _____ 
 Delivery (live birth)………………………….. _______ ____ / ____ / _____ 
 
 Other _____________________________ _______ ____ / ____ / _____ 
 
Type(s) of illness in mother  
(tick all that apply) 
Type(s) of illness in foetus / neonate  
(tick all that apply) 
 Bacteremia / sepsis  Bacteremia / sepsis 
 Meningitis  Meningitis 
 Febrile gastroenteritis  Pneumonia 
 Amnionitis  Granulomatosis infantisepticum 
 Non-specific “flu-like” illness   None 
 None  Other: _______________________________ 
 Other: ____________________________  Unknown 
 Unknown  
 
Mother’s outcome Foetus / Neonate outcome 
 Survived  Survived 
 Died  Died 
 date: ____ / ____ / _____  date: ____ / ____ / _____ 
  due to Listeria     due to Listeria   
  due to other cause (specify)     due to other cause (specify)   
 ____________________________  ____________________________ 
 Unknown  Unknown 
 
NOTE: For perinatal cases ask the remaining questions of the mother 
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Clinical history  
Date of onset of illness:  ______ / ______ / ______ 
In the 4 week period prior to diagnosis of Listeria, did you experience any of the following 
symptoms? 
 Symptom Yes No DK/NS Onset date 
     
Fever ……………………………………………    _____ / ____ / ______ 
Chills/shakes……………………………………    _____ / ____ / ______ 
Headache……………………………………….    _____ / ____ / ______ 
Stiff neck………………………………………..    _____ / ____ / ______ 
Confusion……………………………………….    _____ / ____ / ______ 
Diarrhoea………………………………………..    _____ / ____ / ______ 
Vomiting ………………………………………...    _____ / ____ / ______ 
Muscle & Body Aches…………………………    _____ / ____ / ______ 
Other symptoms……………………………….    _____ / ____ / ______ 
Specify _____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Do you have any of the following illnesses or conditions? 
 Case (response)  Doctor (response) 
Illness / condition Yes No DK/N
S 
 Yes No DK/NS 
        
Diabetes- insulin 
dependant…………………..    
 
   
Diabetes- non-insulin 
dependant……………..    
 
   
Heart disease 
………………………………….. 
       
Renal / kidney disease requiring 
dialysis……    
 
   
Other renal disease 
…………………………… 
   
 
   
Rheumatological condition 
…………………… 
       
Blood disorder 
…………………………………. 
       
Organ transplant 
……………………………….    
 
   
Cancer 
(____________________________)    
 
   
Liver 
disease……………………………………    
 
   
Chronic lung disease (excluding asthma) ….        
Other illness or condition 
……………………..    
 
   
Specify_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 4 weeks prior to illness, were you taking any of the following treatments? 
 Case (response)  Doctor (response) 
Treatments Yes No DK/NS  Yes No DK/NS 
        
Corticosteroids (e.g. prednisone) ……………...        
Cyclosporine ……………………………………..        
Other drugs that affect the immune system         
Chemotherapy …………………………………...        
Radiation therapy ………………………………..        
Antibiotics (__________________________)...        
Antidiarrhoeal medication (e.g. Lomotil, Imodium)        
Antacids (e.g. Mylanta, Mucaine)………………        
Medications that reduce stomach acid (e.g. Zantac, 
Tagamet, Somac, Losec)……………...    
 
   
Other (______________________________)        
 
Comments: __________________________________________________________________________ 
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Hospital admission and day visits (for treatment/care) 
 
Did you have any hospital day visits in the 12 weeks prior to illness?    Yes    No  
 
Date of hospital 
visit 
 
Hospital Hospital food 
consumed 
Detail of food 
consumed 
____ / ____ / ____ ____________________ 
  Yes    No 
 
 
____ / ____ / ____ ____________________ 
  Yes    No 
 
 
____ / ____ / ____ ____________________ 
  Yes    No 
 
 
Reason for visit (e.g. dialysis, outpatient appointment):   
 
____________________________________________________________________________________
__ 
 
Were you admitted to hospital in the 12 weeks prior to illness?   Yes    No 
 
Admission Discharge Hospital Reason for 
admission 
Ward / section 
____ / ____ / 
____ 
____ / ____ / 
____ ________________ ________________ 
 
_____________ 
____ / ____ / 
____ 
____ / ____ / 
____ ________________ ________________ 
 
_____________ 
____ / ____ / 
____ 
____ / ____ / 
____ ________________ ________________ 
 
_____________ 
     
Foods consumed during hospital admission: 
__________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
High risk hospital foods consumed?   Yes      No      Maybe      don’t know/not answered 
 
Environmental risk factors 
 
In the 12 weeks prior to illness, did you travel overseas, to another state or territory or anywhere within the 
state?          Yes    No 
Travel type:  International   Domestic    Local  (please tick) 
Specify location(s): 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
Name of resort, hotel, etc.: 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Departure date:_____ / ____ / ____ 
 
Airline/coach company: _______________ 
Flight No.____________ 
 
Return date: _____ / _____ / _____ 
 Airline/coach company: _______________Flight No. ____________ 
 
Foods consumed on plane or bus:  
__________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________
__________ 
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Potential Food Sources 
In the 4 weeks prior to illness ( ___ / ____ / ____ to ____ / ____ / ____ ) did you consume any of the 
following? 
 
Fruits 
Y
e
s
 
N
o
 
D
K
/ 
N
S
 
Type / brand / details Where purchased / eaten 
Fruit salad (self-serve salad bar)      
Fruit salad (delicatessen)      
Fruit salad (other source)       
Rockmelon / cantaloupe      
Honeydew melon      
Watermelon       
Strawberries      
Other berries       
Other fruit 
Specify: ___________________ 
__________________________ 
   
  
Fresh fruit juice (state type)       
 
 
Vegetables / salads 
Y
e
s
 
N
o
 
D
K
/ 
N
S
 
Type / brand / details Where purchased / eaten 
Whole lettuce (specify 
bagged/unbagged)  
     
Bagged processed lettuce (i.e. 
leaves/shredded): specify….. 
     
Bagged salad other (i.e. 
rocket/spinach): specify…. 
   
  
Bagged coleslaw mix       
Uncooked mushroom      
Alfalfa / pea sprouts      
Bean sprouts      
Fresh herbs eaten raw       
Organic produce      
Home grown produce       
Raw vegetable juice (state type)      
Other raw vegetables 
Specify:_________________________
_____________________ 
     
   
  
 
 
Dairy 
Y
e
s
 
N
o
 
D
K
 
/N
S
 
Type / brand / details Where purchased / eaten 
Brie cheese      
Camembert cheese      
Blue-veined cheese      
Fetta cheese      
Ricotta cheese      
Mozzarella cheese      
Cottage cheese      
Other soft cheese (specify      
Shredded/grated hard cheese      
Raw / unpasteurised cheese      
Sour cream      
Ice-cream       
Gelato       
Yogurt       
Raw / unpasteurised milk 
(cow / goat) 
     
Flavoured milk      
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Other dairy products: 
specify:____________________ 
   
  
 
 
 
Deli Y
e
s
 
N
o
 
D
K
/N
S
 
L
o
o
s
e
 (
d
e
li
) 
Type./ brand / details Where purchased / eaten 
Barbequed chicken     -   
Cold cooked chicken    -   
Luncheon / sandwich meat        
Ham        
Salami        
Chicken / turkey slices       
Other uncooked meat products        
Pate        
Liverwurst        
Frankfurts / cheerios        
Silverside       
Pre-prepared potato salad (deli)       
Pre-prepared coleslaw (deli)        
Pre-prepared pasta salad (deli)       
Dips: 
Specify:____________________ 
      
Other pre-prepared salads: 
Specify______________________ 
    
  
 
Cold/uncooked seafood Y
e
s
 
N
o
 
D
K
//
N
S
 
Type / brand / details Where purchased / eaten 
Mussels       
Crab       
Prawns (purchased cooked)      
Prawns (purchased raw)       
Oysters       
Smoked salmon      
Other smoked fish / seafood      
Sushi / sashimi       
Other seafood: 
Specify:_________________________
________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Sandwiches / burgers / rolls / wraps 
containing: 
 Y
e
s
 
N
o
 
D
K
/N
S
 
P
re
-p
a
c
k
a
g
e
d
 
C
u
s
to
m
 m
a
d
e
 
Type / brand /  
details Where purchased / eaten 
Ham         
Beef         
Bacon, lettuce, tomato (BLT)        
Chicken        
Turkey        
Other meat: 
Specify:____________________ 
       
Salad        
Cheese: 
Specify____________________ 
       
Other filling: 
Specify____________________ 
       
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In the 4 weeks prior to illness, did you attend any of the following? 
 
 
Y
e
s
 
N
o
 
D
K
/N
S
 
Date Food 
Restaurants (specify)    
 
 
 
1. 
   
____/ ____ / ____ 
 
 
2. 
   
____/ ____ / ____ 
 
 
3. 
   
____/ ____ / ____ 
 
 
Takeaway (specify)    
 
 
1. 
   
____/ ____ / ____ 
 
 
2. 
   
____/ ____ / ____ 
 
 
3. 
   
____/ ____ / ____ 
 
 
 
 
Any left-over high risk foods available for testing?   Yes    No    
Specify: 
____________________________________________________________________________
___ 
 
Comments and actions 
 
Before this illness with Listeria, did a healthcare worker tell you to avoid certain foods to prevent 
listeriosis? 
  Yes    No 
 
Information on Listeria requested?      No          Yes, date sent:  ______ / ______ / ______ 
 
Premises/facility inspection required?      Yes          No    
If yes: 
Premises to be inspected by:  __________________________________________________________ 
 
Will food samples be taken for analysis?      Yes          No    
If yes, samples will be collected by (name of organisation or local council)  __________________ 
 
Please provide additional comments in the space provided if required: 
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Appendix 5: Example listeriosis surveillance report 
REPORTING PERIOD TO: 28 August 2013 
OzFoodNet reviews enhanced laboratory and risk factor data on notified cases of listeriosis using a surveillance system 
designed for early detection of related clusters. Reports are provided fortnightly to the OzFoodNet network, and as 
needed. The surveillance system relies on information entered by OzFoodNet sites into a NetEpi database under the 
OzFoodNet plan for the National Surveillance of human Listeria monocytogenes infection (endorsed by PHLN 21 
September 2010). OzFoodNet relies on the efforts of Public Health Laboratories and OzFoodNet sites in providing 
timely information to this surveillance system. The information in this report is confidential and organisationally sensitive 
and should not be discussed outside the network except on a need-to-know basis. For further details about information 
contained in this report please contact OzFoodNet at ozfoodnet@health.gov.au 
 
REPORT SUMMARY 
 Combined 2010-2013 reported cases – 282 cases in NetEpi.  
 
 Comparison between NetEpi and NNDSS data:  
NetEpi contains 50 of the 52 notified cases for 2013.  
 
o Neonatal cases Vic (ID 320132147320) and NSW (ID 100221598) are 
not separately identified from their mother 
 
 Multijurisdictional clustering by PCR-serotype (ST), binary type (BT) and 
where available PFGE typing, for the past 24 week period (Table 1) 
 
o ST: 1/2b, 3b,7. BT: 158, PFGE 4A:4A:1 (2 cases: 1xSA, 1xVic,  plus NSW 
case with notable BT and PFGE) 
 
o ST: 1/2b, 3b, 7. BT: 223, PFGE: 4A:4:1 (3 cases: NSW). These cases were 
identified in the NSW hospital cluster investigation associated with 
profiteroles. 
 
o ST: 4b, 4d, 4e. BT: 254, PFGE 1G:1:1, MLVA similar (2 cases: 1xQLD, 
1xVic) 
 
o ST: 4b, 4d, 4e. BT: 254/255, PFGE 119A:44A:1 MJOI Outbreak closed 22 
August 2013  
 
 Completeness of initial typing by isolate age (ST, BT, PFGE and other typing) 
(Table 2) 
5 recent isolates are missing initial Serotype details 
5 recent isolates are missing PFGE but 2 have MLVA typing 
LISTERIA 
SURVEILLANCE REPORT 
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Figure 1: Epicurve from NetEpi for 1 January 2013 – 28 August 2013 by onset* epidemiological week and state or territory. 
 
* Where onset date is not available, notification, diagnosis (a calculated field), specimen or hospital admission dates are used.
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CLUSTER DETECTION 
Table 1: Cases of listeriosis reported to NetEpi for the past 24 weeks, by initial subtyping (PCR-ST + BT), state and epidemiological week 
of onset. [28 August 2013]  
 
Serotype Bintype State 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 Total 
1/2a, 3a 147 Western Australia                   1                             1 
  146 Victoria           1                                     1 
  59 Western Australia           1                                     1 
1/2b, 3b, 7 158 South Australia         1                                       1 
    Victoria                     1     1 
  222 New South Wales     1                                           1 
  223 New South Wales     1 1                                         2 
1/2c, 3c 82 New South Wales                 1                               1 
    Queensland          1                1 
4b, 4d, 4e 254 Queensland   1     1                                       2 
    Victoria       1  1                 2 
  255 New South Wales                   1                             1 
    Western Australia   1                       1 
No serotype 
established 
114 New South Wales         1                                       1 
  30 New South Wales                             1                   1 
Serotype 
PENDING 
154 New South Wales                                         1       1 
  158 New South Wales                                       1         1 
  (blank) Victoria                                         1       1 
  215 New South Wales                                       1         1 
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Table 2: Cases of listeriosis reported to NetEpi since mid March 2013 with PCR-ST + BT + PFGE, 
state and epidemiological year/month of onset. [28 August 2013] (Note MLST, MLVA & Ribotyping 
are not routinely requested). 
Local ID NetEpi 
no 
State Year Mth SEROTYPE BINARY 
Type 
PFGE Other Typing 
NSW100191648 117919 New South 
Wales 
2013 3 Serotype 
PENDING 
0 0:00:00 0:00:00 
QLD201306 117905 Queensland 2013 3 1/2b, 3b, 7 159 16A:4G:101 MLVA 4-17-16-5-3-11-14-
0-16 
NSW100194069 117920 New South 
Wales 
2013 3 1/2b, 3b, 7 223 4A:4:1 MLVA 04-17-16-05-03-11-
14-00-16 
WA201307827 117912 Western 
Australia 
2013 3 4b, 4d, 4e 255 86:46A:37 MLVA 03-16-12-05-03-05-
15-00-18 
QLD201307 117924 Queensland 2013 3 4b, 4d, 4e 254 1G:1:1 MLVA: 3-16-24-5-3-5-15-
0-18 
NSW100196241 117928 New South 
Wales 
2013 4 1/2b, 3b, 7 222 4:4A:1 MLVA 04-17-15-05-03-10-
14-00-16 
NSW100194790 117921 New South 
Wales 
2013 4 1/2b, 3b, 7 223 4A:4:1 MLVA 04-17-16-05-03-11-
14-00-16 
NSW100195443 117922 New South 
Wales 
2013 4 1/2b, 3b, 7 223 4A:4:1 MLVA 04-17-16-05-03-11-
14-00-16 
NSW100199612 117930 New South 
Wales 
2013 4 No 
serotype 
established 
114 poor 
cut:107A:poor 
cut 
MLVA 03-12-00-00-03-00-
00-00-17 
QLD201308 117926 Queensland 2013 4 4b, 4d, 4e 254 119A:44A:1 MLVA: 3-16-13-6-3-5-15-
0-18 
520130002970 117925 South Australia 2013 4 1/2b, 3b, 7 158 4A:4A:1 MLVA 04-17-16-05-03-11-
14-00-16 
320132136363 117932 Victoria 2013 4 4b, 4d, 4e 254 52A:46A:4 MLVA: 03-16-12-05-03-
05-15-00-18 
wa201310326 117931 Western 2013 4 1/2a, 3a 59 153:153:117 MLVA 04-16-15-00-03-08-
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Local ID NetEpi 
no 
State Year Mth SEROTYPE BINARY 
Type 
PFGE Other Typing 
Australia 10-00-00 
320132136467 117933 Victoria 2013 4 1/2a, 3a 146 11A:10A:10 MLVA:03-18-23-00-03-12-
10-00-00 
320132146468 118039 Victoria 2013 5 4b, 4d, 4e 254 1G:1:1 MLVA: 03-16-17-05-03-
05-15-00-18 
QLD201309 117983 Queensland 2013 5 1/2c, 3c 82 8H:110A:2R 4-20-20-4-3-13-10-4-0 
NSW100204479 117985 New South 
Wales 
2013 5 1/2c, 3c 82 8E:110B:2F MLVA 03-20-20-04-03-14-
10-04-00 
NSW100207496 118006 New South 
Wales 
2013 5 4b, 4d, 4e 255 0:00:00 MLVA 03-16-14-06-03-05-
15-00-18 
WA201312669 117991 Western 
Australia 
2013 5 1/2a, 3a 147 11A:10:10 MLVA: 03-18-31-00-03-
13-10-00-00 
NSW100211427 118040 New South 
Wales 
2013 6 No 
serotype 
established 
30 155:155:118 03-12-00-00-03-00-00-00-
16 
NSW100219954 118088 New South 
Wales 
2013 7 Serotype 
PENDING 
158 0:00:00 04-17-16-05-03-12-14-00-
16 
NSW100219509 118084 New South 
Wales 
2013 8 Serotype 
PENDING 
215 0:00:00 04-17-08-05-04-07-14-00-
19 
320132158890 118090 Victoria 2013 8 1/2b, 3b, 7 158 4A:4A:1 MLVA: 04-17-16-05-03-
11-14-00-16 
NSW100220984 118089 New South 
Wales 
2013 8 Serotype 
PENDING 
154 0:00:00 0:00:00 
320132160986 118112 Victoria 2013 8 Serotype 
PENDING 
0 0:00:00 0:00:00 
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Appendix 6: Data flow for NELSS. 
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Appendix 7: Pre-interview questions for OzFoodNet personnel 
How many human listeriosis clusters have been detected in your own jurisdiction since the establishment of NELSS 
(since 1 January 2010)? 
(For each cluster, please list year of detection, case numbers, deaths, the implicated source and how the cluster was detected) 
 
Year Number 
affected 
Deaths 
(including 
foetal loses) 
Implicated 
source 
How was cluster 
detected? 
Declared 
an outbreak 
(Yes/No) 
Comments 
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Appendix 8: Survey for OzFoodNet personnel 
NELSS questionnaire for OzFoodNet personnel 
 
1. This interview is intended to collect information on how you use and interact with the 
National Enhanced Listeriosis Surveillance System (NELSS). 
I would like to record this interview to ensure no information has been missed or 
recorded incorrectly. Upon reviewing the recording, it will be deleted and you will be 
sent an email informing you of this. 
Do you consent to being interviewed and the interview being recorded and later 
deleted? 
 Yes                                                                                        No 
2. Please fill in demographic details 
Name: 
Title:  
Organisation:  
State: 
Email Address: 
Phone Number:  
3. What role(s) do you have in investigating human listeriosis cases? 
(i.e. conduct case interviews, data entry, analysis of data, reporting on human 
listeriosis cases) 
 
4. Please describe the information trail (epidemiological and laboratory data) for human 
listeriosis isolates in your jurisdiction (i.e. cases interviewed by PHU but data entered 
into NELSS by OFN, samples sent from jurisdictional laboratory to national reference 
laboratory). 
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NELSS questionnaire for OzFoodNet personnel 
 
5. Do you use NELSS as your only database for collecting enhanced data on human 
listeriosis cases? 
 Yes                                                                                        No 
6. Why is NELSS your only database? 
 
 
 
7. What other database(s) do you use? 
 
 
8. Why do you use other database(s)? 
 
 
 
9. Do you double enter human listeriosis case data? 
(enter data into NELSS and other databases) 
 Yes                                                                                        No 
10. Why do you double enter data? 
 
 
 
11. Specifically, what are the data fields you double enter? 
(either individual fields or categories such as demographics, food history, medical 
history, etc) 
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NELSS questionnaire for OzFoodNet personnel 
 
12. What tasks do you use NELSS for? 
(Y/N for each task i.e. data entry, storage of interview data, jurisdictional analysis, 
reporting) 
 
 
 
 
13. What tasks do you use other databases/systems for and why do you have to use 
these other systems?  
 
 
14. For you, what are the positive aspects of NELSS? (i.e. detection of multistate 
clusters, jurisdictional epidemiological and laboratory data not collated elsewhere). 
 
 
15. For you, what aspects of NELSS you would like to see improved (i.e. duplication of 
data entry, unable to use NetEpi for jurisdictional analysis). 
 
 
16. On average, how much time (in hours) does it take to process an individual 
listeriosis case? 
(data collection, data entry, analysis and reporting) 
 
 
 
17. Does response to an individual case differ during a cluster/outbreak investigation? 
 Yes                                                                                        No 
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NELSS questionnaire for OzFoodNet personnel 
 
18. Please describe how the response differs: 
 
 
19. How are human listeriosis clusters detected in your jurisdiction? 
(i.e. through national analysis and reporting (through NELSS), through your own 
analysis and reporting) 
 
 
 
20. Is there anything else you would like to add prior to ending the interview? 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey. If you have any questions about the 
interview, feel free to ask them now. If you wish to add further information at a later 
time, please email Tim Sloan-Gardner (Timothy.Sloan-Gardner@health.gov.au). 
As stated at the start of this interview, this session has been recorded to ensure no 
information has been missed or recorded incorrectly. Upon reviewing the recording, it 
will be deleted and you will be sent an email with confirmation of this. 
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Appendix 9: Pre-interview questions for laboratory personnel 
Listeria detection in human clinical samples for patient management is performed by 
primary diagnostic laboratories in the public and private sectors and funded 
accordingly. 
Human listeriosis is notifiable in all jurisdictions and all cases are interviewed using 
an agreed format. 
All State and Territory health jurisdictions ask that isolates from all cases, and in 
some cases any putative source, are sent to the local jurisdictional Public Health 
reference laboratory. 
Jurisdictional reference laboratories may undertake further characterisation locally in 
addition to forwarding all isolates to MDU for further characterisation.  
Costs of these characterisations are borne by those performing them, there being no 
programmatic funding per se. 
Epidemiological and laboratory data on each case is forwarded by jurisdictional 
participants to OzFoodNet where data are received, collated, analysed and results of 
analyses regularly fed back to those responsible for implementing any required public 
health action. 
 
To place this model programme on a firmer footing and as a prelude to considering if 
other conditions may be handled in a similar fashion OzFoodNet wish to better 
understand the lab component. 
 
1. What tests do you conduct on human listeriosis isolates? 
(i.e. ST, BT, PFGE, MLVA) 
 
2. If applicable, please specify the specific protocol you use for PFGE 
 
3. What is the indicative/average cost for testing a human listeriosis isolate? 
Is it possible to get this cost broken down further to costs for each test per isolate? 
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Appendix 10: Survey for laboratory personnel 
NELSS questionnaire for Laboratory personnel 
 
Listeria detection in human clinical samples for patient management is performed by 
primary diagnostic laboratories in the public and private sectors and funded 
accordingly. 
Human listeriosis is notifiable in all jurisdictions and all cases are interviewed using an 
agreed format. 
All State and Territory health jurisdictions ask that isolates from all cases, and in some 
cases any putative source, are sent to the local jurisdictional Public Health reference 
laboratory. 
Jurisdictional reference laboratories may undertake further characterisation locally in 
addition to forwarding all isolates to MDU for further characterisation. 
Costs of these characterisations are borne by those performing them, there being no 
programmatic funding per se. 
Epidemiological and laboratory data on each case is forwarded by jurisdictional 
participants to OzFoodNet where data are received, collated, analysed and results of 
analyses regularly fed back to those responsible for implementing any required public 
health action. 
To place this model programme on a firmer footing and as a prelude to considering if 
other conditions may be handled in a similar fashion OzFoodNet wish to better 
understand the lab component. 
1. This interview is intended to collect information on how you use and interact with the 
National Enhanced Listeriosis Surveillance System (NELSS). 
I would like to record this interview to ensure no information has been missed or 
recorded incorrectly. Upon reviewing the recording, it will be deleted and you will be 
sent an email informing you of this. 
Do you consent to being interviewed and the interview being recorded and later 
deleted? 
 Yes                                                                                        No 
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NELSS questionnaire for Laboratory personnel 
 
2. Please fill in demographic details 
Name: 
Title:  
Organisation:  
State: 
Email Address: 
Phone Number: 
3. Which type of laboratory do you work in? 
 Jurisdictional reference laboratory 
 National reference laboratory 
 Other (please specify) 
 
4. During routine testing, on average how long does it take to get a result and 
communicate findings to the test requester for each test? (from isolate receipt to 
informing requester) 
 
 
 
5. How do you communicate test results to the requester? 
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NELSS questionnaire for Laboratory personnel 
 
6. Do the timelines and method of communication change during a human listeriosis 
outbreak investigation? 
 Yes                                                                                        No 
7. How do the timelines and method of communication change? 
 
 
 
8. After you have conducted your tests, do you send isolates on to other laboratories 
for further testing? 
 No 
 Yes (please specify where) 
9. Is there anything else you would like to add prior to ending this interview? 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey. If you have any questions about the 
interview, feel free to ask them now. If you wish to add further information at a later 
time, please email Tim Sloan-Gardner (Timothy.Sloan-Gardner@health.gov.au). 
As stated at the start of this interview, this session has been recorded to ensure no 
information has been missed or recorded incorrectly. Upon reviewing the recording, it 
will be deleted and you will be sent an email with confirmation of this. 
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Chapter 4 – the National Human 
Rabies Immunoglobulin Database 
4.1 Prologue 
4.1.1 Study rationale 
This analysis was initially requested by the Communicable Diseases Network Australia 
(CDNA) due to supply shortages of Human Rabies Immunoglobulin (HRIg). As no 
analysis of the data had been undertaken since 2011, this work was required to inform 
policy. 
4.1.2 My role 
I was the lead investigator who was responsible for the following tasks: 
 literature review; 
 epidemiological study design; 
 data entry, cleaning and analysis; 
 stakeholder engagement; and 
 conference and poster presentation. 
4.1.3 Lessons learnt 
This project provided me with a wealth of opportunities. Firstly, it allowed me to engage 
with state and territory epidemiologists to obtain the data, or in one case, enter the data 
myself into the database. Both of these opportunities allowed me to gain a greater 
understanding of how the data were collected and also why certain categories had 
such low data completeness. One reason for the lack of data completeness was that 
some jurisdictions simply did not ask some questions, such as visiting a rabies enzootic 
country, or record certain fields, i.e. number of vials administered. Through consultation 
with these stakeholders, I was able to improve data completeness. This included 
Queensland modifying their database to collect the number of vials administered. 
I was also able to work closely with members of CDNA and was also part of a CDNA 
working group looking into measures to reduce national HRIg usage. Outcomes of this 
work included the development of public health messaging which aimed to reduce 
animal injuries overseas, including travel information cards. The working group was 
also tasked with reviewing Australia’s HRIg rationing protocol and is due to meet again 
in early 2015. 
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A second opportunity that was afforded to me through this project was being able to 
present at a national conference. My abstract for this project was accepted as an oral 
presentation (Appendix 1) at the Public Health Association of Australia (PHAA) 14th 
National Immunisation Conference in Melbourne from 17 to 19 June 2014. This was my 
first oral presentation at a national conference and allowed me to further refine my 
presentation skills. I received very positive feedback on both the presentation material 
and my presenting style. Attending the conference was also a great networking 
opportunity and allowed me to meet many new people working in the field of public 
health. 
As well as the presentation, my abstract was accepted as a poster presentation 
(Appendix 2) at the PHAA 43rd Annual Conference in Perth from 15 to 17 September 
2014. This was my first poster at a national conference and was a great lesson in 
concise presentation. I also received positive feedback on the visual aspects of the 
poster and the information it contained. I was unable to attend this conference in 
person, though I did receive communication from attendees wanting to discuss the 
project further. It was interesting to note that those who worked in state and territory 
public health units were unaware of the rabies travel information cards developed as 
part of this project with CDNA. The information on these cards has been discussed at 
CDNA, however, it seemed the information had not been further communicated to the 
public health units. 
In terms of working with the national database, I learnt a very important lesson. When 
designing a database, it is really important to have a clear understanding of the 
purpose of the database, what is possible to collect and how the data will be used. I 
was only able to find a paper presented at a CDNA teleconference (25 November 
2009) that described the purpose of the database and was unable to find a finalised 
data dictionary. The database currently contains fields for data not collected by some 
jurisdictions and over three years of data from three different jurisdictions was missing 
from the database. By working closely with the jurisdictions, I was able to improve the 
completeness of the database, though more could be done. Specifically I would 
recommend the development of a complete data dictionary and some method of 
integration so that New South Wales and Queensland could load their data directly into 
the national system from their own existing systems rather than requiring double entry 
of data. 
A lesson I learnt from this project came during the analysis phase. When presenting 
data, the way data are categorised data can affect the message they convey. The 
graphs below display the number of people receiving HRIg for potential exposures to 
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Australia Bat Lyssavirus in Australia, with age categorised differently. Figure 1 displays 
the data by sex and 5-year age groups up to 60+ years. Figure 2 displays the data by 
sex and 10 year age groups up to 80+ years. The first graph appears to show a slight 
increase in the number of people receiving HRIg with age then a substantial increase 
for those in the 60+ year old age group. When the data is displayed by 10 year age 
groups you can see that the sharp increase was an artefact of the grouping. This also 
highlighted the benefit of using rates as opposed to frequencies. 
 
Figure 1: Counts of people receiving HRIg for potential exposures to ABLV occurring in 
Australia by sex and 5 year age-groups. 
 
Figure 2: Counts of people receiving HRIg for potential exposures to ABLV occurring in 
Australia by sex and 10 year age-groups.  
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4.1.4 Public health implications of this work 
There have been and will continue to be important public health implications of this 
work. The first was the development of travel information cards (Appendix 3). This 
project highlighted the need to educate those travelling to Indonesia and Thailand on 
the risks of animal injuries, particularly from monkeys. This analysis was also fed back 
directly to public health staff through presentations at two national public health 
conferences. Following on from the cards, the Australian Government Department of 
Health produced an information webpage for the public 
(http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/ohp-rabies-consumer-
info.htm). 
The work that will continue is the review of Australia’s HRIg rationing protocol. Initially 
this was to be conducted by a CDNA working group. This has now been expanded to a 
joint CDNA and Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation working group. 
This working group have been tasked with reviewing and updating the current protocol, 
and is due to meet in early 2015. 
4.1.5 Acknowledgements 
I wish to acknowledge the following persons and organisations for their assistance with 
this study: Bridget O’Connor, Martyn Kirk and Emily Fearnley at the National Centre for 
Epidemiology & Population Health, ANU; Katrina Knope, Jenny Firman, Stephanie 
Williams and Michael Lidman at the Australian Government Department of Health, 
Canberra; Ellen Donnan at the Department of Health, Queensland; Chris Naggy at the 
Department of Health, Northern Territory; Lucinda Franklin at the Department of 
Health, Victoria; David Durrheim at the University of Newcastle, Newcastle; State and 
territory health departments; Public Health Units (PHU); Members of the Human 
Rabies Immunoglobulin CDNA working group and CDNA. 
4.1.6 Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology core activity requirement 
 Analyse a public health dataset such as surveillance data; 
 An abstract and oral presentation of the project at national or international scientific 
conference (Appendix 1); 
 A relevant report on the project to a non-scientific audience (Appendix 4); 
 A literature review that demonstrates skills in conducting a targeted literature 
search and synthesis. 
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4.2 Abstract 
Human Rabies Immunoglobulin (HRIg) is a limited resource globally that is used to 
treat unvaccinated people exposed, or potentially exposed, to the rabies virus or 
Australian bat lyssavirus (ABLV). Australia has experienced shortages in HRIg due to 
increased demand in recent years.  
Data received by the National Human Rabies Immunoglobulin Database (NHRID) were 
analysed for usage and risk exposure patterns. For inclusion in this analysis, a person 
must have received HRIg in Australia from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2013 for a 
potential exposure. 
A third of people received HRIg for potential exposures to ABLV occurring in Australia, 
with a large increase observed in 2013. This coincided with the death of a boy in 
Queensland from ABLV infection and subsequent media attention. Rates were higher 
in older individuals, particularly males, and almost all were due to injuries caused by 
bats. 
Two thirds of people received HRIg for potential exposures to rabies virus occurring 
overseas. In this study, travel to Indonesia accounted for over 60% of potential 
exposures occurring overseas, with the majority of these due to monkeys. Injuries 
caused by monkeys in Indonesia accounted for approximately half of the people 
receiving HRIg potential exposures occurring overseas and a third of people receiving 
HRIg for all potential exposures during the study period. 
We need to continue to warn of the dangers of handling bats in Australia and improve 
vaccine uptake for high risk groups to reduce the need for post-exposure prophylaxis, 
and to reduce the risks for these individuals. The current messaging should be 
reviewed and revised to ensure that it is appropriately targeted and effective. We 
should also continue to warn of the risk of potential exposure to rabies virus when 
travelling overseas, particularly to Indonesia. 
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4.3 Introduction 
According to the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses, there are 14 
recognised Lyssaviruses (1). The rabies virus and ABLV both belong to this genus and 
both invariably result in progressive, fatal encephalomyelitis in humans (2). 
Rabies virus infection occurs in more than 150 countries and on all continents except 
Antarctica, with more than 95% of human deaths occurring in Asia and Africa (3). Dogs 
are responsible for the majority of human rabies infection deaths worldwide. Foxes, 
cats, coyotes, wolves, racoons, skunks, jackals, mongooses, monkeys and bats are 
also reservoirs of the rabies virus (3, 4). Whilst Australia is free of terrestrial rabies 
virus, the related ABLV was identified in Australia in 1996 and has been detected in 
four species of Australian flying fox and one insectivorous bat species (5-7). In 2013, 
the Queensland Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry confirmed ABLV 
infection in two horses on a Queensland property. These were the first known equine 
cases of ABLV infection (8, 9). 
Factors such as poor surveillance, under reporting in developing countries and 
misdiagnosis are likely to lead to underestimation of the true global disease burden for 
rabies virus infection. In 2010, annual global deaths due to human rabies virus infection 
were estimated at between 26,400 and 61,000 (10). Taking into account factors such 
as post-exposure prophylaxis, lost productivity and death, the estimated annual cost of 
rabies infection is US$ 6 billion (10). 
The primary route for the virus to enter the body is via contaminated saliva from a bite, 
though it can also enter via a scratch, or saliva coming in contact with open wounds, 
the eyes or mucous membranes (11). Transmission via inhalation of contaminated 
aerosols has occurred in the laboratory (12, 13) and human-to-human transmission via 
corneal (14-19) and solid organ transplantations has been documented (19-23).  
Upon entering the body, the virus spreads via centripetal propagation (moving towards 
the central nervous system) through the motor neurons. After entering the spinal cord 
and the brainstem, the virus spreads throughout the central nervous system. Once in 
the central nervous system, centrifugal propagation (moving outwards) allows the virus 
to spread throughout the rest of the body. The virus enters the extraneural organs and 
move into the salivary glands, allowing the virus to be transmitted (11, 24-26). 
The clinical stages of rabies virus infection can be divided into five stages. The first is 
the incubation period which is usually one to two months, though it can range from 
days to years. The incubation period is not affected by the site of infection nor the 
symptom manifestation. The second stage is the prodrome which is vague and non-
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specific. Prodromal symptoms can include itching, burning or pain sensations at the 
wound site. The third stage is the acute neurological phase where nervous system 
dysfunction becomes apparent. Here the infection presents as either furious or 
paralytic. The classic features of furious rabies virus infection are hydrophobia or 
aerophobia, fluctuating consciousness, dysfunction of the autonomic nervous system 
and inspiratory spasms. Approximately two-thirds or rabies virus infections will manifest 
as furious. The only recognised sign of paralytic infection is lower motor neuron 
ascending weakness, which is why it is often misdiagnosed as other conditions such as 
Guillain-Barrè syndrome. In the fourth stage, coma, the case loses consciousness. 
There can be fever, racing heartbeat, abnormal heart rhythms and a collapse in the 
circulatory system usually precedes death, which is the final stage (11, 24). 
The CDNA national surveillance case definitions for rabies virus (27) and ABLV (28) 
require isolation of the virus by confirmed sequence analysis or detection by nucleic 
acid testing, from cerebrospinal fluid, nuchal biopsy, brain, salivary gland, saliva, tissue 
culture supernatant or formalin fixed tissue (29). It should be noted that there is no 
diagnostic test available for virus infection in humans prior to the onset of symptoms 
(3). 
In Australia, there have been three confirmed cases of ABLV infection in humans; in 
1996, 1998 and 2013. All cases occurred after injuries sustained following close 
contact with a bat and all were fatal (30-33). In addition to these ABLV infection cases, 
there have been two recorded cases of rabies virus infection in humans in Australia. 
Both were from animal exposures overseas, and both were fatal. The first occurred in 
1987 in a 9 year old male who had reported travel to India (34), and the second in 1990 
in a 10 year old female who had migrated to Australia via Hong Kong (35, 36).  
Whilst rabies virus infection invariably results in death in humans, there are reports of 
individuals surviving after the onset of symptoms (13, 37-45). The common feature to 
these cases is that all were previously vaccinated or received some form of post-
exposure prophylaxis (vaccine or rabies virus immunoglobulin). Whilst these cases 
survived, most did not recover completely. 
The rabies virus vaccine is effective for pre-exposure prophylaxis against the rabies 
virus and ABLV. The recommended schedule in Australia is three doses of the vaccine, 
with the second and third doses given seven and 21 to 28 days after the initial dose. 
The vaccine is recommended for those whose occupational or recreational activities 
place them at greater risk of bat exposures or those who work in or travel to a rabies 
virus-enzootic country (4, 10, 46).  
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HRIg contains concentrated rabies virus neutralising antibodies derived from 
hyperimmunised individuals used to treat unvaccinated people who have been 
exposed, or potentially exposed, to the rabies virus or ABLV. HRIg is injected into or 
near the wound site to provide passive immunity prior to individuals developing their 
own immune response after receiving the rabies virus vaccination; which takes 
approximately 7-10 days. The Australian Immunisation Handbook (47) recommends 20 
International Units (IU) of HRIg per kilogram of body weight. Each millilitre (ml) of HRIg 
has a minimum titre of 150 IU. Therefore a 75 kilogram person would require 10 ml of 
HRIg or five 2 ml vials. 
In Australia, the post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) algorithm is defined in the Australian 
Immunisation Handbook (47) based on the WHO guidelines (46, 48). According to the 
Rabies and ABLV Series of National Guidelines (SoNG) and the Australian 
Immunisation Handbook (4, 47), HRIg should be administered to non-immunised 
individuals, or those with poor immunisation histories, who fit the potential exposure 
definition: any bite or scratch from, or mucous membrane or broken skin contact with 
the saliva or neural tissues of, a bat in Australia or elsewhere in the world, or a wild or 
domestic terrestrial mammal in a rabies-enzootic country. HRIg is administered in 
conjunction with four doses of the vaccine, administered on day zero, three, seven and 
fourteen. HRIg should not be administered after the seventh day post the first dose of 
rabies virus vaccine as it may supress the immune response to the vaccine. The SoNG 
goes on to specify that, HRIg should only be administered to individuals with category 
III exposures or immunocompromised individuals (regardless of vaccination status) 
with category II or III exposures. The exposure categories are detailed below (Table 1). 
Table 1: Rabies virus and ABLV exposure categories, Rabies and ABLV Series of 
National Guidelines. 
Exposure Category Description 
Category I* Touching or feeding animals, licks on intact skin, as well as 
exposure to blood, urine or faeces or to an animal that has 
been dead for more than 4 hours. 
Category II Nibbling of uncovered skin, minor scratches or abrasions 
without bleeding. 
Category III Single or multiple transdermal bites or scratches, 
contamination of mucous membrane with saliva from licks, 
licks on broken skin. 
*HRIg not recommended for Category I exposures if contact history is reliable. 
Since 1 January 2010, national data have been collected on those who require HRIg 
for potential exposures and receive it in Australia. Information is collated though an 
online database (NetEpi) called the National Human Rabies Immunoglobulin Database 
(NHRID).  
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A Department of Health internal document, Shortage of Rabies Immunoglobulin and 
Post Exposure Treatment for Rabies and Australian Bat Lyssavirus (RIG rationing 
protocol), details Australia’s plans to manage limited supplies of HRIg should they 
occur. This document was endorsed by the then Australian Health Protection 
Committee on 5 January 2009. When Australia’s HRIg stocks fall below critical supply 
levels, CDNA may choose to invoke the rationing protocol. The measures to reduce 
HRIg usage include: 
 Rounding down dose – reducing wastage by rounding down the volume of HRIg to 
be given to adults weighing 60kg or more when only 0.5ml or less is required from 
a vial; and, 
 Vaccine only – use of rabies virus vaccine alone without concomitant HRIg when 
the exposure was over one year ago or there was an animal scratch but no bite 
(unless the scratch was on the head or neck, the person is immunocompromised, 
or the circumstances indicate a higher risk of bat infection, i.e. an identified 
insectivorous bat or a bat that behaved abnormally). 
Kate Astridge conducted an analysis of the NHRID in 2011 (49). This analysis was 
carried out on 2010 data only, and it found that two-thirds of individuals receiving HRIg 
required it for potential rabies virus exposures from animal-related injuries acquired 
overseas, over half of which occurred in Indonesia. This analysis also found that HRIg 
was administered appropriately in Australia during 2010.  
Previous studies conducted on Australian travellers returning from overseas with 
potential exposures to the rabies virus, suggest that the majority of these occur in 
Indonesia, with Bali accounting for almost all of them. Studies show that most potential 
exposure injuries are caused by monkeys and the most frequently represented age 
group are the 20 to 29 year olds (50-53). These Australian studies were case series 
studies over differing time periods confined to specific geographical regions; New 
South Wales (53), South Brisbane (51), Queensland and West Australian travel clinics 
(50), and the Northern Territory (52). To date no studies have analysed multiple years’ 
worth of data from the NHRID.  
4.3.1 Aims and objectives 
The aim of this study is to describe HRIg usage in Australia from 2010 to 2013, for 
individuals potentially exposed to the rabies virus or ABLV. Specifically, I was looking 
to answer what the usage is in Australia by jurisdiction, what the main types of potential 
exposures leading to HRIg usage are and whether there are any patterns to the HRIg 
usage for domestic and overseas potential exposures. The outcomes of this study will 
be used to inform policy and public health messaging to reduce potential exposures 
and HRIg usage.   
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4.4 Methods 
4.4.1 Study type 
I conducted a retrospective case series analysis on records entered into the NHRID. 
4.4.2 Case definition 
A potential exposure was defined as per the Rabies and ABLV SoNG and the 
Australian Immunisation Handbook (4, 47). For inclusion in this analysis, a person must 
have received HRIg in Australia between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2013. 
Where the date of HRIg administration was missing, the wound assessment date was 
used as an approximation, as most people would receive HRIg on the day their wound 
was assessed. Where neither of these dates were available, the date rabies virus 
vaccine was given or the date the possible exposure occurred was used. 
Where the number of HRIg vials administered was missing, the number of vials was 
calculated using the recorded weight, based on the Australian Immunisation Handbook 
(47) algorithm (Appendix 5). 
Exclusion criteria were, records that received HRIg outside of the study period, records 
where HRIg was not required due to being previously fully vaccinated, records listed as 
‘None’ for number of HRIg vials administered and records for which the number of 
HRIg vials and their weight was missing. 
4.4.3 Data collection 
When a person requires HRIg, a doctor or hospital must submit a request form 
(telephone/fax/email) to the Communicable disease/Immunisation area of the 
jurisdictional health department or the appropriate PHU, depending on the jurisdictional 
arrangements. Questions on the HRIg request form are what populate the data for the 
national database. 
Six jurisdictions enter data directly into the web-based national database (NetEpi) using 
the national questionnaire (Appendix 6), the Australian Capital Territory, Northern 
Territory, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia. New South Wales 
and Queensland collect HRIg data on their own database systems, and require data to 
be imported into the NHRID. The data collected by these two jurisdictions differs 
slightly to the national database, as their respective databases were established prior 
to the national database. For example, in November 2013 Queensland started 
collecting data on the number of vials used in PEP for each potential rabies virus/ABLV 
exposure. As such, prior to this date, the number of vials used in Queensland was 
estimated from the weight of the person receiving the HRIg. 
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Data cleaning included checking the completeness of fields and removal of dummy and 
test entries. Time was also spent with jurisdictional HRIg data entry personnel to clean 
data and improve completeness prior to the data extraction. At the time of the analysis, 
the majority of entries for 2011 to 2013 Victorian HRIg treatments had not been entered 
into the national database. The original HRIg order forms sent to the Victorian Health 
Department, which contained the required information, were electronically scanned and 
sent to me. I entered the data into a Microsoft Excel file for uploading into the national 
database. 
Data were extracted from the NHRID as a Microsoft Excel file. This file was then 
uploaded into Stata intercooled v10 (stat Corp, College Station, TX, USA) for analysis. 
4.4.4 Epidemiological investigations 
Demographic, exposure and risk factor data were compared between potential 
exposures occurring domestically and overseas. Data were analysed by Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test, proportions were assessed by Chi-square tests and trends were 
analysed using the user-built Stata code of nptrend (available from 
http://www.stata.com/stb/stb9). A p value of less than 0.05 was considered statistically 
significant. 
To calculate age, sex and jurisdictional-specific rates, I used the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) mid-year estimated resident populations (54). These are presented as 
rates per 100,000 population. 
To calculate rates of potential exposure to rabies virus overseas, I used the ABS 
overseas arrivals and departures data (55). This publically available data provides 
information on short-term resident departures (STRD) by selected destinations and 
short-term visitor arrivals (STVA) by selected country of residence. A STRD is defined 
as an Australian resident who is intending to stay abroad for less than 12 months. 
STRD were used instead of short-term resident returns (STRR) as these were not 
available by country departed from, and I assumed near equivalence of STRD and 
STRR. A STVA is defined as an overseas visitor who intends to stay in Australia for 
less than 12 months. Data on Australian residents intending to stay overseas for 12 
months or longer, overseas visitors intending to stay in Australia for 12 months or 
longer or migrants to Australia by country departed to or arrived from were not 
publically available and thus were not included in the denominator data. I assumed that 
numbers in these categories would be low. 
I combined STRD and STVA to calculate rates of people receiving HRIg for potential 
exposures occurring overseas per 100,000 travellers and the number of country-
specific potential exposures occurring overseas per 100,000 country-specific travellers. 
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This method of using the ABS publically available overseas arrivals and departures 
data has been used previously to calculate disease rates for overseas-acquired 
infections (56, 57).  
To calculate the cost of PEP, I used the figure for a 75 kilogram unvaccinated individual 
reported by Haiart et al. of $2,170 (52). According to the Australian Immunisation 
Handbook (47), an unvaccinated immunocompetent individual would receive four 
doses of the vaccine and five 2ml vials of HRIg. Thus the calculated cost for PEP is 
$90 per dose of vaccine and $362 per 2ml HRIg vial.  
4.4.5 Ethics 
Ethics approval was not required for this analysis as the data were collected for the 
purpose of public health surveillance under jurisdictional public health legislation, and 
this analysis was consistent with the purposed for which the data were collected. 
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4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Data 
Data were exported from the NHRID on 6 May 2014 and contained 4,577 records. 
Records with date of HRIg administration outside the study period, 1 January 2010 to 
31 December 2013, were excluded (n=1,574), including those without a date of HRIg 
administration (n=656). Records which were listed as receiving no HRIg (n=466) or for 
which the amount of HRIg provided and the weight was missing (n=33) were also 
excluded. 
The final analysis was conducted on 3,003 records. 
4.5.2 Descriptive analysis – all potential exposures 
For those records where gender was recorded (99%, 2,975/3,003), half (51%, 
1,516/2,975) were female. Forty-four per cent (436/995) of potential exposures to 
ABLV occurring in Australia were female and 54% (1,075/1,988) of potential exposures 
to rabies virus overseas were female. The difference between the two were statistically 
different (p <0.05). 
Almost all records had a date of birth listed (99%, 2,979/3,003), and the median age of 
those receiving HRIg was 33 years (range 1 to 93 years). There was a statistically 
significant difference in the median ages of potential exposures occurring in Australia 
(44 years, range 1 to 93 years) and potential exposures occurring overseas (29 years, 
range 1 to 82 years). Median age for all potential exposures remained steady over the 
study period, being 32 years (range 2 to 88 years) in 2010, 33 years (range 1 to 88 
years) in 2011, 32 years (range 1 to 90) in 2012 and 34 years (range 1 to 93 years) in 
2013. Any change was not statistically significant (p value >0.05). 
Over the study period, Queensland residents had the highest counts (n=932) and 
Northern Territory residents the highest rates (18.7 per 100,000) of people receiving 
HRIg for all potential exposures (Table 2). In 2013 there was a large increase in the 
number of people receiving HRIg for potential exposures to the rabies virus or ABLV to 
1,003 people, compared to the previous three year mean of 667 people. In 2013, 
Queensland saw a 246% increase in people receiving HRIg compared to the previous 
three year mean (420 compared to 171) (Table 2). Whilst the database did contain 
records of non-Australian residents receiving HRIg, the exact number of these is 
unknown due to some records missing full demographic/residential information; the 
number of these is expected to be low. 
There were some anomalies noted with the ‘state’ field. When a jurisdiction was 
administering HRIg to a person who was an out-of-state resident, some jurisdictions 
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recorded the residential state of the individual and others recorded the state where the 
HRIg was administered. I was unable to determine exactly how many records this 
affected. 
Table 2: Counts (N) and rates per 100,000* of people receiving HRIg for potential 
exposures to the rabies virus or ABLV by year and jurisdiction, 1 January 2010 to 31 
December 2013, NHRID (n=3,003). 
State 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 N Rate N Rate N Rate N Rate 
NT 27 11.8 27 11.7 21 8.9 45 18.7 
QLD 178 4.0 134 3.0 200 4.4 420 9.0 
WA 138 6.0 140 5.9 165 6.8 161 6.4 
VIC 99 1.8 122 2.2 110 2.0 186 3.2 
ACT 13 3.6 13 3.5 18 4.8 11 2.9 
SA 34 2.1 40 2.4 38 2.3 41 2.5 
NSW 170 2.4 111 1.5 182 2.5 134 1.8 
TAS 7 1.4 4 0.8 9 1.8 5 1.0 
Total 666 3.0 591 2.6 743 3.3 1,003 4.3 
* Rates calculated using the ABS mid-year estimated resident populations. 
The 3,003 individuals received a total of 14,522 vials of HRIg. The greatest number of 
treatments for potential exposures (n=1,003), and subsequently the greatest number of 
HRIg vials administered (n=4,884), occurred in 2013 Table 3. 
Table 3: Counts (N) and vials of HRIg administered to people for potential exposures to 
ABLV in Australia or the rabies virus overseas, 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2013, 
NHRID. 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 
N Vials N Vials N Vials N Vials 
Australia 240 1,223 170 922 157 778 428 2,196 
Overseas 425 1,904 419 2,026 578 2,730 566 2,637 
Missing country information 1 5 2 7 8 43 9 51 
Total potential exposures 666 3,132 591 2,955 743 3,551 1,003 4,884 
 
Weight was recorded for 99% (2,967/3,003) of potential exposures, with a median 
weight of 70 kilograms (range 7 to 154 kilograms). The NHRID needed to be amended 
during the analysis to include a new category of 10 vials of HRIg used. This was due to 
people with a weight of greater than 135kg kilograms requiring PEP for potential 
exposures in 2011, 2012 and 2013. Of the 2,967 potential exposures with a weight 
recorded, 26% (787/2,967) did not receive the correct amount of HRIg for their weight. 
The majority (93%, 734/787) of those that did not receive the correct amount of HRIg 
based on weight, received less vials than required. Most of these received one vial less 
than recommended. Eighteen potential exposures received more than one vial of HRIg 
less than recommended; eight received two vials less, six received three vials less, two 
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received four vials less, one received five vials less and one received seven vials less. 
Fifty-three individuals received more HRIg than recommended based on weight. The 
majority of these (79%, 42/53) received one vial of HRIg more than recommended, 
though three received two vials more, four received three vials more and another four 
received four more.  
4.5.3 Potential exposures to ABLV occurring in Australia 
A third of people (33%, 995/3,003) received HRIg for potential exposures to ABLV 
occurring in Australia. Just over half (55%, 545/995) were male and the median age 
was 44 years (range 1 to 93 years) (Figure 3). The median age did fluctuate over the 
study period, being 44 years (range 3 to 88 years) in 2010, 47 years (range 7 to 88 
years) in 2011, 43 years (range 2 to 90 years) in 2012 and 42 years (range 1 to 93 
years) in 2013. This was not statistically significant (p value >0.05). The median age for 
both males and females was 44 years and there was no statistically significant 
difference (p value >0.05) between them. The median weight was 75 kilograms (range 
7 to 145 kilograms). 
 
 
Figure 3: Counts of people receiving HRIg for potential exposures to ABLV occurring in 
Australia by sex and age group, 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2013, NHRID 
(n=975*). 
* Eight records missing date of birth, so no age or age group could be calculated and 12 missing sex. 
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Rates of people receiving HRIg for potential exposures to ABLV occurring in Australia 
significantly increased with age (p <0.05), and males had higher rates of treatment for 
potential exposures across all age categories compared to females (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Rates per 100,000 of people receiving HRIg for potential exposures to ABLV 
occurring in Australia by sex and age group, 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2013, 
National Human Rabies Immunoglobulin Database (n=975*). 
* Eight records missing date of birth, so no age or age group could be calculated and 12 missing sex. 
 
Some seasonality and response to events can be observed for people receiving HRIg 
for potential exposures to ABLV, with peaks in treatments occurring in the late summer 
months. In 2013, there was a large increase in treatments for potential exposures with 
two distinct peaks observed (Figure 5). The two large peaks in 2013 coincide with the 
death of a case in Queensland (21 February 2013) and a subsequent 60 Minutes story 
that aired on national television (2 June 2013), and the confirmation of ABLV infection 
in two horses on a Queensland property (21 May 2013). 
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Figure 5: HRIg treatments for domestic potential exposures by month, 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2013, NHRID. 
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Queensland residents accounted for over half (56%, 554/995) of people receiving HRIg 
for potential exposures to ABLV occurring in Australia. In 2013 there was a 227% 
increase in people receiving HRIg compared to the previous three year mean (428 
compared to 189). Queensland residents accounted for almost two-thirds (66%, 
282/428) of the 2013 increase, a 310% increase compared to the previous Queensland 
three year mean (282 compared to 91). Jurisdictional-specific rates for people receiving 
HRIg for potential exposures have remained steady over the study period, with the 
exception of Northern Territory and Queensland, which had a large increase in 2013 
(Table 4). 
Table 4: Counts (N) and rates per 100,000 population of people receiving HRIg for 
potential exposures to ABLV occurring in Australia, by jurisdiction and year, 1 January 
2010 to 31 December 2013, NHRID. 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 
State N Rate N Rate N Rate N Rate 
NT 12 5.2 7 3.0 1 0.4 22 9.1 
QLD 110 2.5 71 1.6 91 2.0 282 6.1 
NSW 75 1.0 59 0.8 41 0.6 63 1.0 
VIC 22 0.4 19 0.4 7 0.1 44 0.8 
TAS 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 0.6 
SA 3 0.2 6 0.4 1 0.1 6 0.4 
ACT 8 2.2 4 1.1 6 1.6 1 0.3 
WA 10 0.4 4 0.2 10 0.4 7 0.3 
Australia 240 1.1 170 0.8 157 0.7 428 1.8 
 
The animal responsible for the injury was listed for 97% (963/995) of records. These 
included fruit bat/flying fox, other types of bat, monkey or ‘other’ with an animal 
description. Injuries caused by any bat (fruit bat/flying fox or other types of bat) were 
responsible for almost all (99%, 956/963) records where the animal responsible was 
listed. 
As with the increase in people receiving HRIg for potential exposures to ABLV in 2013, 
there was a similar increase in people receiving HRIg due to bat injuries (Table 5). In 
2013 there was also an increase in the ‘other’ category (n=32) for responsible animal. 
Only six of these records had a description of an animal, three listed as cat and three 
as horse. These were the first potential exposures due to a horse in the database. 
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Table 5: Animals causing potential exposures to ABLV in Australia by year, 1 January 
2010 to 31 December 2013, NHRID. 
Animal Description 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Fruit bat/Flying fox 198 131 106 274 709 
Other Types of bat 40 38 47 122 247 
Monkey 0 0 1 0 1 
Unknown 1 0 1 4 6 
Other 1 1 2 28 32 
Total 240 170 157 428 995 
 
The 995 people received 5,119 vials of HRIg for potential exposures to ABLV in 
Australia. Injuries caused by bats represented 96% (4,918/5,119) of HRIg vials used for 
potential exposures to ABLV and 34% (4,918/14,416) of HRIg vials used for all 
potential exposures with complete country information. 
4.5.4 Potential exposures to rabies virus occurring overseas 
Two thirds of people (66%, 1,988/3,003) received HRIg for potential exposures to 
rabies virus occurring overseas. Just over half (54%, 1,075/1,988) were female and the 
median age was 29 years (range 1 to 82 years). The median age did vary slightly over 
the study period, being 27 years (range 2 to 76 years) in 2010, 30 years (range 1 to 76 
years) in 2011, 30 years (range 1 to 75 years) in 2012 and 29 years (range 1 to 82 
years) in 2013. This was not statistically significant (p >0.05). There was a statistically 
significant difference (p <0.05) between the median ages of males (28 years, range 1 
to 82 years) and the median age of females (30 years, range 2 to 77 years). 
Just under half (47%, 928/1,988 of those receiving HRIg for potential exposures 
occurring overseas during the study period were aged between 20 to 39 years 
(Figure 6). The median weight was 66 kilograms (range 8 to 154 kilograms). 
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Figure 6: Counts of people receiving HRIg for potential exposures occurring overseas 
by sex and age group, 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2013, NHRID (n=1,965*). 
* 14 records missing date of birth, so no age or age group could be calculated and nine missing sex. 
Using the ABS mid-year estimated resident populations as denominator data, females 
had higher rates of people receiving HRIg for potential exposures to rabies virus 
occurring overseas across all age groups, except in the 0 to 9 and the 10 to 19 year 
olds. The highest rates for females and males were both in the 20 to 29 year age 
group, at 5.2 per 100,000 and 3.4 per 100,000 respectively (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: Rates per 100,000* of people receiving HRIg for potential exposures 
occurring overseas, by sex and age group, 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2013, 
NHRID (n=1,965†). 
*Rates calculated using the ABS mid-year estimated resident populations. 
† 14 overseas potential exposures missing date of birth, so no age or age group could be calculated and 
nine missing gender. 
The total number of people per year receiving HRIg for potential exposures to rabies 
virus overseas has remained fairly constant over the study period, with a slight 
decrease from 578 in 2012 to 566 in 2013. Western Australia residents accounted for 
the highest number of people receiving HRIg (29%, 573/1,988), followed by Victoria 
(21%, 423/1,988), Queensland (19%, 375/1,988), then New South Wales (17%, 
345/1,988). The Northern Territory consistently had the highest rate each year, 
followed by Western Australia (Table 6). 
Table 6: Counts (N) and rates per 100,000* of people receiving HRIg for potential 
exposures occurring overseas, by jurisdiction and year, 1 January 2010 to 31 
December 2013, NHRID. 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 
 Jurisdiction N Rate N Rate N Rate N Rate 
NT 15 6.5 20 8.6 20 8.5 23 9.6 
WA 128 5.6 136 5.8 155 6.4 154 6.1 
QLD 67 1.5 62 1.4 108 2.4 138 3.0 
ACT 5 1.4 9 2.4 12 3.2 10 2.6 
VIC 77 1.4 102 1.9 102 1.8 142 2.5 
SA 31 1.9 34 2.1 36 2.2 35 2.1 
NSW 95 1.3 52 0.7 136 1.9 62 1.0 
TAS 7 1.4 4 0.8 9 1.8 2 0.4 
Australia 425 1.9 419 1.9 578 2.5 566 2.4 
* Rates calculated using the ABS mid-year estimated resident populations. 
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Some seasonality is observed in people receiving HRIg for potential exposures to 
rabies virus occurring overseas. Exposure peaks coincide with school and university 
holiday periods and appear approximately one month after an increase in travellers. 
The exposure peak during July appears to be disproportionately larger than the 
preceding increase in travel in June (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Seasonality of people receiving HRIg for potential exposures to rabies virus 
occurring overseas and travellers, by month, 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2013, 
NHRID and ABS. 
 
The country where the potential exposure occurred was 100% complete for the study 
period; Indonesia accounted for approximately 60% (1,236/1,988) of potential 
exposures occurring overseas. The next most frequently reported country was 
Thailand, which accounted for less than 20% (334/1,988), followed by Viet Nam (3%, 
61/1,988). Table 7 lists the top ten countries where potential exposures to rabies virus 
occurred, with the full list provided at Appendix 6. Travellers to Indonesia accounted for 
approximately 7% (4,016,100/55,845,000) of total travellers during the study period. 
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Table 7: Counts of people receiving HRIg for potential exposures to rabies virus 
occurring in the top 10 overseas countries by year, 1 January 2010 to 31 December 
2013, NHRID.  
Country of potential exposure 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Indonesia 256 268 367 345 1,236 
Thailand 77 62 102 93 334 
Viet Nam 16 10 17 18 61 
Malaysia 7 17 18 18 60 
India 6 12 9 11 38 
China 11 11 9 5 36 
Philippines 7 5 7 11 30 
Cambodia 3 4 6 9 22 
Sri Lanka 2 3 5 3 13 
People's Democratic Republic of Laos 6 0 1 4 11 
Other overseas countries 34 27 37 49 147 
Overseas total 425 419 578 566 1,988 
 
Along with the highest count, Indonesia consistently had the highest rate for people 
receiving HRIg for potential exposures occurring overseas each year; ten times that of 
the rate for total potential exposures occurring overseas and double that of the rate for 
Thailand (Figure 9). Rates for people receiving HRIg for potential exposures occurring 
overseas for the seven countries with available travel data from the ABS are also 
provided below (Table 8). 
 
Figure 9: Rates per 100,000 travellers* of people receiving HRIg for potential 
exposures occurring overseas, by selected place of exposure and year, 1 January 
2010 to 31 December 2013, NHRID. 
* Rates calculated using ABS overseas arrivals and departures data. 
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Table 8: Rates per 100,000 travellers* of people receiving HRIg for potential exposures 
occurring overseas, by selected place of exposure and year, 1 January 2010 to 31 
December 2013, National Human Rabies Immunoglobulin Database. 
Country of exposure 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Indonesia 29.8 29.8 34.9 31.6 
Thailand 14.7 14.7 14.7 13.2 
Viet Nam 7.2 7.2 6.7 6.7 
Philippines 3.9 3.9 3.1 4.4 
Malaysia 1.5 1.5 3.6 3.2 
India 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.7 
China 1.4 1.4 0.9 0.5 
Overseas total 3.3 3.3 4.1 3.7 
* Rates calculated using ABS overseas arrivals and departures data. 
When Indonesia is listed as the country where the potential exposure occurred, the 
specific Island in Indonesia should also be recorded. This field was 95% (1,176/1,236) 
complete for the study period. Of the potential exposures occurring in Indonesia with 
complete data, 99% (1,159/1,176) were listed as occurring in Bali. These exposures 
equated to 58% (1,159/1,984) of potential exposures occurring overseas with country 
information, or 39% (1,159/2,983) of all potential exposures with complete country 
information. 
The field for the animal that caused the potential exposure was 90% (1,787/1,988) 
complete for the study period. Incomplete categories included: missing data (n=4), 
wildlife-general (n=3), unknown (n=4) and other (n=190). Animal descriptions from the 
other category (n=150) include: cat, squirrel, horse, Asian cat bear, rat, tiger, pizote 
(badger), lion, orang-utan, hutia (banana rat), cheetah, mongoose, coati (racoon), civet, 
cow, leopard, lemur, otter, tree rat and mouse. 
Injuries caused by monkeys were responsible for the majority (65%, 1,254/1,937) of 
potential exposures occurring overseas where the animal responsible was recorded. 
This was followed by dog or canine at 26% (499/1,937). The majority of potential 
exposures occurring overseas due to monkeys occurred in Indonesia (78%, 
973/1,254). Whilst the highest number of injuries caused by dog or canine also 
occurred in Indonesia (n=149), this only represented 12% (149/1,236) of the total 
potential exposures occurring in Indonesia. Table 9 lists the top ten countries, with the 
full list provided at Appendix 7.  
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Table 9: Animal descriptions for potential exposures occurring in the top 10 overseas 
countries, 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2013, NHRID. 
Country of 
potential 
exposure 
Fruit bat/ 
Flying 
fox 
Other 
Types of 
bat 
Dog or 
canine 
Monkey Wildlife - 
general 
Unknown Other 
Indonesia 9 15 149 973 3 1 83 
Thailand 2 0 116 167 0 1 47 
Viet Nam 0 1 40 17 0 1 2 
Malaysia 0 0 6 50 0 0 4 
India 0 0 30 6 0 0 2 
China 0 0 29 3 0 0 4 
Philippines 0 0 19 4 0 0 7 
Cambodia 0 0 12 7 0 0 3 
Sri Lanka 0 0 9 0 0 0 4 
People's 
Democratic 
Republic of Laos 
0 0 4 3 0 0 4 
Other overseas 
countries 
3 4 85 24 0 1 30 
Overseas Total 14 20 499 1,254 3 4 190 
 
The 1,988 people with potential exposures to rabies virus overseas received 9,297 
vials of HRIg. Potential exposures occurring in Indonesia equated to 62% (5,796/9,297) 
of HRIg vials for all potential exposures occurring overseas. This also accounted for 
40% (5,796/14,416) of HRIg vials used for all potential exposures with complete 
country information. 
Injuries due to monkeys in Indonesia equated to 4,607 vials of HRIg. This represented 
50% (4,607/9,297) of HRIg vials used for potential exposures occurring overseas with 
complete country information and 32% (4,607/14,416) of HRIg vials used for all 
potential exposures with complete country information. 
4.5.5 Reducing overseas potential exposures 
In response to a preliminary analysis I conducted in 2013, the Australian Government 
Department of Health developed messaging for outgoing passengers travelling to 
Asian countries, particularly Indonesia and Thailand, warning them of the risk of 
acquiring the rabies virus overseas. Information cards (Appendix 3) were made 
available and electronic messaging displayed and distributed at Adelaide, Sydney, 
Darwin, Port Headland, Gold Coast, Brisbane and Melbourne airports. These aimed to 
reduce injuries from animals overseas and highlighted the need to seek medical 
treatment following potential exposures. 
 153 
 
In additional to the traveller cards, messages were also developed and put on the 
Department of Health's twitter feed (@Healthgovau). Examples of these ‘tweets’ 
include: 
 "Did you know – rabies vaccination takes at least 28 days to complete.  Find out 
more info here http://bit.ly/JverrT” 
 "Travelling to Bali or Southeast Asia? Avoid the risk of rabies. Do not feed, pat or 
play with stray animals http://bit.ly/JverrT” 
 "Avoid the risk of rabies. Do not feed, pat or play with animals while overseas, 
especially in rabies endemic areas. http://bit.ly/JverrT” 
 "Did you know bats, dogs, cats and monkeys can present a rabies risk while 
overseas? Click here to find out more http://bit.ly/JverrT” 
This analysis was also presented at two national conferences (Appendix 1 and 
Appendix 2). Feedback from conference attendees, mainly those who work in public 
health, was that they were unaware that the messaging had been developed. 
4.5.6 Cost of treatments for potential exposures 
Those who are pre-vaccinated require three doses of vaccine and then two booster 
doses post-potential exposure (vaccine cost $90/dose, 5 x doses = $450). In this 
instance the cost of the three doses of pre-vaccine are covered by the individual and 
the booster doses are covered by the public health budget of the administering 
jurisdiction. The exception to this may be if the person requiring the booster doses has 
exposures to animals through their work then their employer may cover the cost. 
For PEP for potential exposures to the rabies virus overseas or ABLV in Australia, 
there is no cost to the individual for the vaccine or the HRIg. Whilst the Australian 
Government will fund half the cost of the HRIg for volunteer bat workers or private 
citizens non-occupationally (potentially) exposed to ABLV by a bat in Australia, the 
remaining costs are worn by the jurisdictions administering it.  
With 3,003 individuals (vaccine costs of 3,003 x $360/individual = $1,081,080) 
receiving 14,522 vials of HRIg (14,522 x $362/2ml vial = $5,256,964) the total cost for 
PEP to Australian governments was over $6 million during the study period. It should 
be noted here that this cost is only for those individuals requiring HRIg and does not 
include individuals who receive the vaccine only and does not take into account the 
cost to the doctor/travel clinic visit.  
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4.6 Discussion 
This is the first analysis that includes multiple years of data from the NHRID. Between 
2010 and 2013, a total of 3,003 people received HRIg due to potential exposures to 
ABLV in Australia or the rabies virus overseas. The cost of PEP for these individuals 
was over $6 million. 
Potential exposures to ABLV occurring in Australia 
A third of our total HRIg was used for potential exposures to ABLV occurring from bat 
injuries in Australia and Queensland residents accounted for the highest proportion of 
those receiving HRIg for potential exposures to ABLV. I also found that rates of people 
receiving HRIg for potential exposures to ABLV occurring in Australia increased with 
age. Older age, particularly being older and male, were also associated with potential 
exposures in other studies (49, 53).  
Peaks in people receiving HRIg over the summer months were also found in 
jurisdictional-specific studies (7, 53). These studies state that the summer months 
coincide with the birthing season of some flying foxes and the harvesting of fruits 
popular with these animals. They propose that an increase in bat activity leads to an 
increase in injuries caused by bats and thus an increase in people receiving HRIg. 
Whilst determining seasonality for HRIg use due to potential exposures to ABLV may 
be beneficial for planning, events such as a human case of ABLV infection and 
associated media interest can cause spikes in HRIg use. This response to an event 
was evident in 2013, with a greater than 200% increase in people receiving HRIg for 
potential exposures to ABLV compared to the previous three years. These spikes, 
particularly the second, coincided with media reporting (58) of the death which may 
have contributed to the increase in usage through people seeking medical attention for 
bat-related exposures. This is also suggestive of underreporting of potential exposures 
in other years where such large scale media attention did not occur. Underreporting is 
also supported by studies showing a low perception of risk from bat interactions in the 
community (59-62), with those interviewed indicating that the need to help an injured or 
trapped bat would be greater than the perceived risk of harm or injury to themselves 
(61). Also unique to 2013, was the listing of horse as the animal responsible for a 
potential exposure to ABLV in Australia. This coincided with the novel detection of 
ABLV infection in horses in Queensland that same year (8, 9). 
With almost all potential exposures to ALBV being caused by bats, this study highlights 
the need to continue to educate not only bat handlers of the need for vaccination, but to 
warn community members of the dangers of handling bats. Whilst public health 
messages warning people against handling bats are freely available, it appears that the 
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messaging is ineffective. This is supported by multiple South East Queensland studies 
(7, 62, 63) and a New South Wales study (53) which report large numbers of 
unvaccinated volunteer bat handlers and community members intentionally handling 
bats. Some people reported that they would still intentionally handle a bat despite 
seeing the warning messages (59). Public health officials may wish to consider other 
messaging strategies. Quinn et al. (61) have suggested that the effectiveness of uptake 
of current warnings may be improved if we change from the current messaging of ‘don’t 
handle bats’ to ‘you may cause greater injury to the bat and potentially expose yourself 
to ABLV if you handle them’. 
Effective and targeted messaging will reduce potential exposures to ABLV occurring in 
Australia and reduce the chance of another human case of ABLV infection. Such 
messaging would also reduce the number of people requiring HRIg and flow on to cost 
savings for Australian governments. 
Potential Exposures to Rabies Virus Occurring Overseas 
Despite a large increase in HRIg in 2013 for potential exposures to ABLV occurring in 
Australia associated with the death of a young boy from ABLV infection, between 2010 
and 2013 the majority of HRIg administered was for potential exposures to rabies virus 
occurring overseas. 
Whilst cases of rabies virus infection had been reported in Indonesia since the 19th 
century, the island of Bali was considered rabies virus free until November 2008. 
Between 2008 and 2010, an outbreak resulted in the death of 104 people, and dog 
culling and vaccination programs were unable to control the outbreak (64). 
This study found most potential exposures to rabies virus that occurred overseas were 
in younger people. Furthermore, most injuries were caused by monkeys in 
Indonesia/Bali. This has also been observed in other Australian studies (49-53, 65). 
International studies have also noted that travellers returning from Asian countries 
account for the majority of PEP for potential rabies virus exposures (66-70). Despite 
travel to Asia accounting for only 4.8% of total trips by United Kingdom residents, more 
than half of all rabies virus potential exposures occur there (69). I observed similar 
results in this study. The Australian Government does warn travellers of the risk of 
acquiring rabies virus infection overseas, specifically in Indonesia (71).  
In this study, I found 20 to 29 year old females had the highest rates of people 
receiving HRIg for potential exposures occurring overseas; almost double that of males 
in the same age group. Additionally the rates for females were higher than males in all 
age groups except the 0 to 9 years and 10 to 19 years age groups. The ABS report that 
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the peak age group for female travellers (STVA and STRD) is 25 to 29 years, and is 
younger than that for male travellers (72).  
In 2013, the United Kingdom Health Protection Agency (HPA) updated their guidelines 
on managing rabies virus PEP (73). The key change was the recommendation that 
people potentially exposed to the rabies virus via rodent or monkey bites should now 
receive vaccine only as PEP, regardless of whether it occurred in a low or high risk 
country. The Communicable Diseases Network Australia is currently reviewing 
Australia’s guidelines for HRIg use in PEP. If Australia followed a similar path to the 
HPA guidelines, this could result in a significant reduction in HRIg usage, and thus 
significant cost reductions, for state and territory health departments. 
Previous studies have reported that almost all those requiring PEP for potential 
exposures did not receive any pre-vaccination (50, 53, 65, 68). The WHO (46) and 
Australian (47) guidelines for pre-vaccination both state that those travelling to rabies-
enzootic areas should consider pre-vaccination. However, ambiguous wording in each 
guideline could be a barrier for pre-vaccination. Neither guideline provides a definition 
for ‘outdoor exposures’ or ‘animal interactions’. Additionally, with travel clinics not 
routinely recommending vaccination for the rabies virus (53) it is not surprising so few 
people are pre-vaccinated. Ensuring messaging regarding the availability and suitability 
of pre-exposure vaccine for high risk groups will help reduce HRIg usage. 
Whilst the Australian Government Department of Health did develop information cards, 
airport signage and tweets, warning travellers of the risk of rabies virus infection 
overseas, this campaign was somewhat limited with only a few airports targeted. As the 
majority of our HRIg is used for potential exposures occurring overseas, the 
Department of Health should consider further targeted messaging to reduce potential 
exposures, particularly injuries caused by monkeys in Indonesia. 
4.6.1 Limitations 
The National Human Rabies Immunoglobulin Database captures information on people 
who receive HRIg in Australia, and requires people to report potential exposures and 
medical personnel to administer HRIg. With HRIg needing to be requested from health 
departments or PHUs, the results presented here are likely to be an accurate reflection 
of HRIg usage in Australia. These figures should not be interpreted as the total number 
of potential exposures to the rabies virus occurring overseas and ABLV in Australia due 
to under reporting and individuals who received vaccine only. 
Not all those receiving HRIg during the study period could be categorised as potential 
exposures to ABLV occurring in Australia or potential exposure to rabies virus 
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occurring oversea. As these represented a small proportion (<1%, 20/3,003) of the 
study population they would not have a significant impact on the reported results. 
I did not undertake a complete costing of PEP in Australia and the estimated cost of 
over $6 million for vaccine and HRIg over the study period did not take into account 
additional costs such as fees associated with visiting a doctor/travel clinic. It is still 
indicative of costs for this disease.  
The largest user of HRIg, Queensland, began recording the number of HRIg vials 
administered from November 2013 onwards. Prior to this, the amount of HRIg 
administered was calculated using the entered weight. As there is a defined algorithm 
for the amount of HRIg to administer based on weight, the amount of HRIg used for 
Queensland residents is likely to be accurate. 
Whilst I did identify individuals who had received an incorrect amount of HRIg for their 
weight, the majority of these received less HRIg, which may be accounted for by 
rounding down of HRIg vials during rationing periods. I was unable to confirm this 
theory, as an accurate record of when the rationing protocol has been invoked has not 
been kept. The remainder who did not fit into this category represented a small 
proportion of the total people receiving HRIg and are unlikely to have a significant 
effect on the results.  
There are a few limitations of the travel data. These data are counts of movements, as 
opposed to individual travellers, with multiple movements for an individual traveller 
being counted separately. These movements do not include long term visitor arrivals, 
long term resident returns or migrants. As data on short term resident returns were not 
available by country, I used STRD and assumed near equivalence of the two. I would 
not expect these factors to have a significant impact on the presented rates.  
Age, sex and jurisdictional-specific rates for potential exposures to rabies virus 
occurring overseas should be interpreted with caution. As I was unable to obtain travel 
data broken down by these variables, I used the estimated Australian resident 
population as the denominator. As such these rates may not represent the true burden 
of people receiving HRIg for potential exposures to rabies virus occurring overseas. 
They are presented for comparative purposes to the rates for potential exposures to 
ABLV occurring in Australia. 
A limitation of the study was the inability to analyse the number of people requiring 
PEP who were pre-vaccinated due to low data completeness. Other studies have 
reported that almost all those requiring PEP for potential exposures did not receive any 
pre-vaccination and I would expect similar results for this study. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
With continued shortages of HRIg expected globally, we need to reduce the number of 
potential exposures to ABLV and rabies virus to ensure HRIg remains available. By 
understanding risk factors for potential exposures we can continue to develop targeted 
messaging. We need to continue to warn of the dangers of handling bats in Australia 
and improve vaccine uptake for high risk groups to reduce the need for post-exposure 
prophylaxis, and to reduce the risks for these individuals. The current messaging 
should be reviewed and revised to ensure that it is appropriately targeted and effective. 
We should also continue to warn of the risk of potential exposure to rabies virus when 
travelling overseas, particularly to Indonesia. 
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4.8 Appendices 
Appendix 1: Oral presentation, PHAA 14th National Immunisation Conference, 
Melbourne 17 - 19 June 2014. 
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Appendix 2: Poster, PHAA 43rd Annual Conference, Perth 15 - 17 September 
2014. 
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Appendix 3: Australian Government Department of Health – outgoing passenger cards 
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Appendix 4: Minute to Assistant Secretary 
Rob Cameron 
Assistant Secretary 
Office of Health Protection 
APPROVAL OF POSTER FOR CONFERENCE 
Purpose 
To seek your approval of a poster on Human Rabies Immunoglobulin (HRIg) 
usage in Australia which will be presented at the Public Health Association of 
Australia (PHAA) 43rd Annual Conference, 15 to 17 September 2014, in Perth. 
Background 
Human Rabies Immunoglobulin (HRIg) is concentrated rabies virus neutralising 
antibodies derived from hyperimmunised individuals. It is used to treat unvaccinated 
people exposed, or potentially exposed, to the rabies virus overseas or Australian bat 
lyssavirus (ABLV) in Australia.  
Since 1 January 2010, national data have been collected on those who require HRIg 
for potential exposures (overseas or in Australia) and receive it in Australia. Information 
is collated though an online database (NetEpi) called the National Human Rabies 
Immunoglobulin Database (NHRID).  
HRIg is a limited resource globally and Australia has experienced shortages in HRIg 
due to increased demand in recent years. This analysis was initially requested by the 
Communicable Diseases Network Australia (CDNA) due to supply shortages of Human 
Rabies Immunoglobulin (HRIg). As no analysis of the data had been undertaken since 
2011, this work was required to inform policy. 
An abstract on an analysis of the NHRID was accepted for a poster presentation at the 
PHAA 43rd Annual Conference. 
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Current Status 
A third of people received HRIg for potential exposures to ABLV occurring in Australia, 
with a large increase observed in 2013 that coincided with the death of a case in 
Queensland from ABLV infection and subsequent media attention. Older individuals, 
particularly males, had the highest rates of people receiving HRIg for potential 
exposures and almost all were due to injuries caused by bats. 
Two thirds of people received HRIg for potential exposures to rabies virus occurring 
overseas. Travel to Indonesia accounted for over 60% of potential exposures occurring 
overseas, with the majority of these due to monkeys. Injuries caused by monkeys in 
Indonesia accounted for approximately half of the people receiving HRIg potential 
exposures occurring overseas and a third of people receiving HRIg for all potential 
exposures during the study period. 
The poster highlights that we need to continue to warn of the dangers of handling bats 
in Australia and improve vaccine uptake for high risk groups, and continue to warn of 
the risk of potential exposure to rabies virus when travelling overseas, particularly to 
Indonesia. This poster also highlights some of the work the Department of Health has 
done to reduce potential exposures to the rabies virus overseas (traveller information 
cards and tweets). 
This analysis has been sent to members of the Communicable Diseases Network of 
Australia for information. 
Recommendation 
That you approve the poster for presentation at the PHAA 43rd Annual 
Conference. 
Name: Timothy Sloan-Gardner 
Email: Timothy.Sloan-Gardner@health.gov.au 
Contact no: 02 6289 2377 
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Appendix 5: Vials of HRIg administered based on weight of individual, Australian 
Immunisation Handbook. 
Weight Vials of HRIg 
<15 kilograms 1 
<30 kilograms 2 
<45 kilograms 3 
<60 kilograms 4 
<75 kilograms 5 
<90 kilograms 6 
<105 kilograms 7 
<120 kilograms 8 
<135 kilograms 9 
<150 kilograms 10 
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Appendix 6: NHRID questionnaire, NetEpi. 
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Appendix 7: Counts of people receiving HRIg for potential exposures to rabies 
virus occurring overseas, by country and year, 1 January 2010 to 31 December 
2013, NHRID (n=1,988). 
Country of potential exposure 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Indonesia 256 268 367 345 1,236 
Thailand 77 62 102 93 334 
Viet Nam 16 10 17 18 61 
Malaysia 7 17 18 18 60 
India 6 12 9 11 38 
China 11 11 9 5 36 
Philippines 7 5 7 11 30 
Cambodia 3 4 6 9 22 
Sri Lanka 2 3 5 3 13 
People's Democratic Republic of Laos 6 0 1 4 11 
Timor-Leste 4 1 2 2 9 
Turkey 4 1 0 4 9 
Myanmar 0 1 3 4 8 
Bolivia 3 0 1 3 7 
Nepal 0 4 2 0 6 
South Africa 1 3 1 1 6 
United States 1 0 2 3 6 
Ecuador 3 1 1 0 5 
Papua New Guinea 1 1 2 1 5 
Peru 2 0 2 1 5 
Fiji 0 1 1 2 4 
Mexico 0 1 2 1 4 
Namibia 1 2 0 1 4 
Vanuatu 0 0 1 3 4 
Chile 0 1 2 0 3 
Costa Rica 0 1 0 2 3 
Cuba 2 0 0 1 3 
Hong Kong 1 1 1 0 3 
Kenya 0 1 2 0 3 
Morocco 1 1 0 1 3 
Bhutan 1 0 1 0 2 
Brazil 1 0 1 0 2 
Egypt 0 0 2 0 2 
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 2 2 
Romania 0 1 0 1 2 
Singapore 0 1 0 1 2 
United Republic of Tanzania 0 0 0 2 2 
Ukraine 1 0 1 0 2 
Zambia 0 0 0 2 2 
Armenia 0 0 0 1 1 
Belize 0 0 0 1 1 
Botswana 0 0 0 1 1 
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Country of potential exposure 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Canada 0 1 0 0 1 
Colombia 0 0 0 1 1 
Congo 1 0 0 0 1 
Cyprus 0 0 0 1 1 
Ethiopia 0 1 0 0 1 
France 0 0 1 0 1 
French Polynesia 1 0 0 0 1 
Ghana 0 0 1 0 1 
Guinea 0 0 1 0 1 
Haiti 0 1 0 0 1 
Honduras 1 0 0 0 1 
Hungary 0 0 0 1 1 
Israel 0 0 1 0 1 
Italy 0 0 1 0 1 
Republic of Korea 1 0 0 0 1 
Lebanon 1 0 0 0 1 
Madagascar 0 0 0 1 1 
Mongolia 1 0 0 0 1 
New Caledonia 0 0 1 0 1 
Samoa 0 0 0 1 1 
Saudi Arabia 1 0 0 0 1 
Serbia and Montenegro 0 0 0 1 1 
Province of Taiwan 0 0 0 1 1 
Tonga 0 1 0 0 1 
Tunisia 0 0 0 1 1 
United Arab Emirates 0 0 1 0 1 
Overseas total 425 419 578 566 1,988 
 
  
 176 
 
Appendix 8: Animal descriptions for potential exposures occurring overseas, by 
country, 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2013, NHRID (n=1,984*). 
Country of 
potential 
exposure 
Fruit bat/ 
Flying 
fox 
Other 
Types of 
bat 
Dog or 
canine 
Monkey Wildlife - 
general 
Unknown Other 
Indonesia 9 15 149 973 3 1 83 
Thailand 2 0 116 167 0 1 47 
Viet Nam 0 1 40 17 0 1 2 
Malaysia 0 0 6 50 0 0 4 
India 0 0 30 6 0 0 2 
China 0 0 29 3 0 0 4 
Philippines 0 0 19 4 0 0 7 
Cambodia 0 0 12 7 0 0 3 
Sri Lanka 0 0 9 0 0 0 4 
People's 
Democratic 
Republic of Laos 
0 0 4 3 0 0 4 
Timor-Leste 0 0 6 2 0 0 1 
Turkey 0 0 6 0 0 0 3 
Myanmar 0 0 6 2 0 0 0 
Bolivia 0 0 4 3 0 0 0 
Nepal 0 0 4 2 0 0 0 
South Africa 0 0 3 2 0 0 1 
United States 0 0 2 0 0 0 4 
Ecuador 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 
Papua New 
Guinea 
0 1 4 0 0 0 0 
Peru 0 0 3 1 0 0 1 
Fiji 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 
Mexico 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 
Namibia 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 
Vanuatu 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Cuba 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Hong Kong 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
Kenya 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Morocco 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Bhutan 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Brazil 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Egypt 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Kazakhstan 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Romania 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Singapore 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
United Republic 
of Tanzania 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Ukraine 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Zambia 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
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Country of 
potential 
exposure 
Fruit bat/ 
Flying 
fox 
Other 
Types of 
bat 
Dog or 
canine 
Monkey Wildlife - 
general 
Unknown Other 
Armenia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Belize 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Botswana 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Colombia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Congo 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Cyprus 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Ethiopia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
France 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
French 
Polynesia 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Ghana 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Guinea 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Haiti 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Honduras 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Hungary 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Israel 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Italy 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Republic of 
Korea 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Lebanon 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Madagascar 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Mongolia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
New Caledonia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Samoa 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Province of 
Taiwan 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Tonga 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Tunisia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
United Arab 
Emirates 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Overseas total 14 20 499 1,254 3 4 190 
*4 overseas potential exposures were missing the animal description. 
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Chapter 5 - Epidemiology of Q fever 
in Australia 
5.1 Prologue 
5.1.1 Study rationale 
This project centred on the lack of a national study into the epidemiology of Q fever 
following the end of the National Q Fever Management Program (NQFMP) and an 
apparent increase in Q fever notifications. We sought to gain a better understanding of 
what was occurring in order inform public health policy. 
5.1.2 My role 
I was the lead investigator who was responsible for the following tasks: 
 literature review; 
 epidemiological study design; 
 ethics review application; 
 data request applications; 
 data cleaning and analysis; and 
 organising and leading investigation team meetings. 
5.1.3 Lessons learnt 
This project had a number of lessons for me. Firstly, this was the first time I had 
submitted an application for approval from a Human Research Ethics Committee 
(HREC). Previously, I have only been involved in projects where the data were 
collected under public health legislation and used for the purpose for which it was 
collected. Going through the process of HREC approval gave me a greater 
understanding of the importance of protecting privacy and ensuring your project aims 
are fit-for-purpose. Additionally, it highlighted the skill and requirement of being able to 
communicate your project to the layperson. 
Having only worked previously for the Australian Government, I also came to realise 
how fortunate we are to have access to such a rich data source; the National Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS). In having a project that intended to 
incorporate data from a multitude of sources meant understanding the data request 
processes of other organisations. The process of requesting data from the New South 
Wales and Queensland Health Departments allowed me to gain a greater insight into 
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the demands of those who request such data regularly. It also highlighted for me where 
these processes could be streamlined, particularly at the national level. 
This project also taught me the important lesson of keeping expectations contained and 
more importantly focussed. Initially, I intended to incorporate not only the enhanced 
Q fever data from New South Wales and Queensland, but also data on the number of 
abattoir/meat workers vaccinated from the Australian Q fever Registry and 
manufacturing data on the number of Q fever vaccinations and test kits sold by 
Bio CSL. There were also initial plans of incorporating mapping into the analysis. Whilst 
the other two data sources would have been valuable to understanding the demand for 
vaccination/testing and the changes in the main at-risk population for Q fever over time, 
I was unable to access them. This allowed me to focus our project on the data we 
could obtain. 
Another extremely important lesson was the diplomacy required when caught between 
differing sides of an argument. At one stage during this project, clear and careful 
negotiation was needed to resolve concerns regarding privacy and access to data held 
by other parties. Thankfully, I was able to mediate a mutually agreed position with the 
eventual outcome allowing me access to the enhanced data. 
Something else that was new for me was Poisson and Negative Binomial Regression. 
Whilst I had a taste of regression modelling in my outbreak investigation chapter, this 
new experience yet again highlighted the importance of setting data up correctly; 
rubbish in, rubbish out. It also highlighted the complexity of interpretation of regression 
modelling results. 
Something else that was specific to this project was being the lead of an investigation 
team. As members of this team were spread around the country, one of my roles was 
to keep all informed of progress through regular meetings and email communication. 
This highlighted the importance of clear and concise communication. It was also very 
valuable having two extremely knowledgeable and respected Q fever experts as part of 
the team who provided great insights and guidance throughout the project. It is these 
passionate people you need to find whenever you want to investigate a public health 
problem. 
5.1.4 Public health implications of this work 
This study was the first detailed analysis of national Q fever notifications since the 
Gidding et al. 2009 (1) review of the NQFMP. It was also the first national analysis that 
combined Q fever notifications and enhanced data from multiple jurisdictions. Whilst 
analysis of the enhanced data was hampered due to low data completeness, our 
findings do correlate with the growing body of evidence that Q fever is no longer just 
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confined to abattoir workers and farmers. It may be time to review the current 
recommendations for Q fever vaccination as per the Australian Immunisation 
Handbook. 
This information is pertinent to the Department of Health’s request for tender 
Health/045/1415 - National Supply of Australian Antivenoms, Q fever and Pandemic 
Influenza Vaccine Supplies 
(https://www.tenders.gov.au/?event=public.atm.show&ATMUUID=B4A838CC-93E9-
7A88-480936D434FCE112). The current arrangements for supply for Q fever vaccine 
and tests kits by Bio CSL are due to expire in 2016, and tender proposals were due on 
17 November 2014. The findings of this study should be acknowledged when reviewing 
the tender proposals. With the identification of Q fever cases under the recommended 
age of vaccination (less than 15 years) it may also be time for manufactures to invest in 
research to develop a vaccine that is safe for use in children. 
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5.2 Abstract 
Q fever is a disease caused by the organism Coxiella burnetii. In Australia, this 
zoonotic disease has long been associated with abattoir workers and farmers, with 
handling animal birthing products or slaughtering animals being high risk exposures.  
Between 2001 and 2006, the Australian Government funded a targeted screening and 
vaccination program called the NQFMP. Whilst a review of this program analysed 
national Q fever notifications to the end of 2006, no studies have analysed national 
data since. Additionally, no studies have combined national Q fever data and enhanced 
data from multiple jurisdictions. 
We analysed notified cases of Q fever from the NNDSS and enhanced data on Q fever 
cases collected by the New South Wales and Queensland Health Departments from 
1991 to 2013. The aim of this study was to understand the epidemiology of Q fever in 
Australia, particularly since the end of the vaccination program.  
There was a 20% reduction in Q fever cases after the end of the NQFMP (2007 to 
2013), though recently (2013) rates of Q fever notifications have started to increase. 
The reasons for this are currently unknown. The highest rates of Q fever notifications 
were in males, aged 40 to 59 years, who resided in Queensland or New South Wales. 
The age of notified Q fever cases and the proportion of cases that were female both 
increased over time. 
The fields of occupation, animal fluid exposures and environmental exposures known 
to be associated with Q fever from the enhanced datasets had low data completeness. 
Additionally, this analysis was impacted by New South Wales and Queensland 
collecting different data. The most frequently listed occupation for Q fever cases 
involved contact with livestock, followed by no known risk occupations. Whilst cautious 
interpretation is required, the analysis does suggest that the occupation field alone 
does not adequately describe the risk of Q fever infection. 
Q fever appears to be no longer a disease confined to abattoir workers and farmers, 
and this analysis supports growing evidence that it may be time to re-evaluate the at-
risk groups recommended for Q fever vaccination as per the Australian Immunisation 
Handbook. Additionally, more comparable and complete enhanced datasets, either at 
the jurisdictional or national level, would aid in the understanding of the epidemiology of 
Q fever in Australia.  
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5.3 Introduction 
Q fever was the name given to an illness described by Edward Derrick in 1937 (2) in 
Brisbane abattoir workers, with the Q standing for query, “until fuller knowledge should 
allow for a better name.” The disease is caused by the intracellular bacterium 
Coxiella burnetii, named after the two scientists who almost simultaneously isolated the 
organism, Herald Cox (3) and Frank Burnet (4). 
Q fever is a zoonotic disease (meaning it is spread from animals to humans), with a 
wide range of reservoirs. These include wild and domestic mammals, birds and ticks. In 
Australia, kangaroos have been implicated as a possible transmission pathway for the 
pathogen (5). Infected animals will not usually display symptoms after infection, 
however, Q fever is known to cause abortions and low birth weight in cattle (6). The 
only jurisdiction in Australia that requires notification of Q fever in animals is Tasmania 
(7). 
Q fever is distributed throughout the world, with New Zealand being a notable 
exception (8-10). The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention currently list 
Q fever as a Category B bioterrorism agent or disease. By definition, this is due to the 
disease being moderately easy to disseminate, having moderate morbidity rates and 
the requirement for enhancements to diagnostic capacity and disease surveillance for 
detection (11). Parker et al. propose that this classification may be due to claims that a 
single organism can cause disease in a susceptible person (12). 
The primary route of infection for humans is airborne, usually from inhalation of 
aerosolised particles from animal birthing products, urine, and faeces or ingestion of 
raw milk (6). Person-to-person transmission is rare. The incubation period for Q fever is 
usually 2 to 3 weeks with a range of 4 days to 6 weeks. The disease can manifest as 
an acute febrile illness with muscle aches, weakness, severe headaches and fatigue or 
chronic illness that may affect the heart or liver (6, 12). 
Acute illness is non-specific and can present as influenza-like illness with varying 
degrees of pneumonia and hepatitis, and the case fatality rate is 1% to 2% (6, 12, 13). 
Chronic disease usually presents as endocarditis and generally in people with 
underlying disease (6). Chronic disease can occur a month to years after acute illness 
or there may be no history of acute illness. Q fever may recrudesce during pregnancy 
and can induce abortion in humans (14). Long term sequelae, though not well studied, 
can include chronic fatigue lasting more than 6 months (15). 
While most papers on Q fever state that approximately half of those infected are 
asymptomatic, this is based on a serological survey of a Q fever outbreak in a Swiss 
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valley in 1983 (16). Dupuis et al. investigated a human Q fever epidemic in the Val de 
Bagnes district of Switzerland. Of the 3,036 inhabitants serologically tested, 
approximately 14% (415/3,036) were confirmed Q fever using complement fixation and 
indirect micro-immunofluorescence tests for Immunoglobulin M. Of these 54% 
(224/415) were asymptomatic.  
In Australia, Q fever has traditionally been associated with abattoir workers and 
farmers (2, 12, 17). Assisting in birthing and slaughtering of animals have been 
considered high risk exposures (18-20). Q fever became a nationally notifiable disease 
in Australia in 1991. The current national surveillance case definition states that a 
confirmed case requires laboratory definitive evidence, or laboratory suggestive 
evidence and clinical evidence, for Q fever and that only confirmed cases should be 
notified (21).  
The only human whole-cell vaccine for Q fever was licenced in Australia in 1989 and 
the company Bio CSL began promoting vaccine use for abattoir workers in 1994 (1). 
The NQFMP was announced by the Australian Government in 2000. It was 
implemented in Queensland, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia in 2001 
and by the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales and Tasmania in 2002. The 
Australian Government provided funding for screening and vaccination under the 
program. Phase I (2002) of the program targeted abattoir workers, contractors working 
in abattoirs and sheep shearers. Phase II (2003) expanded the target population to 
include sheep/dairy/beef cattle farmers, their employees and family members working 
on farms. For this phase, over 1000 immunisation providers were trained for mass 
community-based clinics (1). 
Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales completed the 
program in June 2004, Western Australia in June 2005, Victoria and South Australia in 
June 2006 and Queensland in December 2006. During the program 48,986 people 
were immunised. Bio CSL report that between 2001 and 2004, 128,878 doses of the 
whole-cell vaccine were distributed (1). 
Q fever rates declined by more than 50% to their lowest levels in 2005/2006 (1). The 
greatest decline in notification rates was observed in young adult males, the target 
population of phase I of the NQFMP. Initially the median age and proportion of notified 
Q fever cases who were female increased, but this decreased again post phase II 
(reflecting the target population of phase II) (1). The main reasons for uptake in the 
abattoir industry were the free vaccine and training of additional vaccine providers. The 
main uptake during phase II of the program was the implementation of mass 
vaccination clinics (1). 
 188 
 
The Australian Government may fund vaccine and skin tests in emergency situations 
where there is a Q fever outbreak (22) however, there is no definition as to what 
constitutes an outbreak. The Q fever vaccine is not recommended for people under 15 
years of age and pregnant or breastfeeding women. 
Pre-vaccination testing is required prior to administering the Q fever vaccine. These 
tests are used to exclude those who have previously been exposed to C. burnetii, to 
reduce the likelihood of hypersensitivity reactions to the vaccine. The Australian 
Immunisation handbook currently recommends vaccine for those at risk of infection, 
which include: abattoir workers, farmers, stockyard workers, shearers, animal 
transporters, and others exposed to cattle, camels, sheep, goats and kangaroos or 
their products (including products of conception). It also includes veterinarians, 
veterinary nurses, veterinary students, professional dog and cat breeders, agricultural 
college staff and students, wildlife and zoo workers working with high-risk animals and 
laboratory personnel handling veterinary specimens or working with the organism. 
Workers at pig abattoirs do not require Q fever vaccination (22). 
There have been state-specific analyses of notified Q fever cases published (20, 23-
26), however, the only recent analysis of national Q fever notifications was published 
as part of the review of the NQFMP, and only analysed data to 2006 (1). A study of 
Q fever data since the end of the NQFMP in December 2006 is needed in order to 
understand the epidemiology of Q fever in Australia since this change in policy.  
5.4 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this study is to describe the epidemiology of Q fever in Australia from 1991 
to 2013. This project will seek to answer the questions of:  
1. What are the rates of Q fever notifications in Australia by age, sex and jurisdiction?; 
2. What are the risk factor(s) for Q fever in Australia before, during and since the 
NQFMP?; and  
3. Was the epidemiology of Q fever different during the periods of pre-NQFMP 1991 
to 2000, during NQFMP 2001 to 2006 and post-NQFMP 2007 to 2013?  
The outcomes of the project will assist public health services in specifically targeting at-
risk groups for Q fever vaccination and inform future public health policy and action.  
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5.5 Methods 
5.5.1 Study Type 
A retrospective case series analysis was conducted on Q fever cases notified to the 
NNDSS between 1 January 1991 and 31 December 2013. 
5.5.2 Case Definitions 
A case of Q fever was defined as per the CDNA national surveillance case definition 
(21). 
5.5.3 Data collection 
Notifications of Q fever are sent to the NNDSS on a daily basis by states and 
territories. The fields of date of birth, jurisdiction, gender, country where Q fever was 
acquired and diagnosis date were extracted from the NNDSS. 
Diagnosis date was used to define the period of analysis. This NNDSS generated date 
represents either the onset date or where the date of onset was not known, the earliest 
of the specimen collection date, the notification date, or the notification received date. 
Diagnosis year was grouped into the following periods: Pre-NQFMP 1991 to 2000, 
During NQFMP 2001 to 2006 and Post-NQFMP 2007 to 2013. 
Data were extracted from the NNDSS on 15 July 2014, with diagnosis dates ranging 
from 1 January 1991 to 31 December 2013. The exported Microsoft Excel file was 
imported into Stata intercooled v13 (Stata Corp, Collage Station, TX, USA) for analysis. 
5.5.4 Descriptive analysis 
Cases were summarised by year, NQFMP period/year, age, gender, jurisdiction and 
place where Q fever was acquired. Demographic and risk factor data were compared 
between analysis periods. Data were analysed by Wilcoxon rank-sum test, a 
nonparametric test for trend across ordered groups and proportions were assessed by 
Chi-square tests. A p value of less than 0.05 was considered statistically significant. 
Domestic Q fever rates were calculated using the Australian Bureau of Statistics mid-
year estimated resident populations (27). They are presented as notifications per 
100,000 population or jurisdictional-specific notifications per 100,000 jurisdiction-
specific population. 
5.5.5 Regression modelling 
To investigate the relationships between covariates such as gender, age, jurisdiction 
and the NQFMP on Q fever notifications, regression modelling was undertaken. 
Initially, Poisson regression was used to calculate gender, age group, jurisdiction and 
NQFMP period/year specific incident rate ratios (IRRs) for Q fever notifications.  
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To test the appropriateness of using Poisson regression, we conducted a Chi-square 
goodness-of-fit test. We also graphed our data against the Poisson and Negative 
Binomial probabilities using the user-built Stata code of nbvargr (available from 
http://www.stata.com/stb/stb9). 
The final Negative Binomial model was used to calculate gender, age group, 
jurisdiction and NQFMP period/year specific IRRs for Q fever notifications, with 95% 
confidence intervals (CI) and p values. Two degrees-of-freedom chi-square tests were 
conducted on all variables in the final model to see if they were statistically significant 
(p <0.05) predictors of Q fever notifications. 
5.5.6 Enhanced dataset analysis 
Both New South Wales and Queensland Health interview all notified cases of Q fever 
to seek additional exposure information. New South Wales Health use question 
prompts from their notifiable disease surveillance system during interviews, and as 
such there is no printable version of this form available. Queensland Health use a 
separate questionnaire which can be found at Appendix 1. 
Applications were submitted to both New South Wales and Queensland Health for all 
additional data not sent to the NNDSS. Enhanced data were only sought from these 
two jurisdictions as they account for the majority of Q fever cases nationally. A 
complete list of fields received from New South Wales and Queensland Health can be 
found at Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively. The New South Wales data were 
extracted by symptom onset date, or where that was missing, the laboratory specimen 
date. The Queensland data were extracted by symptom onset date. The de-identified 
data were supplied as a Microsoft Excel file, and imported into Stata intercooled v13 
(Stata Corp, Collage Station, TX, USA) for analysis. 
For New South Wales cases from 1991 to May 2010 there were no clinical details or 
animal exposure information as this was not recorded in the notifiable diseases 
database operational during that period. Abattoir exposures however, were recorded in 
occupation where applicable. For the Queensland data, no occupation information was 
collected between 1991 and 2001. 
As both jurisdictions ask slightly different questions when interviewing notified Q fever 
cases, the data were recoded for this analysis, in consultation with surveillance staff 
from the relevant jurisdictions. The data fields used and the steps for recoding for both 
the New South Wales and Queensland enhanced datasets can be found at Appendix 4 
and Appendix 5 respectively. 
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Any identifying information was removed and the data were categorised into specific 
occupation groups by Queensland Health prior to release for this study. Due to the 
Queensland enhanced dataset containing limited occupational information, occupations 
were also classified by whether the occupation was known to be a risk factor for 
Q fever infection. Occupations recommended for Q fever vaccination as per the 
Australian Immunisation Handbook (22) formed the risk occupation categories. Where 
a recorded occupation was not recommended for vaccination, it was placed in the no 
known risk occupation category. Those where the occupation was unknown or blank 
was classified as Unknown occupation. This is depicted visually in the table below 
(Table 1). 
Table 1: Occupational risk categories for Q fever infection. 
Broad categories Recoded Occupations 
Risk occupation 
Abattoir worker 
Contact with animals other than livestock 
Contact with livestock 
Transport worker 
No known risk occupation 
Medical/Science 
Tradesperson 
No known risk occupation 
Unknown occupation Unknown 
 
As both New South Wales and Queensland Health collect varying degrees of 
information on animal fluid exposures (e.g. being involved in birthing, slaughtering of 
animals) and environmental exposures (e.g. worked on or near farms, sale yards) 
known to be associated with Q fever infection, the data were recoded into the broad 
categories of animal fluid exposures or environmental exposures. Please see 
Appendix 4 and Appendix 5 for more information. 
The field of previously vaccinated for Q fever was regrouped into Yes, No or Unknown, 
where the latter grouping included a response of Unknown, Not known by case or 
doctor, or Blank. 
The NNDSS data fields of state and gender, the calculated diagnosis year and 20 year 
age groups, were linked to the New South Wales and Queensland enhanced dataset 
fields of vaccination status, case status and the recoded fields of occupation, animal 
fluid exposures and environmental exposures via direct linkage using the unique 
jurisdictional notification identifier. 
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5.5.7 Ethics 
Ethics approval for this study was granted though the Australian National University 
HREC; Human Ethics protocol 2014/205. Approval for access to the enhanced 
Queensland and New South Wales datasets was granted by the Director General of 
Queensland Health and the Chief Health Officer of New South Wales Health, 
respectively. 
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5.6 Results 
5.6.1 Data 
The exported data contained 11,692 records. Cases that were listed as being acquired 
overseas were analysed separately. 
5.6.2 Overseas acquired cases 
During the study period, there were 21 Q fever notifications listed as being acquired 
overseas. The majority of these notifications were male (71%, 15/21) and the median 
age was 40 years (range 9 to 75 years). Table 2 summarises the overseas country of 
acquisition for these notifications. As we were focussing on the epidemiology and risk 
factors of Q fever in Australia, these records were excluded from the remainder of the 
analysis. 
Table 2: Overseas acquired notifications of Q fever by country, 1 January 1991 to 31 
December 2013, NNDSS (n=21). 
Place of acquisition Q fever notifications 
Southern and Eastern Europe 9 
China 3 
Egypt 2 
Imported from overseas, country unknown 1 
Polynesia 1 
Spain 1 
United Arab Emirates 1 
Philippines 1 
Afghanistan 1 
Northern America 1 
 
5.6.3 Locally acquired cases 
During the study period, 11,671 Q fever notifications were listed as being acquired in 
Australia. For those records where gender was recorded (99%, 11,641/11,671), the 
majority were male (80%, 9,323/11,641) (Table 3). Between 1991 and 2013, the 
proportion of Q fever notifications that were male ranged from 70% to 86% (Figure 1). 
There was a statistically significant (p <0.05) increase in the proportion of females 
cases over time.  
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Table 3: Counts of Q fever notifications by gender and year, 1 January 1991 to 31 
December 2013, NNDSS (n=11,641*). 
Year Female Male Total 
1991 75 435 510 
1992 77 474 551 
1993 122 735 857 
1994 106 560 666 
1995 66 381 447 
1996 76 461 537 
1997 84 452 536 
1998 113 439 552 
1999 87 425 512 
2000 100 471 571 
2001 132 546 678 
2002 187 599 786 
2003 130 429 559 
2004 111 349 460 
2005 76 277 353 
2006 86 324 410 
2007 133 313 446 
2008 109 266 375 
2009 78 235 313 
2010 90 245 335 
2011 95 255 350 
2012 79 282 361 
2013 106 370 476 
Total 2,318 9,323 11,641 
*30 cases missing gender 
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Figure 1: Proportion of Q fever notifications by gender and year, 1 January 1991 to 31 
December 2013, NNDSS (n=11,641*). 
*30 cases missing gender 
Almost all records had a date of birth listed (98%, 11,450/11,671), and the median age 
of Q fever notifications was 40 years (range 0 to 92 years). The median age for males 
was 39 years (range 0 to 92 years) and for females was 42 years (range 0 to 92 years). 
The differences in age and sex were statistically different (p <0.05). 
A total of 243 people under the age of 15 years were notified during the study period, 
77 pre NQFMP (1991 to 2000), 95 during (2001 to 2006) and 71 post NQFMP (2007 to 
2013). 
The highest counts of Q fever notifications for males were in the 20 to 39 years 
age group and for females the 40 to 59 years age group (Figure 2). The highest rates 
for both males and females were in the 40 to 59 years age group (Figure 3). 
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Figure 2: Counts of Q fever notifications by gender and age group, 1 January 1991 to 
31 December 2013, NNDSS (n=11,424*). 
*26 cases missing gender, 217 missing date of birth so no age group could be calculated and 
four missing both gender and date of birth. 
 
 
Figure 3: Rates per 100,000 of Q fever notifications by gender and age group, 
1 January 1991 to 31 December 2013, NNDSS (n=11,424*). 
*26 cases missing gender, 217 missing date of birth so no age group could be calculated and 
four missing both gender and date of birth. 
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The median age of all cases increased over the study period with the Pre-NQFMP 
period (1991 to 2000) having a median age of 35 years (range 0 to 92 years), during 
the NQFMP (2001 to 2006) 43 years (range 0 to 92 years) and Post-NQFMP period 
(2007 to 2013) 47 years (range 1 to 89 years); this increase was statistically significant 
(p <0.05). 
Rates of Q fever notifications dropped after the introduction of the Q fever vaccine in 
1994. They peaked in 2002 (4.0 per 100,000) following the introduction of the NQFMP 
and declined to the lowest rate on record (1.7 per 100,000) in 2005. Rates have 
increased again in 2013 (2.1 per 100,000) (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Rates per 100,000 of Q fever notifications by year, 1 January 1991 to 
31 December 2013, NNDSS (n=11,671). 
 
Queensland and New South Wales residents accounted for the majority of notifications 
(87%, 10,183/11,671), with Queensland residents alone accounting for just under half 
of all Q fever notifications (47%, 5,492/11,671) (Table 4).  
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Table 4: Counts of Q fever notifications by state and territory, 1 January 1991 to 31 
December 2013, NNDSS (n=11,671). 
Jurisdiction Q fever notifications 
QLD 5,492 
NSW 4,691 
VIC 801 
SA 381 
WA 264 
NT 26 
ACT 13 
TAS 3 
Australia 11,671 
 
Along with the highest counts, Queensland residents also had the highest rates of 
Q fever notifications throughout the study period (Figure 5). The peaks in Queensland 
notification rates in 2001, and for New South Wales in 2002, correspond with the 
differing start dates for the NQFMP in those jurisdictions. 
 
Figure 5: Rates per 100,000 of New South Wales and Queensland Q fever notifications 
by year, 1 January 1991 to 31 December 2013, NNDSS. 
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model, see Figure 6. A Negative Binomial model is also more appropriate due to the 
high number of zero counts in the data (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 6: Graph modelling data against Poisson and Negative Binomial probabilities. 
 
 
Figure 7: Counts of discrete frequencies of modelling data. 
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A two degrees-of-freedom chi-square test, indicated that gender, age group, jurisdiction 
and NQFMP period were statistically significant predictors (p <0.05) of Q fever 
notifications. 
Males had statistically significant higher rates of Q fever notifications (IRR 4.00) 
compared to females, when adjusting for NQFMP period, age group and jurisdiction 
(Table 5). Since the end of the NQFMP, there has been a 20% reduction in the rate of 
Q fever notifications (Post NQFMP IRR 0.80) compared to before the introduction of 
the NQFMP (Table 5). This was statistically significant (p <0.05). 
The rates for Q fever notifications were highest in the 40 to 59 year age group 
(IRR 6.51), and were also higher in the 20 to 39 year age group (IRR 5.64) and 60 to 
79 year age group (IRR 3.50) (Table 5). Statistically significant higher rates of Q fever 
notifications were also observed in Queensland (IRR 12.11), New South Wales 
(IRR 5.50) and South Australian (IRR 1.86) residents (Table 5). 
Table 5: Negative Binomial regression analysis of Q fever notifications, 1 January 1991 
to 31 December 2013(n=11,424). 
 IRR 95% CI p value 
Gender Reference = Female     
Male 4.00 3.48 4.61 <0.01 
     
NQFMP Period Reference 
 = Pre NQFMP 1991 to 2000 
    
During NQFMP 2001 to 2006 1.21 1.03 1.43 0.02 
Post NQFMP 2007 to 2013 0.80 0.68 0.95 0.01 
     
Age group Reference = 0 to 19yr     
20 to 39yr 5.64 4.58 6.95 <0.01 
40 to 59yr 6.51 5.28 8.01 <0.01 
60 to 79yr 3.50 2.81 4.36 <0.01 
80+yr 0.84 0.59 1.19 0.33 
     
Jurisdiction Reference = VIC     
ACT 0.31 0.17 0.57 <0.01 
NSW 5.50 4.45 6.80 <0.01 
NT 0.99 0.63 1.56 0.96 
QLD 12.11 9.79 14.98 <0.01 
SA 1.86 1.46 2.38 <0.01 
TAS 0.05 0.02 0.16 <0.01 
WA 0.95 0.73 1.23 0.70 
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When using the same variable and substituting individual years for the NQFMP period, 
the Q fever notification rates decreased significantly from 2009 to 2012 (IRR 0.62 to 
0.65, p <0.05). The Q fever notification rate appears to increase in 2013 (IRR 0.86), 
compared to 2012, though the 2013 Q fever notification rate is still lower than before 
the NQFMP (before 2001) and this change was not statistically significant (p >0.05) 
(Table 6). Using individual years did not have an impact of the other variables in the 
model. 
Table 6: Negative Binomial regression analysis of Q fever notifications using single 
years (n=11,424). 
 IRR 95% CI p value 
Gender Reference = Female     
Male 4.07 3.73 4.44 <0.01 
     
Year Reference = 2000     
1991 0.84 0.63 1.11 0.22 
1992 0.87 0.66 1.15 0.34 
1993 1.53 1.18 2.00 <0.01 
1994 1.37 1.05 1.79 0.02 
1995 0.85 0.64 1.12 0.24 
1996 1.09 0.83 1.44 0.52 
1997 0.91 0.69 1.20 0.50 
1998 1.04 0.79 1.37 0.78 
1999 0.97 0.74 1.28 0.85 
     
2001 1.38 1.06 1.80 0.02 
2002 1.74 1.34 2.26 <0.01 
2003 1.14 0.87 1.50 0.33 
2004 1.16 0.88 1.53 0.29 
2005 0.73 0.55 0.97 0.03 
2006 0.86 0.65 1.14 0.29 
2007 1.03 0.78 1.36 0.83 
2008 0.80 0.60 1.06 0.12 
2009 0.62 0.46 0.83 <0.01 
2010 0.63 0.47 0.83 <0.01 
2011 0.65 0.49 0.86 <0.01 
2012 0.65 0.49 0.87 <0.01 
2013 0.86 0.65 1.13 0.29 
     
Age group Reference = 0 to 19yr     
20 to 39yr 5.46 4.79 6.22 <0.01 
40 to 59yr 6.21 5.45 7.07 <0.01 
60 to 79yr 3.42 2.97 3.94 <0.01 
80+yr 0.80 0.60 1.07 0.14 
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 IRR 95% CI p value 
Jurisdiction Reference = VIC     
ACT 0.30 0.17 0.52 <0.01 
NSW 5.36 4.70 6.12 <0.01 
NT 0.95 0.63 1.44 0.82 
QLD 11.88 10.42 13.56 <0.01 
SA 1.85 1.56 2.18 <0.01 
TAS 0.05 0.02 0.15 <0.01 
WA 0.98 0.81 1.17 0.79 
 
5.6.5 New South Wales and Queensland enhanced datasets 
The New South Wales enhanced data were extracted from the New South Wales 
Health Notifiable Conditions Information Management System on 4 July 2014 and 
contained 4,731 records. The Queensland enhanced data was extracted from the 
Queensland Health Notifiable Conditions System on 25 August 2014 and contained 
5,504 records. 
All New South Wales notifications from the NNDSS could be matched to a record in the 
New South Wales enhanced dataset. All but four Queensland notifications from the 
NNDSS could be matched to a record in the Queensland enhanced dataset. Fifty-six 
records from the enhanced datasets could not be matched to NNDSS notifications 
(New South Wales n=40 and Queensland n=16). Reasons for not being able to match 
all data included differing extraction dates and methods. The combined dataset 
contained a total of 10,179 records; 4,691 New South Wales records and 5,488 
Queensland records.  
For vaccination status, 68% of cases (6,965/10,179) were listed as unknown; no data 
were provided for 88% (6,112/6,965) of these. For those records where vaccination 
status was recorded, 2% (71/3,214) were listed as being vaccinated for Q fever. The 
proportion of cases with unknown vaccination status decreased over time, with over 
90% (405/446) of cases in 1991 listed as unknown compared to 22% (90/411) in 2013. 
Almost all cases were listed as confirmed (10,148/10,179) as per the national 
surveillance case definition. According to the national surveillance case definition and 
both New South Wales and Queensland guidelines, the 31 cases (four from New South 
Wales and 27 from Queensland) listed as possible or probable should not have been 
notified to the NNDSS. 
From 2002 onwards (as this is when both jurisdictions collected occupational 
information) 66% (2,971/4,506) of cases did not have an occupation listed. The 
majority of these (68%, 2,028/2,297) were Queensland notifications. The most 
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frequently listed occupation was contact with livestock, followed by no known risk 
occupation (Table 7). 
Table 7: Occupation, New South Wales and Queensland enhanced datasets, 2002 to 
2013 (n=4,506).  
Occupation New South 
Wales 
Queensland Total 
Contact with livestock 699 3 702 
No known risk occupation 281 88 369 
Abattoir worker 116 159 275 
Tradesperson 98 0 98 
Contact with animals other than livestock 32 1 33 
Transport worker 33 0 33 
Medical/Science 25 0 25 
Unknown 943 2,028 2,971 
Total 2,227 2,279 4,506 
 
The proportion of cases in each of the listed occupations is similar during the NQFMP 
(2002 to 2006) and after it (2007 to 2013). For both periods, the most frequently 
recorded occupation was one that involved contact with livestock, followed by no 
known risk occupation (Table 8). 
Table 8: Occupation proportions during and after the NQFMP, New South Wales and 
Queensland enhanced datasets. 
Occupation During NQFMP 
2002* to 2006 
Post NQFMP 
2007 to 2013 
Contact with livestock 16% 15% 
No known risk occupation 7% 10% 
Abattoir worker 6% 6% 
Tradesperson 1% 3% 
Contact with animals other than livestock 0% 1% 
Medical/Science 1% 1% 
Transport worker 1% 1% 
Unknown 68% 64% 
* Data not collected in 2001. 
From 2002 onwards, 60% (2,693/4,506) of cases had no information listed for animal 
fluid exposures. Of those cases with complete information (n=1,813), under half (42%, 
763/1,813) had contact with animal fluids that are known to be associated with Q fever 
(Table 9). Data completeness for this field did improve over time (Table 10). 
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Table 9: Animal fluid exposures, New South Wales and Queensland enhanced 
datasets, 2002 to 2013 (n=4,506). 
Animal fluid exposures New South 
Wales 
Queensland Total 
Yes 196 567 763 
No 305 745 1,050 
Unknown 1,726 967 2,693 
Total 2,227 2,279 4,506 
 
Table 10: Animal fluid exposure proportions during and after the NQFMP, New South 
Wales and Queensland enhanced datasets. 
Animal fluid exposures During NQFMP 
2002* to 2006 
Post NQFMP 
2007 to 2013 
Yes 14% 20% 
No 11% 35% 
Unknown 75% 45% 
* Data not collected in 2001. 
From 2002 onwards, 62% (2,794/4,506) of cases had no information listed for 
environmental exposures. Of those cases with complete information (n=1,712), the 
majority (93%, 1,598/1,712) had an environmental exposure known to be associated 
with Q fever (Table 11). Data completeness for this field also improved over time 
(Table 12). 
Table 11: Environmental exposures, New South Wales and Queensland enhanced 
datasets, 2002 to 2013 (n=4,506). 
Environmental exposures New South 
Wales 
Queensland Total 
Yes 295 1,303 1,598 
No 112 2 114 
Unknown 1,820 974 2,794 
Total 2,227 2,279 4,506 
 
Table 12: Environmental exposure proportions during and after the NQFMP, New 
South Wales and Queensland enhanced datasets. 
Environmental 
exposures 
During NQFMP 
2002* to 2006 
Post NQFMP 
2007 to 2013 
Yes 22% 48% 
No 0% 5% 
Unknown 78% 47% 
* Data not collected in 2001. 
A comparison of during and after the NQFMP, of the counts and proportions of those 
with animal fluid and environmental exposures previously associated with Q fever by 
occupational risk categories can be found in Table 13 and Table 14. These tables show 
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that whilst Q fever cases may not have reported a high-risk occupation, animal fluid 
and or environmental exposures were reported. During the NQFMP, approximately half 
(51%, 1,117/2,193) of the Q fever cases had an unknown occupation recorded and no 
animal fluid or environmental exposures recorded. This did improve overtime, reducing 
to 32% (729/2,313) after the NQFMP. Approximately 1% (28/2,313) of Q fever cases 
after the NQFMP did not have a high risk occupation recorded and unknown animal 
fluid exposures or environmental exposures. 
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Table 13: Occupation categories, animal fluid and environmental exposure counts during and after the NQFMP, New South Wales and 
Queensland enhanced datasets, 2002 to 2013. 
Counts 
Animal Fluid Exposure  NO  YES UNKNOWN   
Environmental Exposure No Yes Unknown No Yes Unknown No Yes Unknown Total 
During 
NQFMP 
2002* to 
2006 
Risk occupation 0 2 0 1 73 61 0 0 375 512 
No known risk occupation 0 15 0 0 24 0 0 0 151 190 
Unknown occupation 0 219 7 0 140 0 0 8 1117 1491 
Total 0 236 7 1 237 61 0 8 1643 2193 
            
Post 
NQFMP 
2007 to 2013 
Risk Occupation 0 138 0 73 85 51 0 1 183 531 
No known risk occupation 28 133 0 8 57 0 0 2 74 302 
Unknown Occupation 4 491 13 2 219 1 0 21 729 1480 
Total 32 762 13 83 361 52 0 24 986 2313 
Table 14: Occupation categories, animal fluid and environmental exposure percentages during and after the NQFMP, New South Wales 
and Queensland enhanced datasets, 2002 to 2013. 
Percentages 
Animal Fluid Exposure NO (%) YES (%) UNKNOWN (%)  
Environmental Exposure No Yes Unknown No Yes Unknown No Yes Unknown Total 
During 
NQFMP 
2002* to 
2006 
Risk occupation - 0.1 - <0.1 3.3 2.8 - - 17.1 23.3 
No known risk occupation - 0.7 - - 1.1 - - - 6.9 8.7 
Unknown occupation - 10.0 0.3 - 6.4 - - 0.4 50.9 68.0 
Total - 10.8 0.3 0.0 10.8 2.8 - 0.4 74.9 100.0 
                       
Post 
NQFMP 
2007 to 2013 
Risk occupation - 6.0 - 3.2 3.7 2.2 - <0.1 7.9 23.0 
No known risk occupation 1.2 5.8 - 0.3 2.5 - - 0.1 3.2 13.1 
Unknown occupation 0.2 21.2 0.6 0.1 9.5 <0.1 - 0.9 31.5 64.0 
Total 1.4 32.9 0.6 3.6 15.6 2.2 - 1.0 42.6 100.0 
* Data not collected in 2001. 
 207 
 
5.7 Discussion 
This study represents the first detailed analysis of national Q fever notifications since 
the end of the NQFMP, and the first to combine Q fever notification data with enhanced 
data from multiple jurisdictions. It is known that the NQFMP was effective in reducing 
Q fever notifications (1), with Q fever notification rates halving and dropping to their 
lowest level in 2009 at 1.4 per 100,000. A 20% reduction in Q fever notification rates 
occurred during the NQFMP, however, from 2010 onwards Q fever notification rates 
have increased. This analysis suggests that without a nationally funded program, Q 
fever rates appear to be increasing. With only one published Q fever outbreak since the 
end of the NQFMP (28), this apparent increase cannot be attributed to outbreaks 
alone. 
With approximately 50% of Q fever cases being asymptomatic, the disease usually 
being mild and a generalisation of Q fever being a disease of abattoir workers and 
farmers, this disease may not be a high public health priority. However, this disease is 
known to cause significant morbidity and mortality, and has similar or higher national 
notification rates to other vaccine preventable diseases which have nationally funded 
immunisation programs, such as Haemophilus influenzae type b, measles and 
meningococcal infection (29). 
Consistent with other published studies (1, 19), we found that New South Wales and 
Queensland residents accounted for the majority of Q fever cases nationally and that 
rates of Q fever notifications were highest in males. Also similar to other studies, we 
found that the age of notified Q fever cases (1, 24) and the proportion of females both 
increased over time (20, 24, 30). We also found increased notification rates in South 
Australia, which may be associated with a number of known Q fever outbreaks in this 
jurisdiction and a history of Q fever in South Australian abattoir workers (17, 18, 31-35). 
When reviewing the New South Wales and Queensland enhanced Q fever data, 
vaccine status was unknown for the majority of cases and of those that were known, 
only 2% were listed as being vaccinated. Whilst there is an effective vaccine available 
(36), studies have noted barriers to people being vaccinated (1, 20, 30). These include 
the belief of being not-at-risk, costs associated with pre-screening and vaccination, 
problems accessing medical services, the need for pre-screening or being under the 
recommended age of vaccination. We also found a number of notified Q fever cases 
under the recommended age for vaccination (<15 years). 
There were 31 cases listed as probable or possible in the New South Wales and 
Queensland enhanced Q fever datasets. According to the national surveillance case 
definition (21), and the New South Wales and Queensland Q fever guidelines (37, 38), 
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only confirmed cases should be reported to health departments. These cases should 
be reviewed to determine if they are true cases or data entry errors.  
With New South Wales and Queensland capturing slightly different exposure data in 
their respective enhanced datasets and a high level of missing data, the analysis of the 
enhanced data requires cautious interpretation. Almost a third of records from after the 
NQFMP (2007 to 2013) had incomplete data for all the analysed fields of occupation, 
animal fluid exposures and environmental exposures. With each Q fever case requiring 
New South Wales and Queensland public health staff to follow-up, interview and enter 
data into respective systems, it may be worth investigating barriers to collecting 
complete data. This would ensure more meaningful analyses of this data to inform 
public health policy and action. 
As well as improving data completeness, it may also be worthwhile reviewing the 
enhanced data collected from Q fever cases to ensure it accurately reflects the 
exposures currently known to be associated with Q fever infection in Australia, 
including non-traditional exposures. When analysing the occupation field, the second 
highest occupation was no known risk occupation. This highlights that the field of 
occupation alone is not a reliable determinant for risk of Q fever infection. This is also 
supported by other studies (20, 30). We also observed Q fever notifications with a no 
known risk occupation who did not have an animal fluid or environmental exposures 
associated with Q fever. Whilst the risk of Q fever from exposure to animal fluids and 
birthing products, particularly for abattoir workers, is well recognised, the potential 
increase in environmental exposures through farm animals or even from wind/dust 
appear to be risk factors (35, 39). 
Other published studies have also identified non-traditional exposures associated with 
Q fever infection. O’Connor et. al. reported that one person infected with Q fever during 
an outbreak lived half a kilometre away from the source of infection, though they did 
regularly cycle past it (35). Additionally, C. burnetii has been isolated from urban soil, 
atmospheric and vacuum cleaner samples (40) and similar Q fever seropositivity levels 
have been detected in people from metropolitan and rural/remote areas (41). There 
have also been cases of Q fever associated with domestic pets (28, 40, 42, 43) and an 
outbreak associated with a cosmetic supply factory (44). 
This analysis also raises an issue around the recommendations for Q fever vaccination 
according to the Australian Immunisation Handbook (22). It appears that the listed risk 
exposures, for the purpose of recommending vaccination, of occupation, animal 
slaughtering or farm animals, may need reviewing to more accurately reflect who is at 
risk of Q fever infection. 
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Overall, the analysis of the enhanced datasets highlights the need for consistent 
collection of data. An agreed and consistent enhanced dataset to be collected by all 
jurisdictions would allow more detailed analyses and thus more detailed understanding 
of the epidemiology of Q fever in Australia. If all jurisdictions were to collect enhanced 
data on Q fever cases in the NNDSS, it would allow regular national analyses of the 
enhanced data, as opposed to current arrangements where varying datasets must be 
separately requested from the jurisdictions that collect it to allow for national analysis.  
5.7.1 Limitations 
A limitation of notification data is that they represent only a proportion of the total cases 
occurring in the community, as approximately 50% of cases are asymptomatic. As 
these asymptomatic cases typically have minimal implications for case health, cost for 
healthcare or public health action, they were not a focus of this analysis. Whilst some 
symptomatic cases may not become notified due to not seeking health care or being 
tested for Q fever, we believe the total number of these to be low. 
A limitation of the enhanced data is that New South Wales and Queensland collect 
different information. There is a potential for misclassification due to the broad category 
groupings used for the analysis. The effect of this would be potentially missing the 
exposure associated with the infection. This misclassification was minimised by 
grouping data into multiple fields known to be associated with Q fever infection.  
The greatest limitation for the enhanced data was the number of records from both 
jurisdictions with missing data. It is possible that exposures may have been missed. 
Whilst cautious interpretation of the analysis of the enhanced data is needed, almost 
two thirds of records from the enhanced data could be linked to an occupation, animal 
fluid exposure or environmental exposure previously associated with Q fever infection.  
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5.8 Conclusion 
Whilst the NQFMP was effective in reducing national Q fever notification rates, recently 
they have started increasing. The reasons for this are not currently known. We found 
notified Q fever cases were predominately male, aged 40 to 59 years, who resided in 
Queensland or New South Wales. Interestingly the age of notified Q fever cases and 
the proportion of cases that were female both increased over time. 
Despite the limitations of the enhanced datasets having low data completeness, this 
analysis does suggest that Q fever is no longer a disease confined to abattoir workers 
and farmers. 
It may be time to re-evaluate the at-risk groups recommended for Q fever vaccination 
as per the Australian Immunisation Handbook. Additionally, there may be a place for an 
agreed and consistent enhanced dataset for collection at the jurisdictional level or at 
the national level to better understand the epidemiology of Q fever in Australia.  
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5.9 Appendices 
Appendix 1: Queensland Q fever case report form 
 
 
...................................................................... Public Health Unit     Outbreak ID: ....................................... 
 
Completed by: ................................................................      Date sent to NOCS: ......../......../......... 
 
Telephone: .....................................  Fax:................................................. 
 
 
NOTIFICATION: 
 
Date PHU notified: ......../......../........ Date initial response: ......../......../........ Notifier: .............................................. 
Organisation:........................................................................... Telephone: ........................................  
Fax: ...................................... Email: ................................................................... Treating Dr: ................................... 
Telephone: ........................................ Fax: ...................................... Email: ............................................................. 
CASE DETAILS:                                                   UR No: .................................................................................... 
 
Name:............................................................................................................................................................................. 
First name Surname 
 
Date of birth: ......./......../..... Age: ..........Years......... Months Sex:  Male  Female ............................................ 
 
Name of parent/carer: .................................................................................................... 
 
 Aboriginal  Torres Strait Islander  Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander  Non-Indigenous  Unknown 
 
English preferred language:  Yes  No – specify ..................... Ethnicity – specify .......................................... 
Permanent address: .............................................................................................................. 
......................................................................................................................................... Postcode: .........................................  
Home tel: .......................................... Mob: .................................. Email: ............................................................................ 
Occupation: ................................................................................ Work telephone: ..........................................................  
Temporary address in Queensland (if different from permanent address) : ........................................................................ 
....................................................................................................................................... Postcode: ......................................... 
Telephone: ........................................ Mob: .................................. Email: ..........................................................................  
General Practitioner: Dr ..............................................................................................................................................................  
Address: ........................................................................................................................... Postcode: ......................................... 
Telephone: ........................................ Fax: ................................... Email: ................................................................ 
 
 
CLINICAL DETAILS: 
 
Date of onset of symptoms: ......../......../........             Date of first consultation: ......../......../........ 
 
 Fever  Sweats  Chills  Headache  Fatigue  Loss of appetite 
 Abdominal pain  Nausea  Vomiting  Diarrhoea  Jaundice  Eye pain 
 Cough  Pneumonia  Shortness of breath  Chest pain  Sore throat  Any heart problems 
 Joint Pains  Muscle aches  Memory difficulties  Mood changes  Weight loss  
Other symptoms: 
............................................................................................................................................................................. 
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Worked in the grounds of the abattoir:  Yes – list duties ...................................................................  No  Unknown 
 
Contract worker at an abattoir:  Yes – list duties ...................................................................  No  Unknown 
 
Visitor to an abattoir:  Yes – list duties ...................................................................  No  Unknown 
Was the patient hospitalised?  Yes   No   Unknown  Days hospitalised: ..................  Days off work: .............. 
 
 
Complications:  Yes – specify 
 
......................................................  No  Unknown 
 
Antibiotics:  Yes – specify 
 
.....................................................  No  Unknown 
 
LABORATORY CRITERIA:     Laboratory: .............................First collection date: ......../......../........ 
 
Has there been any previous Q Fever Testing?  Yes  No  Unknown 
 
Lab: ................................ Date: ......../......../........ Result: .................................................................. 
 
Lab: ................................ Date: ......../......../........ Result: .................................................................. 
 
VACCINATION DETAILS: 
 
Previous screening:      Yes  No  Unknown Date: ......../......../........   Specify: ............ 
 
Previous vaccination:     Yes  No  Unknown Date: ......../......../........   Specify: ............. 
Did patient think they were at risk of Q Fever? 
Was patient aware of the Q Fever vaccination? 
 
EXPOSURE PERIOD:   All questions in this section relate to the month prior to illness onset. 
 
Date: ......./......../........ to Date:......./......../........ 
(Onset of symptoms – 1 month)  (Date of onset of symptoms) 
Abattoir exposure: 
 
Worked in an abattoir:   Yes   No   Unknown  If Yes, go to next question. If No, go to ‘Animal 
exposure’. 
 
Duties:   Slaughter floor   Boning   Rendering plant   Producing meat meal or blood and bone 
 
 Packer              Cleaner  Maintenance     Other– specify ............................................................ 
 
Animals slaughtered:   Cattle   Sheep   Goats   Kangaroo   Other 
............................................................ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Animal exposure:  
Contact with any of the following animals/insects:   Cattle  Sheep  Domestic goats  Feral goats 
 Domestic pigs  Feral pigs  Dogs  Cats 
 Kangaroos            Small marsupials (bandicoots)   Ticks 
 
 Other – specify ............................................................... 
Assisted or observed an animal birth:  Yes – what animal/s ...................................................   No  
Involvement in slaughtering, skinning, or meat processing:   Yes – what animal/s .......................  No 
Any involvement in shooting/hunting:                   Yes – what animal/s .......................................   No 
What area hunting in: ................................................................................................................................................... 
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Worked with wool:  Yes    No  Shearing shed  Yes    No  Wool processing  Yes    No  
Worked with straw or animal bedding:  Yes    No 
Worked with animal manure/animal fertiliser e.g. in the garden:  Yes   No 
 
Attended a saleyard or animal show:  Yes – where............................................................................... No 
 
Environmental exposure: 
 
Live on a farm:   Yes  No 
 
Visited a farm:  Yes  No 
 
Exposure to dust from paddocks or animal yards:  Yes  No  Unknown 
 
Live/work within 1km of an abattoir/animal grazing area/sale yards  Yes  No  Unknown 
 
Exposure to trucks for transporting sheep, cattle or goats:  Yes  No  
 
Laundered clothes from someone who works with animals:  Yes  No  
 
Had household contact with a Q Fever infected person:  Yes  No  Unknown 
 
Consumed unpasteurised milk or milk products:  Yes  No  Unknown 
 
Had contact with untreated water (dams, irrigation sprays):  Yes  No  Unknown 
Details: 
........................................................................................................................................................................................... 
 
Live/work within 300m of a bush/scrub/forest area:   Yes   No   Unknown 
 
 
Outcome:   Survived   Died       Date of death: ......../......../........      Died of condition  Unknown 
 
 
PLACE ACQUIRED: 
 
 Queensland   Other Australian state/territory – specify 
.......................................................................................................... 
 
 Unknown       Other country – specify 
...................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
NOTIFICATION DECISION: (see notification criteria) 
 
 Confirmed Acute Q Fever   Confirmed Chronic Q Fever   Unlikely to be Q Fever   Q Fever results pending 
 
 
COMMENTS: 
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Appendix 2: New South Wales enhanced Q fever data fields 
Field Description 
NCIMS ID'n NSW database ID 
Notification received date Date Q fever notification was 
received by NSW health 
Onset date Date of symptom onset 
Occupation Occupation of case 
Symptoms   
Any symptoms Yes/No field 
Abnormal liver function tests Yes/No field 
Chills Yes/No field 
Endocarditis Yes/No field 
Fever Yes/No field 
Headache Yes/No field 
Lethargy Yes/No field 
Malaise Yes/No field 
Other Free text for other symptoms 
Hospitalisation status Was the person hospitalised? 
Vaccinated Was the person vaccinated? 
HR occupation (multiple fields) High risk occupation(s) 
HR occupation_date last worked Date last work in high risk 
occupation 
HR occupation other specify (multiple fields) Details of high risk occupation(s) 
Misc activities (multiple fields) This fields was mostly blank but 
did capture contact with another 
known Q fever case 
Misc activities description Details of miscellaneous activities 
Animal-risk exposures The following captures known 
animal-risk exposures such as 
exposure to birthing products, 
faces, urine, farm animals etc. 
Animal exposures (multiple fields) Setting of animal exposure(s) 
(i.e. farm, sale yard, etc.) 
Animal exposure setting date (multiple fields) Date of animal exposure(s) 
Animal exposure setting location (multiple fields) Location of animal exposure(s) 
Animal exposure setting other description 
(multiple fields) 
Other animal exposure(s) (i.e. 
slaughtering animals, bush 
walking) 
Contact with any animals  
Any animal contact (multiple fields) Contact with any animal(s) 
Any animal contact calving (multiple fields) Animal calving contact(s) 
Any animal contact calving date (multiple fields) Date of animal calving contact(s) 
Any animal contact calving desc (multiple fields) Description of animal calving 
contact(s) 
Any animal contact calving desc text (multiple 
fields) 
Free text fields for additional 
description of animal contact(s) 
Any animal contact location (multiple fields) Location of any animal contact(s) 
Any animal contact notes Additional free text field for any 
animal contact(s) information 
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Field Description 
Condcode Condition code – all specified as Q 
fever 
HR occupation (multiple fields) Due to the data extraction 
methods, there was duplication of 
the high risk occupation field. 
Ident method Identification method (i.e. 
laboratory, laboratory and clinical) 
Lab test method (multiple fields) Laboratory test(s) conducted 
Labconf Was the case laboratory 
confirmed? 
Occupation Due to the data extraction 
methods, there was duplication of 
the occupation field. 
Specimen date (multiple fields) Date(s) specimen was collected 
Specimen site (multiple sites) Specimen(s) collection site 
Specimen type (multiple fields) Specimen(s) type (i.e. blood, 
faeces, cerebrospinal fluid) 
State acquired State where the infection was 
acquired 
Symptom onset date Due to the data extraction 
methods, symptom onset date 
was duplicated. 
Symptomatic Due to the data extraction 
methods, case symptoms were 
duplicated. 
Case classification Due to the data extraction 
methods, laboratory confirmation 
was duplicated. 
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Appendix 3: Queensland enhanced Q fever data fields 
Field Description 
Notification_ID QLD database ID 
Country source Place where infection was acquired – 
includes countries and Australian 
states/territories 
Place of work/ occupation  The majority were blank and the remaining 
data were recoded into notable occupation 
groups by Queensland Health. 
Prev testing Was the case previously tested for Q fever? 
Prev testing date Date of previous Q fever testing 
Prev testing results Previous Q fever testing results 
 
Available data are incomplete and cannot be 
reclassified into confirmed / probable) 
Prev screening Previous screening for Q fever 
Prev screening date Date of previous Q fever screening 
Prev vaccination Previously vaccinated for Q fever 
Prev vaccination date Date of previous Q fever vaccination 
At risk of Q fever Did the case think they were at risk of 
Q fever? 
Aware of Q fever vaccination Was the case aware of the Q fever 
vaccination 
Abattoir exposures  
Abattoir exposure Did the case have an abattoir exposure? 
Work inside abattoir Did the case work inside an abattoir? 
Inside abattoir duties Specified tick box list 
Other exposure in abattoir Other inside abattoir duties 
Other exposure details Free text field for other inside abattoir duties 
Work in ground of abattoir Did the case work in the grounds of an 
abattoir? 
In grounds duties List abattoir grounds duties 
Contract worker Was the case a contract worker at an 
abattoir? 
Contract worker duties List contract worker duties 
Visitor to abattoir Was the case a visitor to an abattoir? 
Visitor details List details of visit 
Animal exposures  
Animal contact Specified tick box list. 
Each notification may have more than 1 
animal contact/s 
Animal contact details Free text field. 
Each notification may have more than 1 
animal contact/s 
Assist or observe animal birth Did the case assist or observe animal 
birthing? 
Animal birth details Details of assist or observe animal birth. 
Skinning meat process Was the case involved in slaughtering, 
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Field Description 
skinning or meat processing? 
Skinning meat process details Slaughtering, skinning or meat processing 
details 
Slaughtered animal Specified tick box list. 
Each notification may have more than 1 
animal slaughtered 
Slaughtered animal details Free text field. 
Each notification may have more than 1 
animal slaughtered 
Shooting/hunting Was the case involved with shooting or 
hunting? 
Shooting/Hunting details Details of shooting or hunting 
Shooting/Hunting location details Location of shooting or hunting 
Worked with wool Has the case worked with wool? 
Worked in shearing shed Has the case worked in a shearing shed? 
Worked in wool processing Has the case worked in wool processing? 
Worked with straw animal bedding Has the case worked with straw or animal 
bedding? 
Worked with animal manure etc Has the case worked with animal 
manure/animal fertiliser? 
Attend saleyard/show Has the case attended a saleyard or animal 
show? 
Attend saleyard/show details Details of saleyard or animal show? 
Environmental exposures  
Live on farm Does the case live on a farm? 
Visit farm Has the case visited a farm? 
Exposed to livestock transport Has the case had exposure to trucks for 
transporting sheep, cattle or goats? 
Laundered clothed animal worker Has the case laundered clothes of an animal 
worker? 
Contact with infected person Has the case had household contact with a Q 
fever infected person? 
Consumed unpasteurised milk Has the case consumed unpasteurised milk 
or milk products? 
Consumed untreated water Has the case consumed untreated water 
(dams, irrigations, sprays)? 
Consumed untreated water details Details of untreated water consumption 
Exposure to paddock dust Has the case been exposed to dust from 
paddocks or animal yards? 
Live/work within 1km of abattoir Does the case live/work within 1km of an 
abattoir/animal grazing area/saleyards? 
Live/work within 300m of bush Does the case live/work within 300m of 
bush/scrub/forest area? 
VALIDITY - Confirmed(VALID) /Probable 
Q fever case 
Each notification may have more than 1 
laboratory result but summarised as valid or 
probable 
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Appendix 4: New South Wales enhanced Q fever data recoding steps 
1. Identify fields with occupational information 
New South Wales enhanced Q fever data field names 
Occupation(s) 
HR occupation(s) 
HR occupation(s) other specify 
 
2. Recode occupation fields into broad categories 
Recoded 
Occupation 
Examples of text in occupational fields 
Unknown Missing, No high risk occupation, other, Unknown, Not agricultural or 
animal related, Employed, Self employed, Retired, Pensioner, 
Unemployed, Presently Unemployed 
Contact with 
livestock 
Farmer, Grazier, Dairy worker, lives on property works with horses, 
farmers wife, farm worker, dairy farm worker, farm assistant, livestock 
handler, musters goats, sheep farmer, pig farmer, Farmers wife-laundry, 
Agriculture, Stock yard worker, Livestock handler, horse trainer, animal 
breeder, Manager of horse complex, equine rep, Shearer, wool classer, 
Woolclassing, Child living on farm, stock carrier 
Contact with 
animals other 
than livestock 
Zoologist culling, Zoo, pig shooter, Shooter - Kangaroo, Pig Etc, 
Professional Kangaroo Shooter, Ranger National Parks & Wildlife, 
Ranger (Park),Vet nurse, vet student, veterinary clinic, veterinary 
surgeon, University of Sydney (vet science student), Nurse, Veterinary 
Nurse, 
Abattoir 
worker 
Abattoir worker, meat worker, slaughter man, Works at abattoir as 
cleaner, butcher 
Medical 
/Science 
Fire Officer/Ambulance/Police, Medical Practitioner/Healthcare worker, 
Nurse, Registered Nurse/Healthcare worker, Police Officer/Ambulance, 
Reg Nurse, Phlebotomist, Pharmacist, Scientist (all forms), Laboratory 
worker, Health care, Fire Officer 
Tradesperson Timberyard worker, Storeman/Packer, Spray painter, Self employed 
lawn mower, Road Construction, Plumber, Plasterer, Painter, Mechanic, 
Motor Mechanic, Miner, Metal worker, Marine mechanic, Machinist, 
machine operator, Lawn Mower Contractor, Landscaper, Landscape 
Gardener, Labourer, Horticulturalist, Handyperson, Handyman, Flight 
Engineer, Fruit Picker, Garbage Collector, Gasfitter, Gardener, Golf 
Course Maintenance staff, Golf Course Superintendent, Garden Nursery 
Person, Fitter/Machinist, Fencer, Factory Worker, Engineer, Clothing 
Machinist, Cleaner, Carpenter, Builder, Builder/Labourer, Bricklayer, 
Brick layer, Boilerman,  cabinet maker, butcher, Bush regenorate, Took 
up a new job in Mary Beach Caravan Park to cut grasses using wiper 
sniper Machine in the area where there were Kangaroo droppings in 
abundance, Sawmiller, Road Maintenance, Grounds man in H.M.A.S 
Creswell in Jervis Bay, Lawn Mowing for relatives, Bush regenerationist, 
Potter, Railway worker,  
Transport 
worker 
Truck driver, Transport worker, School bus driver, bus/coach driver,  
No known 
risk 
occupation 
Shopping Trolley Collector, Textile worker, Station Manager, Prison 
Officer, Plant Operator, Musician, Laundry Worker, Housekeeper, Home 
maker, Home care worker, Home Duties, Housekeeper, Field Officer, 
Casual Worker, helper, Seamen, Prisoner, Accountant, Administration, 
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Recoded 
Occupation 
Examples of text in occupational fields 
Administration officer, architect, administrator, retail, Bank Officer, car 
salesman, Computer Consultant, Computer Operator, Computer 
Technician, Clerk, Hotel Management, Investment/Insurance, 
Management Consultant, Officer manager, Officer worker, Personal 
Service Worker, Public Servant, Publican, Real estate, RETAIL, Retail 
shop, Sales representative, sales assistant, Road Manager - Office, 
Salesperson, Solicitor, Travel Agent, Technical Officer, Tourism Industry, 
small business owner, Postal worker, Hospitality Industry, Restaurant 
worker, Hairdresser, Food Trade/Food Handler, Food Handler, Caterer, 
Receptionist/Telephonist, Secretary, Seamstress, Teacher, Teachers 
aid, Youth worker, Student (uni or tafe), School/Uni Teacher, School 
enrolment, School Assistant, Lecturer, Child, Child at infants school, 
child at primary school, child at secondary school, childcare worker, 
Baby,  
 
3. Identify fields with animal fluid exposure information 
New South Wales enhanced Q fever data field names 
Animal exposure(s) 
Animal exposure other description(s) 
Animal exposure setting other(s) 
Any animal contact(s) 
Any animal calving contact(s) 
Any animal contact description(s) 
Any animal contact description test(s) 
Any animal contact notes 
 
4. Recode fields into animal fluid exposure category 
 Examples of text in animal fluid exposure fields 
Animal fluid exposures 
previously associated 
with Q fever 
Animal discharges or tissues (including birth products), 
Calving, Contact with native animal faeces (?), Abattoir, 
Culling/Slaughtering, dissecting wild goats, 
animal/animal product/recently skinned calf, birth 
products, works in abattoir, pet food factory 
 
5. Identify fields with environmental exposure information 
New South Wales enhanced Q fever data field names 
Misc activities 
Misc activities desc 
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6. Recode fields into environmental exposure category 
 Examples of text in environmental exposure fields 
Environmental exposures 
previously associated 
with Q fever 
Farm, Lives on farm, lives near farm, lives near abattoir, 
lives on small acreage, lives on rural property, National 
Parks, Bush walk, 1km from cattle farm, Golf Course, 
fishing/camping, pet dog/cat/bird, farm animals, shearer, 
farm faeces, farm animals, tick exposure, lives near 
kangaroos, bush walking, hobby farm, multiple rural 
bushland, sale yards, works in large diary, farm animals, 
stock trucks, spreading chicken manure, , rural address, 
Sale yards, tick bite, farm animals, cattle 
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Appendix 5: Queensland enhanced Q fever data recoding steps 
1. Identify fields with occupational information 
Queensland enhanced Q fever data field names 
Place of Work/Occupation* 
Worked in abattoir 
Worked in ground of abattoir 
Contract worker at an abattoir 
Visitor to an abattoir 
* Any identifying information in the ‘Place of Work/Occupation’ field was categorised 
into specific occupation groups by Queensland Health prior to release for this study. 
2. Recode occupation from enhanced Queensland data. 
Recoded 
Occupation 
Examples of text in occupational fields 
 
Unknown Blank 
Contact with 
livestock 
  
Contact with 
animals other 
than livestock 
Kangaroo shooter 
Abattoir 
worker 
Abattoir worker, meat worker 
 
Re-categorise to abattoir worker if Yes answered to the following fields : 
Worked in abattoir, worked in the grounds of abattoir, contract worker at 
an abattoir, visitor to an abattoir 
Medical 
/Science 
  
Tradesperson   
Transport 
worker 
  
No known 
risk 
occupation 
Blank, Farming (cane), Farming (coffee), Farming (cotton), Farming 
(fruit), Farming (nuts), Farming (unspecified), Farming (vegetables), 
Gardener / Garden Centre worker 
 
3. Identify fields with animal fluid exposure information 
Queensland enhanced Q fever data field names 
Worked in abattoir 
Worked in ground of abattoir 
Contract worker at an abattoir 
Visitor to an abattoir 
Assisted or observed animal birth 
Involvement in slaughtering, skinning or meat processing 
Type of animal slaughtered 
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4. Recode fields into animal fluid exposure category 
 Examples of text in animal fluid exposure fields 
Animal fluid exposures 
previously associated 
with Q fever 
Any animal listed in category 'type of animal slaughtered' 
OR ‘Yes’ listed for any of the above data fields. 
 
5. Identify fields with environmental exposure information 
Queensland enhanced Q fever data field names 
Any involvement in shooting/hunting 
Worked with wool 
Shearing shed 
Wool processing 
Worked with straw or animal bedding 
Worked with animal manure/ animal fertiliser 
Attended a saleyard or animal show 
Live on farm 
Visited farm 
Exposure to dust from paddocks or animal yards 
Live/work within 1km of an abattoir/animal grazing area/saleyards 
Exposure to trucks transporting sheep, cattle or goats 
Laundered clothes from someone who works with animals 
Had household contact with a Q fever infected person 
Consumed unpasteurised milk or milk products 
Had contact with untreated water 
Live/work within 300m of a bush/scrub/forest area 
Contact with any of the following animals 
 
6. Recode fields into environmental exposure category 
 Examples of Queensland data 
Environmental exposures 
previously associated 
with Q fever 
‘Yes’ listed for any of the above fields OR any animal 
listed in ‘Contact with any of the following animals’ 
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Chapter 6 - Teaching experiences 
 
“The mediocre teacher tells. The good teacher explains. The superior teacher 
demonstrates. The great teacher inspires.”  
― William Arthur Ward 
6.1 Prologue 
6.1.1 Rationale 
There are two teaching requirements as part of the Master of Philosophy in Applied 
Epidemiology (MAE) program; the first, to prepare and deliver a lesson from the field 
(LFF) and the second, to prepare and conduct a case study for first year MAE scholars. 
In addition to these our cohort also conducted a critical appraisal journal club through-
out the two years.  
6.1.2 My role 
My roles varied for each of the teaching experiences, and are detailed below. More 
broadly, my roles included lesson planning, creating teaching material, session 
facilitation, coordination and participation. 
6.1.3 Lessons learnt 
My LFF stemmed from the work I was exposed to at my placement in the Australian 
Government Department of Health. Being able to take scientific literature and explain it 
to lay audiences in a manner that they comprehend and understand is a valuable skill 
and one that needs practice and revision. 
Whilst I have experience in writing for different audiences, preparing the exercise 
questions and model answers was a good learning opportunity. The most interesting 
part of the LFF process was reading the responses and seeing how varied they were. 
Some organisations were more flexible and less bureaucratic than an Australian 
Government department, and most had similar ‘how-to’ documentation and templates. 
It was also interesting to note that some organisations would allow participants to 
respond directly to media requests. 
My topic for the case study arose from a need to improve my critical appraisal skills. 
This was also the reason that I started the journal club. Once I felt that my skills had 
improved, I then decided to challenge myself by teaching critical appraisal to others. It 
has been said that the best way to learn a topic is to teach it.  
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From feedback early on in my MAE, I had learnt that my presentation style could come 
across as slightly arrogant, due to a raised voice and a talking style that could be 
perceived as lecturing. Since then I have sought opportunities to present in front of 
others regularly and gained further feedback to improve my presenting style. The peer 
evaluation of my teaching session provided positive feedback as to the changes I had 
made. 
Overall, these experiences assisted me in identifying areas of improvement and 
allowed me to develop my teaching abilities and critical appraisal skills. 
6.1.4 Public Health implications of this work 
Whilst there may be no direct public health implications from this work, the lessons I 
learnt were valuable to me. I personally was able to improve my skills through teaching 
others and being involved in the LFFs. I also hope that we were able to improve the 
skills of the next MAE cohort through our session on critical appraisal. 
6.1.5 Acknowledgements 
I wish to acknowledge the following persons and organisations for their assistance with 
this competency: Emily Fearnley at the National Centre for Epidemiology & Population 
Health, ANU; Katrina Knope at the Australian Government Department of Health; my 
cohort (2013) and the 2014 cohort of MAE Scholars. 
6.1.6 Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology core activity requirement 
 Prepare and deliver a lesson from the field (LFF); 
 Prepare and conduct a case study for first year MAE students or other 
epidemiology training program. 
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6.2 Lesson from the field (LFF) 
The LFF is designed to ‘maximise the opportunities for peer-to-peer teaching and 
learning related directly to challenges faced by students in the course of their field 
projects.’ During my time within the Office of Health Protection, I was exposed to 
writing for multiple audiences such as the Minister for Health, the media, academic 
audiences and the general public. I identified a learning opportunity from this, as writing 
for multiple audiences is a skill that is essential in any workplace. 
The aims of my LFF were for participants to be able to write documents containing 
scientific information for lay audiences and to identify resources available to assist 
them within their own field placements. I developed the lesson, the background 
information, the teaching material, identified templates and additional resources to 
assist participants in completing the tasks and facilitated the teleconference to discuss 
the LFF. The session I prepared is included as Appendix 1 with summarised responses 
to the questions from participants in red. I also wrote model examples for the ministerial 
briefing (Appendix 2) and the media response (Appendix 3), which were provided to 
participants after submission of the LFF and prior to the teleconference to assist 
discussions. 
I received positive feedback from all participants, with people describing the LFF as 
useful in that it allowed people to understand their field placement’s processes and 
documentation. Additionally, many participants noted that writing for audiences, such 
as a Minister, was not common for them so it was a great learning opportunity. 
I also participated in LFF’s from other cohort members. 
6.3 Teaching session 
Our cohort was required to conduct a half-day teaching session for first year MAE 
students during the 3rd course block, semester one 2014. Our cohort decided to split 
this half-day of teaching into four sessions and divided into groups accordingly. In 
addition to being in one of the groups, I also had the role of coordinating the planning of 
the sessions, facilitating meetings of our cohort and developing the teaching timetable 
(Appendix 4) and feedback forms. 
The teaching session conducted by Anita Williams and myself centered around critical 
appraisal of published peer reviewed literature. Anita and I developed a powerpoint 
presentation (Appendix 5) to explain the aims of the session, why critical appraisal is 
important and available resources. We also developed group-work tasks for the first 
year MAE students designed to develop their critical appraisal skills. The developed 
tasks and model answers can be seen at Appendix 6. 
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At the end of the half-day of teaching, the first year MAE students were asked to 
provide written feedback on each session via a feedback form (Appendix 7). Overall 
the half-day was rated highly by the students though there were some areas of 
improvement for each session. Specifically for our session, the area of improvement 
was around there being too much information presented in the powerpoint presentation 
and not enough time for the group work. Comments included: 
‘Needed more time to read and analyse the article’ 
‘Maybe need to consider time management’ 
‘Would have helped to receive the article in advance’ 
In addition to the feedback from the first year MAE students, peer evaluations of each 
presenter were also conducted. One of our cohort opted to not be involved in the peer 
evaluations. For the remainder, each presenter was evaluated by two of their cohort 
using a form that I developed (Appendix 8). I received very positive feedback from both 
of my peer evaluators, with compliments on my presenting style, use of humor and 
ability to facilitate discussion. One area for improvement was to not prompt or give too 
many hints during the case study, but the evaluator acknowledged that this was due to 
time pressures and possibly having too many tasks in the study. 
6.4 Journal club 
One skill I felt the need to strengthen after my first year in the MAE was critical 
appraisal. I decided to start a journal club with other members of my cohort. We took 
turns in selecting published peer reviewed journal articles, critically appraising them 
and chairing the teleconferences to discuss our conclusions. I chaired one of the 
teleconferences and participated in all others. For me this was essential in building my 
skills in an area I felt needed developing. It also led me to want to further develop my 
skills by teaching critical appraisal to others, as I did when teaching the first year MAE 
students.  
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6.5 Appendices 
Appendix 1: Lessons From the Field: Writing for different audiences 
The LFF will be conducted by teleconference on Wednesday 9 April 2014. Please save 
your ministerial brief, media response and answers to the questions in a single Word 
file and send to back to me (Timothy.Sloan-Gardner@health.gov.au) by COB 
Wednesday 2 April 2014. Please also send me the telephone number you wish to be 
called on for the teleconference. 
Learning Objectives: 
By the end of this LFF participants should be able to: 
 Identify the organisational-specific documentation for writing to the Minister 
(State/Commonwealth) and responding to media enquiries. 
 Describe your organisational-specific processes for writing to the Minister and 
responding to media enquiries and clearance of these documents. 
 Write documents containing scientific information for different/ lay audiences. 
Background 
A novel coronavirus, later termed Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus 
(MERS-CoV), was identified in June 2012 in a patient who died of pneumonia and 
renal failure from Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
As of 29 October 2013, there were 145 laboratory-confirmed cases of MERS-CoV 
including 62 deaths (Attachment A). All cases have had a history of residence in or 
travel to the Middle East, or contact with travellers returning from these areas. There 
have been no cases in Australia. Most patients have presented with or later developed 
severe acute respiratory symptoms. Mild flu-like illnesses and asymptomatic cases 
have also been reported. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) states that there is currently no evidence 
indicating transmission of MERS-CoV from asymptomatic infected individuals and no 
evidence of ongoing, low-prevalence, mildly symptomatic illness in the community. 
Person-to-person transmission of the virus has occurred in clusters, including 
healthcare settings.  
The Hajj is an Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca that occurs every year. In 2013, the Hajj will 
take place from 13 to 18 October. In preparation for the influx of people, the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia have increased surveillance for cases of suspected MERS-CoV, 
increased the number of healthcare and allied health workers, established sessional 
hospitals and isolation facilities and increased testing capacity for suspected cases. 
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The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has updated the Smartraveller 
advice for Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan to include 
information about the outbreak. DFAT has also issued a bulletin for Pilgrims travelling 
to the Hajj this year, including information about the risk of MERS-CoV. The advice is 
available from DFAT’s website. 
Information cards on MERS-CoV for travellers (Attachment B) have been distributed 
through travel agents who are authorised to book for the Hajj. Posters and electronic 
signage (Attachment C) have been positioned at primary screening areas of all 
international airports, to advise travellers returning from the Middle East of the signs 
and symptoms of MERS-CoV and to see a doctor or go to hospital if they have, or 
develop, these signs or symptoms. The posters and electronic signage will be 
displayed from 8 October to 10 November 2013. 
Additional Information 
Department of Health MERS-CoV information page - 
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/ohp-mers-cov.htm 
Smartraveller travel advice for Saudi Arabia - http://smartraveller.gov.au/zw-
cgi/view/Advice/Saudi_Arabia 
WHO MERS-CoV page - http://www.who.int/csr/disease/coronavirus_infections/en/ 
WHO MERS-CoV summary and literature update as of 20 January 2014 – contains 
information of the 2 probable cases of MERS-CoV reported in Spain - 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/coronavirus_infections/MERS_CoV_Update_20_Jan_20
14.pdf?ua=1 
Saudi Ministry of Health MERS-CoV page - 
http://www.moh.gov.sa/En/CoronaNew/Pages/default.aspx 
WHO Handbook - Effective Media Communication during Public Health Emergencies - 
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/WHO%20MEDIA%20HANDBOOK.pdf 
Attachment A: Department of Health - Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus 
(MERS-CoV) Situation update 31 October 2013 
Attachment B: MERS-CoV Travellers Cards  
Attachment C: Australian banner for placement at airport MERS CoV 
Attachment D: Guide to Question Time and Question Time Briefs 
Attachment E: Question Time Brief Template 
Attachment F: Dealing with media inquiries
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Scenario 
It is 6 November 2013 and you are the Zoonoses Epidemiologist for the Australian 
Government Department of Health. You are sitting at your desk when you get a phone 
call from the Watch Officer in the National Incident Room (NIR). Victoria have notified 
the NIR that they have two people (both males, aged 73 and 25) in hospital with severe 
pneumonia. Both were on a flight returning from the Middle East and both were part of 
a group of six who have returned from the Hajj. This flight contained over 230 
passengers and crew, many of whom had connecting flights within Australia. 
To add a sense of realism to this task attempt to write both the ministerial briefing and 
respond to the media request within an hour. This does not include your reading time, 
just writing time. 
 
Task 1 – Ministerial Briefing 
You need to brief the Minister about what is going on.  
Question 1 – Does your organisation provide documentation for how to write a briefing 
to the Ministers Office (State/Commonwealth)? If so, is it helpful/could it be improved?  
All but one participant reported that their organisation provided documentation for how 
to write ministerial briefs. This organization did not report directly to a minister and as 
such rarely wrote briefings for one. A few participants also reported that their 
organisation provided training courses specifically for this task. 
Responses to how helpful the documentation was included: 
‘there is a very brief document…It’s probably better than nothing’ 
‘some examples might be useful; and a better description of the clearance process’ 
‘I found (the documentation) to be very helpful’ 
Question 2 – What is the clearance process for documentation going to the Minister’s 
Officer, or Organisational Director, in your organisation? 
All participants noted the clearance processes for their respective organisations. It was 
interesting to note that these varied greatly, with some organisations only having two 
levels of clearance, whilst others had up to five levels of clearance. 
Using either your organisation’s own templates or the one provided (Attachment D), 
please write a ministerial brief.  
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The purpose of this brief is to inform the Minister of the current situation, what their 
department is currently doing and who they are collaborating with. Remember that the 
Minister is a politician, not a scientist, so use plain language. 
Resources for task: 
 Attachment A: Department of Health - Middle East respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus (MERS-CoV) Situation update 31 October 2013 
 Attachment D: Guide to Question Time and Question Time Briefs 
 Attachment E: Question Time Brief Template 
Task 2 – Media Request 
You receive an email from the departmental media unit. A reporter has gotten wind of 
the two people in hospital in Victoria. The email reads: 
Hi there, 
I'm a health journalist at the Sydney Morning Herald and I'm looking into reports 
of 2 people with this new SARS virus in Victoria. 
I have several questions: 
1. It is true that there are two people in hospital in Victoria with this new SARS 
virus?  
2. What is the Australian Government doing about the passengers who were 
exposed on the same flight as these two? 
3. Are these cases related to Spain’s two cases that were linked to the Hajj 
Pilgrimage? 
The deadline for this information is COB today. Who can I call to have a quick 
informal phone chat to about this? 
Thank you very much. 
V. Con Cerned 
Health Journalist 
The Sydney Morning Herald 
Question 3 – Does your organisation provide documentation for how to handle media 
requests? If so, is it helpful/could it be improved?  
The majority of responses reported that their organisation provided useful 
documentation for how to handle media enquiries. A few reported that whilst 
information was provided on how to contact relevant media units, no information was 
provided on how handle the enquiry itself. 
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Responses to how helpful the documentation was included: 
‘they are quite clear and useful’ 
‘it is not particularly helpful’ 
‘…it doesn’t tell you what to say or not to say whilst you’re taking details’ 
‘there is no documentation that guides us’ 
Question 4 – What is the clearance process for media requests in your organisation 
and who is allowed to talk with the media? 
The clearance process for media requests and who was allowed to talk to the media 
varied greatly amongst participant organisations. Some participants reported that 
media could be cleared and responded to by senior staff/advisors, though participants 
themselves may be called on to respond to media directly. If this occurred appropriate 
training would be provided. 
For other organisations, all media requests were handles by a media unit. All requests 
must be directed to them and all responses were provided by the media unit only. Staff 
from such organisations were not permitted to address media requests directly. 
As with the ministerial briefings, the clearance process for media requests also varied, 
from two levels up to five levels of clearance. 
This is the first you have heard of the cases in Spain.  
Using either your organisation’s own documentation or Attachment F, please draft an 
email response to the media enquiry. Whilst this reporter claims to be a health 
journalist, they have misreported information before. Make sure your response is 
factual. 
Resources for task: 
 WHO MERS-CoV summary and literature update as of 20 January 2014 – contains 
information of the 2 probable cases of MERS-CoV reported in Spain - 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/coronavirus_infections/MERS_CoV_Update_20_Jan
_2014.pdf?ua=1 
 Attachment F: Dealing with media inquiries  
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Attachment A: Department of Health - Middle East respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) Situation update 31 
October 2013 
What’s new 
 Updated case numbers 
Key points 
 As of 29 October 2013, the WHO had received reports of 145 laboratory-confirmed 
cases of MERS-CoV, including 62 deaths.  
 All cases have had a history of residence in or travel to the Middle East, or contact 
with travellers returning from these areas. There have been no cases in Australia.  
 Most patients have presented with or later developed severe acute respiratory 
symptoms. Mild flu-like illnesses and asymptomatic cases have also been reported. 
 The WHO states that there is currently no evidence indicating transmission of 
MERS-CoV from asymptomatic infected individuals and no evidence of ongoing, 
low-prevalence, mildly symptomatic illness in the community. 
 Person-to-person transmission of the virus has occurred in clusters, including 
healthcare settings. Lapses in infection control may have allowed the virus to 
spread in health care settings in Saudi Arabia. 
 The Hajj occurred in Saudi Arabia from 13 to 18 October 2013. 
 
Figure: WHO-confirmed cases and probable cases of MERS-CoV, by month and year 
of onset (or month of reporting if the onset date is unknown).(1-3) 
Actions taken to date and next steps 
- The IHR Emergency Committee on MERS-CoV convened by the WHO Director 
General is chaired by Australia’s Chief Medical Officer. The committee has met 
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three times, most recently on 25 September 2013, and has determined that as of 
that date, the conditions were not met for the outbreak of MERS-CoV to be a public 
health emergency of international concern. The committee offered the Director 
General a range of technical advice, including on improvements in surveillance, the 
importance of infection control, travel-related guidance, improved data collection, 
and the need to ensure timely and full reporting.(4) 
- Information on MERS-CoV for consumers, for clinicians, labs and public health 
personnel and for GPs can be accessed from the the Department's website - 
(www.health.gov.au/MERS-coronavirus). 
- The Chief Medical Officer held a teleconference with relevant medical Colleges and 
peak medical bodies to raise awareness on 4 June 2013. 
- The Department is working with states and territories through the Australian Health 
Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC) and its standing committees. 
- The Public Health Laboratory Network provided advice on the availability of testing 
for MERS-CoV in Australia. Suitable PCR-based tests are available to diagnose the 
infection if required. Serological tests for MERS-CoV are not currently available in 
Australia. 
- The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has updated the 
Smartraveller advice for Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan 
to include information about the outbreak. DFAT has also issued a bulletin for 
Pilgrims travelling to the Hajj this year, including information about the risk of 
MERS-CoV. The advice is available from DFAT’s website: 
(www.smartraveller.gov.au/) 
- Information cards on MERS-CoV for travellers have been distributed through travel 
agents who are authorised to book for the Hajj. 
- Posters and electronic signage have been positioned at primary screening areas of 
all international airports, to advise travellers returning from the Middle East of the 
signs and symptoms of MERS-CoV and to see a doctor or go to hospital if they 
have, or develop, these signs or symptoms. The posters and electronic signage will 
be displayed from 8 October to 10 November 2013. 
- Advice on surveillance options has been developed in conjunction with CDNA. 
Next steps 
Advice to clinicians, public health personnel and laboratories, and advice for GPs on 
MERS-CoV was updated and reissued during the week of 14-18 October, just prior to 
the return of Pilgrims from the Hajj. 
Epidemiological update 
As of 29 October 2013, 145 laboratory-confirmed cases had been reported by the 
WHO world-wide since the first cases were reported in September 2012.(1) The first 
cases had onsets in March and April 2012, while the majority of cases occurred 
between April and September 2013. Most confirmed cases have been in residents of 
Saudi Arabia (117 cases).  Sixty-two cases have died, and the case fatality rate is 
43%.(1) As of 29 October 2013, at least 56% of confirmed cases had underlying 
conditions (in some cases multiple underlying conditions) that may have made them 
more susceptible.(1, 5)  Cases with severe symptoms have tended to be older, male 
and with underlying conditions, whilst mild and asymptomatic cases have tended to be 
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of a range of ages, including children, and without underlying conditions.(6) The 
median age of confirmed cases with a known age is 50 years. 
All cases have a history of residence in or travel to the Middle East, or contact with 
travellers returning from these areas. The infection has occurred in the community 
(sporadic cases with unknown exposure), in families (contact with infected family 
members) and in health care facilities (patients and healthcare workers, multiple 
generations of transmission) from whence the majority of cases have been reported. 
Further information 
The latest case counts and documents related to MERS-CoV are available from the 
WHO: 
 Coronavirus infections – (www.who.int/csr/disease/coronavirus_infections/en/) 
The WHO has issued updated recommendations for laboratory testing: 
 Laboratory Testing for Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus – 
(www.who.int/csr/disease/coronavirus_infections/en/) 
The WHO has issued advice to travellers on MERS-CoV: 
 Middle East respiratory syndrome - coronavirus (MERS-CoV) – Update – 
(www.who.int/ith/updates/20130605/en/index.html) 
CDNA advice to clinicians, laboratories and public health personnel and to GPs, as well 
as a fact sheet for consumers/patients and an epidemiological summary are available 
from: 
 the Department's website – (www.health.gov.au/mers-coronavirus) 
The Ministry of Health recommendations about the Hajj can be found at: 
 Health Regulations for travellers to Saudi Arabia for Umrah& Pilgrimage (Hajj)-
1434 (2013) (http://www.moh.gov.sa/en/Hajj/Pages/HealthRegulations.aspx) 
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Attachment B: MERS-CoV Travellers Cards 
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Attachment C: Australian banner for placement at airport MERS CoV 
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Attachment D: Guide to Question Time and Question Time Briefs 
What is Question Time? 
Question Time occurs in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.  It 
presents an opportunity for members and senators to direct questions to the 
Government on issues of policy and administration. 
“Question Time provides an opportunity for Ministers to display their political skills and 
to portray their stewardship of government in a positive light.  Other Members, 
especially the opposition shadow ministry, through skilled questioning, hope to reveal 
weaknesses in the performance of Ministers and represent themselves as an 
alternative government.  Thus Question Time can be seen as the Government and the 
alternative government both seeking to demonstrate to the House and to the public that 
their ability to govern is better than that of their opponents – an important part of 
responsible government and the political process.” 
 House of Representatives Infosheet 1, Department of the House of 
Representatives,  January 2013 
While there are no legislative or constitutional rules mandating the occurrence or 
conduct of question time, it is usually held on all sitting days – in both houses – from 
approximately 2pm for a period of one hour or more. 
Due to the adversarial nature of proceedings, Question Time tends to focus on the high 
profile, or ‘headline’, issues of the day.  Questions of a more detailed nature, or on 
issues with a lower profile, are generally directed to the Government in writing. 
A question asked during Question Time, even if taken on notice, is NOT a 
Parliamentary Question on Notice.  Parliamentary Questions on Notice are those 
questions submitted in writing for inclusion in the notice papers.   
What is a Question Time Brief? 
A Question Time Brief (QTB) is a brief prepared to assist a Minister to respond to 
questions received during Question Time.  The brief is structured to provide key facts 
that can be used in answering the question and background information to allow the 
Minister to quickly understand the history and current status of the issue in question. 
As questioners do not provide notice of questions to be asked, unless the questioner is 
from the Minister’s own party, the Department and Ministerial offices work together to 
anticipate the issues that may be raised and prepare QTBs accordingly. 
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Drafting Question Time Briefs 
When drafting QTBs, authors should remember the purpose of the brief and the 
environment in which it will be used.  Briefs should be focused, succinct and clear.  
They should have an emphasis on providing factual information. 
The elements of a QTB are: 
QTB Number  allocated by the QTB Officer 
Title   give a brief title to highlight the issue 
Current Issue  briefly describe the relevant issues and media context 
Key Facts  Include funding/ key achievements facts etc. 
Minister’s  Response lines for the Minister to use as a response to 
questions. 
Response Lines These will be short factual statements to be drafted by the 
Department, but may be amended/supplemented by the 
Minister’s office 
Background  Further information to provide background to the issue 
Style Use plain English, keep wording simple and succinct avoid 
technical jargon 
Spell difficult or technical words phonetically 
Write in short, factual dot points in a logical order – putting the 
most important points first 
Do not write in speech-like terms 
Ensure information is accurate – misleading Parliament  could 
lead to the Minister being impeached 
Do not use acronyms without first explaining them 
Contact details Ensure appropriate contact/clearance details are noted in the 
brief. 
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Additional Information 
The information below is provided by the ANU Academic Skills and Learning Centre 
and can be found here. 
What is a brief? 
 A report to someone, either written or verbal that either: 
o gives the recipient the information they need to know to make an informed decision 
– eg, approve a course of action, sign a letter, approve expenditure; or 
o provides information so the recipient is up-to-date on an issue – eg, what’s 
happened, what’s the issue now, and what needs to be done.  
 As a general rule, a brief should be limited to one or two pages. 
Coverage? 
 Advice to a Departmental Head or Minister about something they have asked for 
advice on, or 
 advice on something someone (senior) thinks they need to get advice on, or be 
informed about – eg,  an upcoming event, potential or actual problem, complaint about 
a service, or 
 background to an issue raised by a member of the public, latest media beat up, or an 
emerging issue, or 
 proposal for a new program or project, or 
 new policy or proposed change to current policy. 
To what other purposes? 
 So recipient doesn’t have to do the research and/or spend the time getting all of the 
information needed to make a decision. 
 Enables a decision to be made quickly and correctly by the decision-maker. 
The recipient should be able to rely on the brief alone – s/he should be able to make a 
decision without having to go back to the person/people who has/have provided the 
advice. 
What structure? 
 Title. 
 Background to the issue – the history, how we got to this point. 
 Current situation – what has happened that requires action or a decision now, or 
requires the recipient to be updated. 
 Comment – sometimes the background and current situation isn’t enough to tell the 
whole story, so this allows for the inclusion of extra information. 
 Recommendation – succinct statement of what you want the recipient to do. 
 Sign off – in large organisations, the brief will often have to go through several layers 
of management. Each layer needs to sign off to show that they are in agreement with 
the recommendation, or if they aren’t they can put an alternative view or add extra 
information.  
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Attachments? 
Put any additional or supporting material as an attachment to the brief. 
 The brief may be attached to a report or piece of research and may include an 
overview of the main findings and possible government response to it.  
 Ministers are usually only interested in, or only have time to scan a couple of pages. 
They rely heavily on someone else getting to grips with the contact and providing 
advice on the report, etc. 
Objective? 
A brief usually provides objective advice on what is best for the recipient. However 
clearly the writer’s opinion is being called for, since the brief tells someone what they 
should do.  
If there are a number of options, the brief should say what they are and why one option 
is being recommended ahead of the others. 
Analysis? 
 Yes – the brief needs to explain a situation, analyse what the key issues are, and 
recommend a way of dealing with them. 
 The complexity of the issue will determine how much analysis there needs to be. 
To what extent does the brief need to take into account the wider 
political/economic context? 
 If the matter requires it, or the decision requires it, then the brief must take the wider 
context into account. 
 Certainly in the Government context, a brief should recommend action which is 
consistent with Government policy, even if another course of action may be better in an 
objective sense. 
 Another example of when it would be necessary to take into account the wider context 
is when it may be necessary to balance the merits of an individual case against the risk 
of setting a precedent, or of being inconsistent in the application of policy or procedure. 
Recommendation? 
 If action is required, then yes. 
 If the brief is just to inform, then no recommendation is needed. 
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Attachment E: Question Time Brief Template 
 
Title 
Current Issue:  
 [Two Lines/One Paragraph explanation of the current issue & contents of QTB.] 
 
Brief talking points: 
 [Headline information and statistics in bullet form] 
 [Information should be quick and easy to read and not in the form of lengthy sentences]  
 [ALL IMPORTANT INFORMATION SHOULD BE CONTAINED ON PAGE 1] 
 [Any Amendments to QTBs should be changed to red text] 
 [This section should be no more than 2/3 of the page]  
 
**SUFFICIENT SPACE ON PAGE 1 MUST BE AVAILABLE FOR THE MINISTER’S 
RESPONSE LINES** 
Key Facts: 
 [Response lines for the Minister to use as a response to questions raised] 
 [This should be additional information not already mentioned above] 
 [These will be short factual statements to be drafted by the Department, but may be 
amended/supplemented by the Minister’s office] 
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Background: 
 [Any relevant background information that may be useful to the Minister] 
 [Any technical explanations (only when absolutely necessary)] 
 [Should still be contained in Bullet/Short sentence form] 
 [Should be limited to the 2nd page of the QTB] 
 [This section can be left blank if no additional information needs to be provided] 
 
Contact Officer: 
insert your name here 
Phone:  0X XXXX XXXX 
Clearance Officer: 
Your boss' name 
Phone:  0X XXXX XXXX 
Date Created: [XX Month XXXX] 
Updated on: [XX Month XXXX] 
Last Reviewed: [XX Month XXXX] 
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Attachment F: Dealing with media inquiries 
Media inquiries are an everyday occurrence and how they are handled directly affects 
the department’s public image. All media inquiries in the first instance must be referred 
directly to the Media Unit. Ministers or their staff are the principal spokespersons, and 
ministers may determine that all media inquiries on a certain subject are to be handled 
by their offices. 
Who may speak to the media 
Only staff in the Media Unit speak directly to media - any staff who may receive contact 
from the media must refer them to the Media Unit. The only authorised spokespeople 
for the Department are the Secretary, the Chief Medical Officer, State Managers and 
Heads of portfolio agencies as required. In all instances, the Media Unit facilitates this 
media contact and approval is sought from the Secretary on all occasions. 
Media Responses 
Staff at any time may be called upon to provide draft responses to media inquiries. 
These will be forwarded to program area staff by your Divisional Business 
Management Unit (BMU) and all responses must go back to the Media Unit, via the 
BMU. 
Clearance 
The appropriate First Assistant Secretary must clear all responses that are developed 
by program areas, before they are forwarded to the Media Unit. This will be handled by 
the Divisional BMU 
Additional Information 
The information below is taken from Section 4.3 Prepare Targeted Messages, of the 
WHO Handbook Effective Media Communication during Public Health Emergencies 
and can be found here. 
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Summary guidelines for simplifying interviews, presentations and 
messages 
Meet the audience more than halfway 
 the higher the level of stress, fear or anxiety, the greater the need to simplify the 
language and to carefully structure communications; 
 use the readability utility included with most word-processing software to measure 
the readability level of the information; and 
 aim to produce messages that are easily understood by the target audience. 
Use clear language 
 provide no more than 3 message points or ideas at a time; 
 use simple and correct grammar; 
 use short sentences;  
 be careful when providing numbers – these can easily be misinterpreted or 
misunderstood; and 
 avoid the use of jargon, acronyms and new terms, and: 
o define new terms so that the target audience can understand them 
o use short sentences to define new terms 
o provide a glossary 
o introduce the concept before introducing a new term or explain the new term 
soon after using it 
o if possible, ask the audience to identify terms that are not understood 
o check frequently for understanding 
o use new terms only if it is important for the target audience to know and 
remember them 
o be careful when using technical words that have a different meaning from 
their common usage. 
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Appendix 2: Model example – ministerial briefing 
MIDDLE EAST RESPIRATORY SYNDROME 
CORONAVIRUS – POSSIBLE AUSTRLIAN CASES 
 
Current Issue:  
 The Victorian Health Department have notified the Office of Health Protection of two 
Australian’s returning from the Hajj Pilgrimage in the Middle East who have been 
hospitalised with severed pneumonia. 
 As of 29 October 2013 the WHO has reported a total of 145 confirmed cases of 
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) with 62 deaths world-
wide.  
 
Brief talking points:  
 I am aware that two Australians have been hospitalised with severe pneumonia 
after returning from the Middle East. 
 Investigations are underway to confirm the cause of illness in these two people. 
 We are trying to identify all those who may have come into contact with these two. 
 I am aware that the WHO has reported several clusters of MERS-CoV infection 
overseas, all of which are linked to the Middle East. 
 This is obviously a serious infection but I understand that most confirmed cases of 
MERS-CoV infection have occurred in people hospitalised with a range of 
underlying illnesses. 
 The Australian Government is continuing to monitor this situation and share what 
we know with the states and territories. 
Key Facts: 
 The two people hospitalised are both male (aged 73 and 25) who returned to 
Australia on a flight from the Middle East. Confirmatory test results are due back 
within the week. 
 These two were part of a group of six who attended the Hajj Pilgrimage from the 13 
to 18 October 2013.  
 The National Incident Room is coordinating the tracing of all those who may have 
come into contact with these with people. Travellers returning from the Middle East 
with signs and symptoms of MERS-CoV should see a doctor or go to hospital and 
mention that they have travelled. 
 The Public Health Laboratory Network of Australia has advised that appropriate 
laboratory testing is available in Australia. 
 The World Health Organization (WHO) first reported cases of a novel coronavirus, 
now referred to as MERS-CoV (previously referred to as novel coronavirus) in 
September 2012.  
 The WHO is providing regular updates on this outbreak, and continues to provide 
advice on risk assessment, detecting and investigating cases and clinical 
management. 
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 The WHO has expressed an increasing level of concern over MERS-CoV citing it at 
the World Health Assembly as the greatest global concern, requiring urgent 
international attention due to the lack of understanding about its epidemiology. 
 Infections with MERS-CoV have typically included moderate to severe pneumonia, 
which has been fatal in 43 per cent of cases.  
 All cases have involved people who have lived in or travelled to the Middle-East, or 
their close contacts. 
 Clusters have occurred in healthcare settings, but there has been no evidence of 
sustained human-to-human transmission of the virus. 
 The Chief Medical Officer has met with relevant medical Colleges and peak medical 
bodies to raise awareness about MERS-CoV. Advice to clinicians, public health 
personnel and laboratories, and advice for GPs on MERS-CoV has been updated 
and reissued. 
 The department has produced information cards on MERS-CoV have been 
distributed through travel agents who are authorised to book for the Hajj. Posters 
and electronic signage have been positioned at primary screening areas of all 
international airports, to advise travellers returning from the Middle East of the signs 
and symptoms of MERS-CoV. 
 The department has been liaising with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT) to update the Smartraveller advice for Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates and Jordan to include information about MERS-CoV. 
 Further planning and preparedness measures will be undertaken in the Office of 
Health Protection. 
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Background: 
All MERS-CoV infections have been associated with the Middle East. The countries in 
which cases have been acquired locally from an unknown source are Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Cases that have been imported, or 
occurred in contacts of returning travellers have been reported by the United Kingdom, 
France, Italy, Germany and Tunisia. 
The infection has occurred in; the community (sporadic cases with unknown exposure), 
in families (contact with infected family members) and in health care facilities (patients 
and healthcare workers).  
The infection has predominantly been reported in people with underlying conditions 
that predispose them to respiratory infection.  Cases with severe symptoms have 
tended to be older males. 
The first reported case of MERS-CoV world-wide was in June 2012 in a patient who 
lived in Saudi Arabia and who died from pneumonia and renal failure. 
Origin of the virus 
Coronaviruses are a family that includes the viruses that cause severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) and the common cold.  The novel virus is distinct from 
the virus which caused SARS in 2003, and from other previously described 
coronaviruses in humans, but similar to coronaviruses previously isolated from 
insectivorous bats.   
 
Contact Officer: 
Timothy Sloan-Gardner 
Phone: (02) 6289 2377 
Clearance Officer: 
Assistant Secretary 
Phone:  (02) 6289 XXXX 
Date Created:  6 November 2013 
Updated on: 6 November 2013 
Last Reviewed: 6 November 2013 
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Appendix 3: Model example – media response 
DEPARTMENTAL MEDIA 
RESPONSE 
DATE:  6 November 2013 
TOPIC:  New SARS virus in Australia 
MEDIA:  Sydney Morning Herald 
Hi there, 
I'm a health journalist at the Sydney Morning Herald and I'm looking into reports of 2 
people with this new SARS virus in Victoria. 
I have several questions: 
1. It is true that there are two people in hospital in Victoria with this new SARS virus?  
2. What is the Australian Government doing about the passengers who were exposed 
on the same flight as these two? 
3. Are these cases related to Spain’s two cases that were linked to the Hajj Pilgrimage? 
The deadline for this information is COB today. Who can I call to have a quick informal 
phone chat to about this? 
 
Thank you very much. 
V. Con Cerned 
Health Journalist 
The Sydney Morning Herald 
Answers to questions: 
1. It is true that there are two people in hospital in Victoria with this new SARS virus? 
Two people have been hospitalised with severe pneumonia in Victoria after returning to 
Australia on a flight from the Middle East. The cause of illness in these two people is 
still unknown. 
2. What is the Australian Government doing about the passengers who were exposed 
on the same flight as these two? 
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The Australian Government is continuing to monitor this situation and share what we 
know with the states and territories. Travellers who feel unwell on return to Australia 
should see a doctor or go to hospital. 
3. Are these cases related to Spain’s two cases that were linked to the Hajj Pilgrimage? 
The two cases in Spain had also travelled to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage, 
though neither has been laboratory confirmed. Both recovered and were discharged 
from hospital. 
All media enquiries must be directed through the departmental media unit. Please 
contact them on 02 6289 7400 or email news@health.gov.au. 
 
Branch:  Health Emergency Management Branch 
Contact Officer: Timothy Sloan-Gardner 
Phone Numbers: 02 6289 2377 
Date:   6 November 2013 
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Appendix 4: Teaching day schedule 
Activity Start Finish Length 
Introduction 09:00 09:05 00:05 
Selection and Measurement Bias 09:05 09:45 00:40 
Critical appraisal 09:45 10:25 00:40 
Break 10:25 10:40 00:15 
Interpreting time series data 10:40 11:30 00:50 
Risk Assessment 11:30 12:10 00:40 
Wrap up and Student Evaluation 12:10 12:30 00:20 
Peer feedback 12:30 13:00 00:30 
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Appendix 5: Critical appraisal presentation 
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Appendix 6: Group exercise guide for MAE teaching exercise 
Critically appraising a paper 
CASP Guidelines 
 
Learning objectives 
After completing this exercise, including the associated presentation, students will 
have the skills and ability to: 
• describe what is critical appraisal; 
• explain why critical appraisal is important; 
• recognise the CASP critical appraisal framework;  
• recognised where to look in a paper to answer the framework questions that 
specifically look at potential sources of selection and measurement bias; and  
• appraise the value of a paper and assess any public health implications 
arising from it. 
Developing team work is a further objective 
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Contents 
Group exercise guide for MAE teaching exercise 1 
Critically appraising a paper 1 
Learning objectives 2 
Overview 4 
Scenario 5 
Group work 5 
Question 1 6 
Question 2 6 
Question 3 7 
Question 4 8 
Question 5 9 
Question 6 11 
 
Overview 
Organisation of the exercise: 
 Divide into 2 groups of 4-6 participants 
 There will be roving facilitators to answer questions and keep you on track 
 This session should take you approximately 20 minutes 
 Once completed we will come back together as a whole group and discuss the 
exercise. 
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Scenario 
You are in your workplace beavering away at your scholarly work when you supervisor 
approaches. They present you with a paper titled “Incidence and risk factors for acute 
respiratory illnesses and influenza virus infections in Australian travellers to Asia” by 
Irani Ratnam (1). 
Your supervisor explains that the Minister has gotten wind of this paper and is 
concerned about the implications for travel to Asia, given the sensitive political situation 
with Indonesia at the moment.  
You are asked to read the paper and determine if the findings in the paper are valid. 
Specifically, your supervisor particularly wants you to focus on any potential biases in 
the paper. You have 20 minutes to report back to your supervisor as they have to go to 
a briefing with the Minister. 
You have read the paper, and decide you need a framework with which to critically 
appraise the paper in order to report back to your supervisor. You remember being 
taught about the CASP framework during your MAE course block and decide to use 
that. 
Group work 
In your group, answer the following CASP framework questions specifically relating to 
potential biases: 
 
Reference 
1. Ratnam I, Black J, Leder K, Biggs BA, Gordon I, Matchett E, et al. Incidence 
and risk factors for acute respiratory illnesses and influenza virus infections in 
Australian travellers to Asia. Journal of clinical virology : the official publication of the 
Pan American Society for Clinical Virology. 2013;57(1):54-8. Epub 2013/02/06. 
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Question 1 
In broad terms, what is the study about?  
For example, is it about the natural history of a disease, magnitude of a problem, 
cause-effect relationship, or evaluation? 
What is the paper about? 
Our primary objectives were to (i) estimate the overall incidence density of 
ARIs (ii) estimate the incidence density of confirmed influenza virus infections 
in Australian travellers to Asia and (iii) identify the risk factors associated with 
ARIs. 
 
Where in the paper would you look to answer this question? 
2. Objectives 
 
What are they trying to do, descriptive epidemiology of an outbreak, determine risk 
factors, evaluate something, literature review, establish cause-effect relationships? 
Determine incidence and risk factors 
 
Question 2 
What is the study type? Is this study type appropriate to answer the research 
question/s? Why? Is there an alternative study type that is ideal for addressing the 
research questions/objectives?  
Where in the paper would you look to answer this question? 
3. Study Design 
 
What study type did they conduct? (Cohort, Case-Control, review, qualitative research, 
etc.) Did they use the right one?  
Prospective cohort study over  3.5 years 
Already have a defined population/cohort and selection is based on exposure 
(travel to Asia) and age (over 16) and duration of stay overseas (minimum 7 
days).  
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Able to assess multiple outcomes and exposures to cohort study therefore it 
was appropriate. 
Question 3 
Who constitutes the study population (‘study base’ for a case control study) 
Consider various levels in the process of selecting the study population, e.g. reference 
population, source population, sampling frame and sampling methods. Who constitutes 
the control group (if relevant) 
Where in the paper would you look to answer this question? 
3. Study Design 
 
Who/what is the population being studied? Any potential selection biases? 
Australian travellers over 16 years of age intending to travel to countries within 
Asia only between August 2007 and January 2010 who attended one of three 
travel clinics – Royal Melbourne Hospital, The Travel Doctor/Travellers 
Medication and Vaccination Centre and Monash Medical Centre.  
Travellers over the age of 16 years and intending to travel to countries within 
Asia (only) for a minimum duration of 7 days were eligible to participate. 
Potential biases 
 Selection bias: Those attending travel clinics more likely to be health 
conscious (health seeking behaviours); How many people travelling to 
Asia actually visits a travel clinic? What about those who visit GP 
consultations? There is a belief that TMVC etc. only push the flu vaccine 
to make more money (?). Also only looked at Melbourne travel clinics yet 
refer to results being for all of Australia. What about WA/NT with more 
travellers to Bali? 
 Cost of consultation – TMVC is not cheap!  
 Locations of clinics – two in CBD, one in SE Suburbs; two within 
hospitals 
 Blood samples taken pre and post travel – potential to for non-
participation due to needle aversion (only 68.58% of eligible travellers 
agreed to participate) 
 Length of stay overseas – potentially missing those who went for shorter 
period?  
 Risk of lost-to-follow-up 
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Question 4 
What are the outcome factors? Have operational definitions been provided? (use 
appropriate terms such as: ‘validity’, ‘reproducibility’, ‘blinding of observers’, quality 
control’)? 
What is an “outcome factor”?  
The “dependant variable” or “response variable” – the outcome being studied 
 
What are the outcome factors? Have operational definitions been provided? 
The development of ARIs within 72hrs of return from trip 
 
Where in the paper would you look to answer this question? 
3. Study Design, specifically 3.2 and 3.3 
 
Look for operation/case definitions, is there potential for selection bias (e.g. 
misclassification of cases and controls/ill and not ill). 
Inclusion Criteria 
ARIs defined as illness episodes involving the presences of at least two of: 
 Fever  
 sore-throat,  
 headache,  
 cough,  
 coryza,  
 myalgia  
with at least one being a respiratory symptom (cough, coryza, and sore-throat) 
up to 72 hours after return to Australia. 
ILI defined according to CDC criteria as fever plus either cough or sore throat – 
validated criteria 
Confirmed influenza virus infection defined as seroconversion to influenza A/B 
and a clinically compatible illness consistent with ARI/ILI and/or a positive 
RT/PCT for Influenza A/B – validated testing 
Positive PCR for respiratory virus from swab sample 
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Exclusion criteria 
Travellers who reported already suffering from an ARI at the time of departure 
from Australia were not considered as ARIs related to travel. 
 
Potential biases 
Doesn’t take into account those who were exposed on planes/transit who 
developed ARI/ILIs whilst on holiday 
Well defined criteria so low chance of misclassification. Broad case definition 
so good capture. 
Table 1 lists ‘recent travel’ as a variable, which is clarified in the paper as 
recent international travel. This would be a given, seeing as to be recruited you 
would have to have been travelling. 
 
Question 5 
What are the study factors? Have operational definitions been provided? (use 
appropriate terms such as: ‘validity’, ‘reproducibility’, ‘blinding of observers’, quality 
control’)?  
What is “study factor”? 
The independent variable is also known as a “exposure variable” or “risk 
factor" 
 
Where in the paper would you look to answer this question? 
3. Study design, 4. Statistical Analysis and 5. Results 
 
Have the operational definitions been provided? 
Yes, see table 1 “variable” 
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What are the potential biases in the study factors? 
Interview conducted with validated pre- and post-travel questionnaires so good 
internal validity. No mention if interviewers were trained or blinded to study 
aims so potential bias could be introduced. 
Blood samples taken pre- and post- travel with testing carried out using 
validated methods. The methods only list some of the pathogens that can 
cause ARI/ILI that were tested for would have been good to have a complete 
list. What about pathogens not tested for? (e.g. bocavirus, coronaviruses, 
enteroviruses, metapneumovirus, avian influenza, rhinoviruses, respiratory 
syncytial viruses, and non-viral pathogens) 
Samples taken up to 8 days AFTER return to Australia (3 days for phone call 
then 3-5 days for sample to be taken) – capability of actually detecting virus?! 
Red book says up to 5 days of shedding after ONSET of symptoms… The 
sensitivity of this study design is appalling.  
Unable to detect virus of illness for those who were ill whilst away (excepting 
influenza seroconversion) – 109 travellers experienced at least one illness 
whilst away/on return. What about illness acquired in-flight as opposed to in-
country? 
Conducted regression analysis (Cox’s proportional hazards regression) which 
controls for cofounders and duration of travel. Appeared to look at age in 10 
year age groups, but not well explained in paper. Would expect to see more 
younger males travelling to countries within Asia.  
Mentions that country is a “time-dependent covariates”? Short-term travel is 
defined as less than 30 days in the results but not explained in the methods 
(post hoc definition?)  
Why would the baseline be Australia? If the recruitment is based on those 
visiting travel clinics with the intention of travelling to countries within Asia, 
how would you then have people only travelling within Australia and could 
these be a large enough population for the model?  
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Question 6 
Would you agree with how the study was designed, the population chosen etc? 
Why/Why not?  Would you have performed the study in the same way?  
What would you have changed? Comments regarding 
results/findings/discussion/conclusions made?  
In order to study what they wanted and easily recruit a study population the 
design was fine, however there are a few limitations of the design and 
population chosen and these are not discussed in the paper. 
Additionally it should be noted that the work was supported by Sanofi-Pasteur, 
a vaccine company. Who would potentially make money from a finding 
recommending the use of more vaccines/antivirals for travellers… 
The paper claims that they demonstrate that influenza still remains the most 
frequent vaccine-preventable infection in travellers to Asia. The study only 
contained 387 people with completed demographic and serological data, of 
which 4 (1%) were positive for influenza. Not sure they can make this claim 
seeing as they didn’t test for other vaccine-preventable diseases (i.e. measles).  
“The occurrence of influenza in one traveller vaccinated pre-travel may have 
been to mismatch in strains or vaccine failure” what if you were positive for an 
influenza stain not covered by the current vaccine? The effectiveness of the 
vaccine? Pushes the idea of travellers having access to antivirals – what about 
resistant strains?  
Only tested 29 for ARI PCR and only found picornavirus – usefulness of these 
results? Should this have even been included in the study? 
Only uses clinics in Melbourne – what about other jurisdictions?  
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Appendix 7: Teaching Evaluation Form 
Master of Philosophy (applied epidemiology) Scholars 2013 Cohort 
Please take a few moments to answer the following questions about each of the 
teaching sessions conducted by the MAE scholars on 7 March 2014.  There are 4 
evaluations tables, please ensure you fill in each one. 
Session xx:  
Please insert emoticon into the appropriate box:  for example       
Session  Hells yeah Sweet 
Can’t say 
could go 
either way 
Twas not 
so good 
I don’t speak 
Dutch 
 Information well presented       
 Meet sessions objectives       
 Speed was appropriate       
 Materials/Handouts were useful      
 Power‐point slides were useful      
 Case study       
Presenters Hells yeah Sweet 
Can’t say 
could go 
either way 
Twas not 
so good 
I don’t speak 
Dutch 
 Explained points clearly      
 Made the session interesting      
 Answered questions well      
 Knowledgeable in content areas      
 Presented well      
Overall rating  
Poor Fair Good 
Very 
Good 
Excellent 
 Overall rating for the session      
 
Do you have any further comments regarding the session:  
__________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________ 
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Appendix 8: Peer Evaluation Form 
Master of Philosophy (applied epidemiology) Scholars 2013 Cohort 
Teaching session topic: 
Name of person being evaluated: 
Evaluation prompts 
Session content Questions for the person being evaluated to answer 
 What do you think went well?   
 
 
 What do you think could have 
gone better?  
 
 
 
 What would you do differently 
next time?  
 
 
 
Delivery Questions for the evaluator to answer 
 What did the person do well?  
 
 
 What could the person 
improve on? 
 
 
 
Overall rating  
(interpretations) 
What’s 
an Epi? 
(Poor) 
I didn’t fall 
asleep 
(Fair) 
I learnt 
stuff 
(Good) 
Fist 
pump 
(Very 
Good) 
Want a job at 
NCEPH? 
(Excellent) 
 Overall rating for the session      
 
Further comments:  
_________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________ 
